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This thesis investigates the implementation of two land titling projects offering interim and full 
statutory property rights in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As in many other African cities, these 
projects encounter severe challenges of implementation and the land management remains 
predominantly informal. This work examines how local institutions, social relations and public 
authority affect the transition to formal property. The thesis is composed of four papers drawing 
on interdisciplinary literature and an innovative combination of methods. Papers 1 and 2 
examine how social relations influence the demand for interim property rights. Using 
econometric analysis of administrative data, paper 1 finds evidence of neighbourhood effects 
suggesting that neighbours influence their early choices of formalisation. Through institutional 
analysis and primary survey data, paper 2 concludes that coordination is the result of an 
informal institution: a descriptive norm that prescribes formalisation conditional on the 
behaviour and advice of others. Papers 3 and 4 interrogate the role of the local public authority 
for the construction of and the transition to formal property. Based on in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic data, paper 3 shows that local leaders are essential to legitimise and operationalise 
the formal property apparatus, specifically the cadastral map and database. Drawing on two lab-
in-the-field experiments, paper 4 suggests that leaders hold accurate knowledge on the local 
demand for full statutory rights, which could be leveraged to inform better pricing strategies. 
Overall, the thesis contributes to an institutional approach to land tenure formalisation by 
quantifying and qualifying how endogenous social interactions mediate the transition to formal 
property. In so doing, the study adds to literature on the implementation of urban land titling 
policies, the demand for land titles and the formality-informality nexus in developing cities. 
Furthermore, the thesis provides policy recommendations of current relevance as urban 
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1.1 Research framework  
1.1.1 Policies of land tenure formalisation: challenges and open questions 
With roughly 1 billion people living in unplanned settlements worldwide, over forty 
international organisations and many developing countries promote land registration to alleviate 
poverty and enable urban development. Economic theory predicts that formal titles will 
stimulate private and public investment by enabling land and credit markets (De Soto, 2000). In 
dense urban areas, formal property rights might be necessary to coordinate land use planning 
and infrastructural provision (Bryan et al., 2019). Other studies illuminate wider potential 
benefits of formal tenure, for example in relation to gendered land inequality (Dancer, 2015). 
However, these policies are controversial and complex to implement. First, they pursue 
conflicting goals producing tensions between actors with diverse interests (Boone, 2019). 
Second, formalisation initiatives often find low demand, fail to achieve their intended outcomes, 
and end up exacerbating pre-existing inequalities (Payne et al., 2009). In fact, critical urban 
theory underscores the exclusionary effects of private property (Harvey, 2013). In much of the 
Global South, the production of private property is the main cause of dispossession and 
displacement of the poor (Ghertner, 2014).  
 
Land registration is not a panacea for urban development and poverty alleviation. Prior studies 
have defined and contributed to four main areas of research on formalisation policies. First, why 
is there low demand for land titles in much of urban Africa? Depending on contexts, choices of 
formalisation might be the result of cost-benefit considerations, whereby the costs of 
formalisation are too high compared to perceived benefits. Yet, there might be more complex 
motivations beyond a mere cost-benefit calculation (e.g. low information, social norms, peer-
effects, behavioural responses). Second, challenges of programme implementation, which are 
both technical and political. These arise at all levels of politics, from the local to the national 
government and above. Third, outcomes of formalisation programmes. I note that these might 
be difficult to study as many titling projects have failed in the implementation phase or have not 
sufficiently scaled up. Fourth, what forms of property rights fit specific contexts? Most titling 
projects propose one-size-fits-all solutions: land titles designed on the Western model of private 
freehold or leasehold. This limited view might obfuscate alternative options to improve informal 




1.1.2 An institutional approach to property rights  
“Land tenure regimes are property regimes that define the manner and terms under which 
rights in land are granted, held, enforced, contested, and transferred. In all political 
economies, property rights lie at the confluence of the political-legal order and the 
economic order” (Boone, 2014: 4). 
Understood as a system of rules, norms, and strategies of behaviour, property rights are 
institutions regulating social life by defining expectations about other people’s behaviour 
(Bicchieri, 2006). Indeed, numerous scholars have looked at property rights reform and land 
titling projects from an institutional perspective, including, for example, the seminal work of 
Ostrom (2005). Some features of property rights institutions are worth noticing. First, as 
mentioned in the quote above, property rights establish and regulate relations: social relations of 
access and use of resources, economic relations of production and distribution of wealth, and 
political relations between the claimers and the enforcers of rights (Boone, 2014: 5). Second, 
they exist in a variety of forms, including written laws or oral traditions. Thus, the “absence of 
familiar property institutions … does not mean absence of institutions” (Boone, 2018: 65). From 
this perspective, unplanned settlements are not ‘institutionless’. In fact, they may be governed 
through ‘social contracts’ or “ententes that stabilised around rules and procedures” (p. 67). 
Third, property rights are locally embedded and not easily transferable across contexts. As 
Peters (2009: 1322) famously put it, land tenure cannot be separated from its social, cultural and 
political-economic matrices. Indeed, land tenure institutions emerge and evolve endogenously 
through forces inherent to both state and social structures (Boone, 2018). In response to any 
intended ‘institutional fix’: 
 “[the] context will go far in shaping the practical meanings, uses and effectiveness of 
new regulatory structures and laws” (Boone et al., 2019: 216). 
Thus, land tenure institutions are the product of conflict and negotiation between central rulers, 
elites and ordinary people. This underscores the need for well-functioning formalisation policies 
to fit to contexts and meet the local demand for specific functions and forms of property rights. 
 
1.1.3 Overview of research objectives and questions 
Drawing on the notions above, this PhD understands formalisation policies as moments of 
institutional transition mediated by the local context of implementation. These policies do not 
occur in an institutional vacuum, and rather promote institutional shifts, from the local social 
contract to formal law. Along this process, pre-existing institutions affect the pace and the mode 
of transition to formal property. Indeed, formalisation policies trigger interactions and tensions 
between new and old institutions. Because institutions are defined, monitored and enforced 
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through social interactions (Bicchieri, 2006), these will negotiate the institutional transition to, 
and the construction of, formal property.  
 
The pilot programmes of regularisation and formalisation of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, which 
are described below in sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, present some common challenges of titling 
programmes, in that they have registered moderate uptake of Certificates of Right of Occupancy 
(CRO) and Residential Licences (RL) respectively. Even if the government has eased access to 
land titles by coordinating processes of plot identification, town planning and surveying at scale, 
we observe relatively low demand for statutory property rights in Dar es Salaam. This thesis 
will investigate how social relations with the local community and the public authority affect 
choices and processes of tenure formalisation in this context.  
 
Thus, this thesis pursues two main objectives. First, it identifies, quantifies and qualifies the role 
of social interactions in the transition to formal property. Second, it examines whether social 
interactions can be leveraged to improve the current projects of formalisation.  
 
This thesis is comprised of four independent papers that as a whole address the following 
questions: 
1. Is formal tenure socially accepted? To what extent has it embedded in the local context? 
2. Do social interactions mediate choices of formalisation? If so, how and to what extent? 
3. Do social interactions mediate the process of formalisation? If so, how and to what extent? 
4. How can social interactions help to improve the current formalisation projects? 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will present the research context starting with an overview of 
the Tanzanian land law reform. This will be followed by details on the incremental approach to 
tenure regularisation through the issuance of full and interim property rights. I will then 
illustrate the dynamics of urbanisation and unplanned settlements development in Dar es 
Salaam, comparing this context to other cities in Tanzania and Sub-Saharan Africa. Next, I will 
provide a summary of this PhD including overviews of individual chapters, fieldwork areas, and 
contributions. Finally, I will discuss the ethical considerations of this research. The chapter will 
conclude by underscoring the limitations of this work and by outlining related research and 
ways forward. 
 
1.2 Research Context 
1.2.1 The Tanzanian Land Law Reform  
Modern-day land tenure in Tanzania cannot be understood outside its historical roots. Under 
German colonisation, all land was vested in the Empire except for private or community land 
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where ownership could be proved. The 1895 Imperial Ordinance effectively alienated ‘un-
owned’ lands, centralising its control to the colonial Governor who granted freeholds to largely 
European and non-native settlers, whilst natives were granted ‘permissive rights of occupation’. 
Since native rural land was considered ‘un-owned’ it became property of the colonial state, 
whereas in urban Dar es Salaam, natives were easily removed since few could prove ownership. 
Continuing the urban/rural and native/non-native divides imposed under German rule, British 
colonisation from 1919 “fleshed out” a ‘dual system’ of land tenure and land administration 
(Mercer, 2021) wherein settlers were governed by imported British law while natives were 
subject to customary law overseen by native authorities (Mamdani, 1996). The 1923 Land 
Ordinance declared all land ‘public’, except for existing freeholds. Statutory land tenure was 
available to all urban dwellers through ‘granted rights of occupancy’ and freeholds. A 1928 
amendment extended ‘deemed rights of occupancy’ to natives in rural areas, under customary 
law. 
 
Although this was apparently done for “the common benefit… of the natives” (URT, 1994), 
Kironde (1994) argues that, despite their statutory status, deemed rights were inferior, 
effectively excluding natives from granted and private property rights – particularly in urban 
areas. Crucially, the British felt that tribal Africans were rural dwellers, not adaptable to urban 
life. Thus, their occupation of townships was strongly resisted (Burton, 2005). In Dar es Salaam, 
racial zoning segregated natives to outside the city centre to where ‘native-style’ dwellings were 
permitted. Furthermore, Government housing provision never attempted to keep pace with 
native rural-urban migration, deeming it a waste of money (ibid). Thus, although it was legally 
possible for natives to acquire urban land and housing, it was practically implausible (Kironde, 
1994). 
 
At independence, and for almost thirty years thereafter (1961-1990), there was little drive to 
land reform, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Lipton, 2009). The post-independence 
government effectively replaced the colonial ruler as the owner of the land, which was vested in 
the President and declared ‘public’, except for freehold land. With the 1967 Arusha Declaration, 
also the latter was nationalised and converted into leasehold (McAuslan, 2013). The post-
independence government adopted explicitly anti-urban policies and continued to systematically 
under-supply housing and services, causing the uncontrolled growth of urban unplanned 
settlements in Dar es Salaam (Kironde, 1994; Kironde, 2006; Lupala, 2002). In fact, the 
masterplan of 1968 proposed slum clearance strategies through the demolition of dilapidated 
settlements and resettlement. However, the approach found scarce implementation due to 
popular resistance, and during the 1970s it was replaced by a more “humane approach” 
(MLHHSD, 2007). In 1979, a second masterplan incorporated existing unplanned areas into the 
city’s official land use fabric as residential areas. Thus, given the new emphasis on upgrading 
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and sites-and-services programmes, “Dar es Salaam of the 1970s onwards [could] rightly be 
called the city of squatters and planning schemes” (Kironde, 1994: 350). The programmes 
involved modest demolition of existing buildings and in-situ provision of basic services. 
Overall, however, all these approaches presented several shortfalls, including the displacement 
of people and their livelihood activities (MLHHSD, 2007). Furthermore, lack of stakeholder 
participation led to poor maintenance of upgraded settlements. Limited government resources, 
dependence on external funding, and lack of effective cost recovery mechanisms constituted 
obstacles to the scaling-up of upgrading initiatives. Finally, settlement upgrade did not 
systematically involve processes of land registration. Thus, these approaches failed to eradicate 
the issues of unplanned settlements or curb their growth. By the late 1990s, large swathes of 
urban land had been occupied and developed under informal, customary, or quasi-customary 
tenure arrangements.   
 
Modern-day land reform is the product of a debate initiated in the 1990s, when the President 
engaged a national Commission on land matters. This investigation resulted in the so-called 
Shivji report (URT, 1994), which focused on rural land issues concerning over 80% of the 
population, while urban tenure received less consideration. Important influences came from the 
World Bank, the UK’s DFID and, later, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy directed by 
Hernando De Soto (Manji, 2006). However, national politics also played a central and leading 
role in shaping land reform policy. For example, while Pedersen (2016) notes no evidence of 
direct interference by the World Bank in dictating the form or mode of delivering land reforms 
(for instance, through poverty reduction strategy conditionalities), Patrick McAuslan (2010) 
describes power struggles between the Ministry of Lands and the Presidential Commission, with 
the former insisting on the use of its Land Policy in writing the Land Acts rather than the 
Commission’s Land Matters report (URT, 1994). Thus, on the one hand, Tanzania constitutes 
an exemplar of the ‘new wave land reform’ of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, with multi-
lateral organisations, foreign donors and consultants variously promoting land reform as an 
essential tool for development through the marketisation, privatisation and formalisation of land 
(Manji, 2006). Yet, on the other, it also underscores the ‘polycentric’ nature of land governance 
in Tanzania involving a range of government actors at several levels seeking to influence what 
is ultimately a highly contingent and contextualised process: i.e. access to land (Pedersen, 
2016). 
 
The land reform of Tanzania culminated in the National Land Policy (NLP) of 1995 and the 
Land Acts of 1999. The NLP is based on six principles: to use and manage land in the national 
interest; to provide security of tenure and title to all citizens; to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the exercise of public power over land; to create the conditions for an efficient 
and equitable land market; to provide an appropriate legal framework for the settlement of land 
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disputes; and to increase the involvement of citizens in land management (McAuslan, 2013: 97). 
Crucially, the NLP stipulates that customary tenure is recognised in rural areas and shall be 
registered through Customary Certificates of Right of Occupancy. Conversely, all urban and 
peri-urban land holders shall have their property recognised and registered under statutory rights 
by the relevant land allocating authority. Accordingly, the Land Act provides a framework for 
the formalisation and regularisation of unplanned urban settlements, and the issuance of short 
and long-term leases: Residential Licences and Certificates of Rights of Occupancy 
respectively.  
 
Most scholars understand the international push to privatisation and regularisation of rights as 
an effort to homogenise the African national land laws based on the Anglo-American legal 
model with the purpose of facilitating an international land market. Indeed, land reforms of 
different countries present homogenising traits. For example, McAuslan (2013) has analysed 
and compared land reform in several East African countries. He argues that the land reform of 
Tanzania aligns with others, e.g. Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda, for two main 
reasons. First, it facilitates the development and the operations of land markets through the Land 
Acts making provisions on sales, leases, mortgages, easements and co-ownership. Second, it 
promotes the centralisation of government control over land management by giving the 
Commissioner of Lands a central role in land administration. Indeed, scholars have criticised the 
excessive centralisation of authority and bureaucratisation of land management, which increases 
the risk of abuse and corruption (Knight 2010; Roughton, 2007; Shivji, 1998; Sundet, 2005).  
 
On the other side, the land reform of Tanzania differs from others in its recognition of pre-
existing tenure institutions, including customary rights in rural areas. African countries have 
variously recognised and integrated customary tenure in their land reforms (Alden Wily, 2018). 
For instance, while customary rights find relatively strong support in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya 
and Mozambique, other countries like Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda and Somalia provide minimal 
to no support to customary tenure. Thus, Knight (2010) concluded that, “in the balance, the 
Village Land Act [of Tanzania] is arguably one of the best in Africa in its careful, solid and 
repeated protections of the land rights of vulnerable groups in the context of both customary and 
statutory law” (p. 211). While some scholars praise this progressive and innovative effort (see 
also Roughton, 2007), others warn that state-led land registration threatens the basis of 
legitimacy and functioning of customary tenure, which will inevitably be compromised over 
time (McAuslan, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the Tanzanian land reform is quite unique in its explicit mention of urban matters 
within the Land Acts, whereas other East African countries concentrated predominantly on rural 
tenure (McAuslan; 2013). First, the Land Act prescribes that regularisation should encompass 
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processes to both register ownership and to physically upgrade the unplanned settlements. 
Second, the Land Act promotes a participatory approach to regularisation through the 
involvement of residents and community organisations, which was a novelty in Anglophone 
Africa. Finally, the Tanzanian land law enables an ‘incremental’ process of regularisation in 
urban areas through the provision of both short and long-term leases, as will be discussed in the 
next section. Regarding the latter, I note that this approach to tenure regularisation is not unique 
to Tanzania. Other sub-Saharan countries have adopted incremental steps to regularisation, by 
offering one or several types of interim titles as evidence of ownership in advance, or in place 
of, longer-term leases or freeholds.  
 
Interim titles are usually attached to specific conditions relative to the recognising authority, 
technology of plot identification, provision of rights, temporal validity and renewability of titles. 
In some cases, this evidence might be the last step of land registration. In others, interim titles 
are meant to convert into longer-term leases or freeholds, subject to conditions. For instance, the 
laws of Mozambique (Hull et al., 2019; Van den Brink, 2008) and the DRC (Mpoyi, 2013; 
World Bank, GLTN, and UN-Habitat, 2016) allow for interim titles – provisional rights or 
rental contracts respectively – with the purpose of enabling land holders to develop their land 
before the acquisition of full property rights. In the DRC, the legal procedure for registering 
rights to land includes three steps: the rental contract, concession contract, and registration 
certificate. The former is a short leasehold granted by the local government in the unplanned 
areas, which allows plot holders seven years to carry out land development before accessing a 
concession title. Another example is offered by the Flexible Land Tenure system of Namibia, 
which provides two types of title for individuals living in urban unplanned settlements: the 
starter title and land hold title (Christensen, 2005; MLR, 2016; Otto, 2009). Compared to 
freehold, these offer different bundles of rights; for example, the starter title cannot be 
mortgaged. Furthermore, interim titles are group-based: each holder has their own individual 
rights within a block of land that is owned under freehold by the state or a private individual or 
a group of individuals.  
 
1.2.2 An incremental approach to tenure regularisation  
The incremental approach of Tanzania distinguishes between processes of regularisation and 
formalisation (MLHHSD, 2007). In a nutshell, both aim to facilitate the recording, adjudication, 
classification and registration of the occupation and use of land by its plot holder(s) (URT, 
2001: 59). However, only regularisation requires processes of town planning ensuring 
compliance with minimum planning standards with regards to plot size, road network, open and 
public space. In practice, infrastructure is not provided (e.g. water pipes or electricity lines), but 
it must be considered within the town plan. After town planning and surveying, individual plots 
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are registered in the cadastre and issued long-term leases – Certificates of Right of Occupancy 
(CRO) – by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD). 
Regularisation is the approach of choice for unplanned areas in their infancy or consolidated 
stage, that is, when settlements are sparsely or moderately built, such as in the urban periphery 
(Lupala, 2019).  
 
Conversely, formalisation does not entail the stages of town planning and surveying. In this 
case, individual plots are adjudicated and recorded within a register for their ‘status-quo’, 
without any land adjustment. They are issued short-term leases – Residential Licence – by the 
relevant Municipality. Settlements qualify for formalisation if they are at saturated stage, with 
high-density construction, poor quality building and infrastructure. In Dar es Salaam, these 
settlements tend to be located in the ‘inner ring’ of the city, from around two to twenty 
kilometres from the centre. Thus, embedding the principle of incremental regularisation, 
formalisation extends the benefits of tenure security and legal recognition where regularisation 
is too challenging and unaffordable. First, overcrowding complicates processes of land 
adjudication and adjustment, town planning and surveying in these areas. Second, the socio-
economic profile of these settlements is characterised by poor land holders, who cannot easily 
afford longer-term leases.  
 
Importantly, the government introduced formalisation as a steppingstone to regularisation 
(Kironde, 2006). First, it was foreseen that formalisation would stop processes of land 
subdivision, thereby preventing further unplanned growth in the already saturated unplanned 
settlements. Second, following the economic theory on private property rights, the government 
expected that tenure security and access to credit would unlock investment in housing and 
infrastructure conditions. Third, formalisation would provide a register of information and a 
stream of revenue through land rents. These would contribute to future regularisation schemes. 
 
1.2.3 The Certificate of Right of Occupancy  
The Certificate of Right of Occupancy (CRO) is a long-term leasehold, valid for 33, 66 or 99 
years (typically 66 years for residential use). It is authorised and issued by the MLHHSD on 
planned and surveyed land. From a legal perspective, it provides the highest protection by law 
in the country. Whilst the government maintains the right to expropriate plot owners with 
statutory rights to land, a CRO secures higher compensation compared to unregistered land.1 
Furthermore, a CRO documents the plot holders’ identity and the exact plot boundaries through 
a survey plan, thereby mitigating potential conflict with third parties, and offering statutory 
 
1 By law, also unregistered land must be compensated in case of expropriation. However, in practice, 
receiving compensation is easier and more secure if the land is registered. Furthermore, a CRO generally 
guarantees higher compensation. 
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protection in the case of double sale, boundary, and inheritance disputes. The ownership and 
transfer of CROs are recorded in cadastral registers, which enable official searches. This is 
meant to ease land markets, by reducing the need for informal means of verification (i.e. verbal 
validation of the rightful owner by local leaders and neighbours), which are less secure and do 
not guarantee state protection in case of scamming. For the same reasons, the CRO is the most 
secure form of collateral for banks. In fact, plot holders pledging a CRO can access larger size 
loans and are subject to more favourable conditions compared to unregistered ownership 
documents (sale agreement) (Manara and Pani, 2020a, see below). 
 
Processes to acquire CROs have been cumbersome and expensive in practice. By the early 
2000s, it was common practice for plot owners to take individual initiatives to regularise their 
plots. This was problematic because of scale economies in processes of town planning and 
surveying, which are less expensive and cumbersome if they involve a neighbourhood instead 
of the single plot. For instance, Nuhu and Kombe (2021) estimate that planning and surveying a 
standalone plot may cost around 2-3 million TSh, while for large scale projects involving more 
than 1,000 plots the average cost does not exceed 0.2 million TSh. Thus, it is little surprising 
that most urban areas had remained predominantly informal. Indeed, in 2002 aerial imagery of 
Dar es Salaam showed that unplanned settlements accommodated some 400,000 housing units, 
equivalent to 80% of all residential buildings (Kironde, 2006: 83). Magigi and Majani (2006) 
document the exceptional case of Ubungo Darajani, where residents engaged in the preparation 
of settlement-wide land use plans and executed a joint cadastral survey. These processes were 
lengthy and difficult; for instance, the phase of plot demarcation took about three and a half 
years and a total of sixty-four trips to the relevant offices (within the Municipality and the 
MLHHSD). Eventually, the survey plan was submitted and approved in late 2004, seven years 
after the project inception. At this point, plot owners had yet to apply and pay for land titles.  
 
To address such challenges and facilitate access to CROs, the government has promoted large-
scale regularisation schemes, in particular through the ten-year strategy 2013-2023 (Lupala, 
2019).2 Starting from 2016/2017, pilot programmes were conducted in seven Municipalities 
(MLHHSD, 2016a, 2018).3 Drawing on World Bank funds, the MLHHSD carried out a pilot 
regularisation scheme in the Kimara Ward of Dar es Salaam, a more middle-class suburb 
located about twelve kilometres from the city centre along the Morogoro Road (Figure 1), with 
the ambitious goal of issuing 6,000 CROs in three months (Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018; 
Omar, 2017). This project embedded the participatory approach enshrined by the Land Act 2007 
 
2 Early regularisation schemes were conducted in Dar es Salaam (Temeke) and Mwanza between 2008 
and 2013, with World Bank funds. 
3 Beyond Dar es Salaam, these include Kigoma-Ujiji, Lindi, Musoma, Singida, Sumbawanga, Tabora, 
where unplanned settlements covered on average 36% of the city area (from 57% in Musema to 8% in 
Singida) (MLHHSD, 2018: 5). 
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and the latest ten-year strategy, whereby land holders were responsible for demonstrating their 
plot boundaries and agreeing land adjustments for the provision of road access and 
infrastructure (MLHHSD 2018). Ubungo Municipality demarcated about 4,800 plots and 
invoiced their plot holders for the acquisition of CROs (World Bank, 2019: 75-77). Two years 
into the programme, 1,482 invoices had been issued in the communities of Kilungule A and B. 
However, only 13% of plot holders had acquired their title deed, even though 28% had been 
invoiced over two years earlier, and only 3% within the last six months.  
 
This outcome is representative of other projects, where “generally the rate of applying and 
paying for land titles was low” (Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018: 284). Learning from this 
project and its challenges of low uptake, the government has adopted further strategies to 
encourage the proliferation of large-scale titling projects and increase uptake of CRO. These 
include encouraging a private market of regularisation services by private companies, loosening 
planning standards to ease town planning and surveying processes, and applying price ceilings 
to reduce the costs of regularisation. In fact, such strategies have been successful in increasing 
the supply of regularisation projects in Dar es Salaam. However, many of these projects are still 
incomplete, and in most cases plot holders have yet to pay for CRO acquisition.  
 
1.2.4 The Residential Licence 
The provision of the Residential Licence (RL) is regulated by Section 23 of the Land Act. This 
is an interim statutory right embedding the principles of an incremental approach to land tenure. 
It can be granted on unplanned and un-surveyed land in urban areas. The MLHHSD selects 
specific areas for formalisation schemes and issuance of RL. Government officers involve local 
leaders and neighbours to verify the identity of the plot holders and their plot boundaries. If the 
plot lies outside of hazardous areas, the Municipality issues a RL, which can be acquired for a 
moderate fee. Buying or renewing a RL requires a fixed payment of 5,600 TSh (approximately 
2.5 USD) and a variable annual land rent calculated on land area and use (ranging 0.25-$9 
USD). Instead, the costs of CRO acquisition might be tenfold those of the RL. For instance, the 
mean fees in the Kimara regularisation scheme described above were 526,000 TSh. The uptake 
of RL is not compulsory, and sanctions are not imposed on plot holders who decide to not take 
up. However, plot holders who take up a RL are obliged to pay a small annual land rent and 
keep the document renewed, as set out on the RL document. 
 
On paper, the RL makes the same provisions of a longer-term lease (i.e. the CRO discussed 
above). In fact, it grants the right to occupy land for recognised uses. Furthermore, the RL offers 
the same level of compensation in case of government expropriation.4 It is enforceable within 
 
4 Conditional on the RL having been held for at least three years. 
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formal tribunals in case of ownership, boundary and inheritance disputes with third parties. It is 
legally transferable and collateralisable providing access to formal land markets and formal 
credit organisations (e.g. mainstream banks). However, the RL differs from a CRO in three 
important respects. First, it has a shorter temporal validity, currently limited to five years 
(renewable). In fact, all Municipalities have continued to allow renewals since the RL program 
began. Second, contrary to a CRO, the RL is not attached to a proper survey plan. Instead, the 
plot boundaries are drawn by hand on aerial pictures in the field then transferred into GIS, and 
the plot layout is printed on the RL without coordinate references and linear measurements. 
Third, as said above, under formalisation a plot is registered for its ‘status-quo’. Because 
formalisation does not require conformance with town planning standards, there is no need of 
land adjustment. Finally, thanks to the deployment of low-cost technology and the absence of 
town planning, acquiring a RL is considerably cheaper and easier, even considering the recently 
reduced costs of surveying and CRO acquisition and the simplified processes of large-scale 
regularisation projects.5 Thus, embedding the principles of incremental regularisation, 
formalisation extends the benefits of tenure security and legal recognition to many low-income 
land holders who cannot afford regularisation and longer-term leases.  
 
Under the auspices of the MLHHSD in collaboration with the municipal governments of Dar es 
Salaam, a pilot formalisation project started in earnest in 2004, targeting about 200,000 plots 
located in areas considered to have reached a ‘saturated’ stage of development (Kironde, 2006). 
These were selected for the first phase of the RL programme extending from the city centre to the 
periphery, across all Municipalities of Dar es Salaam: Ilala, Kindoni and Temeke (Figure 1).6 
Processes of plot identification in the field took about two years until December 2006, and the 
first RL was issued in May 2005. Uptake was concentrated in the early years of the programme. 
Around 50% of eligible plot owners have taken up a RL. However, only 12.5% currently have an 
active RL as a result of limited new uptake and low renewal. In response to such low demand and 
limited financial returns, the second phase of the programme was suspended until 2019 (Sheuya, 
2010).  
 
In April 2019, the Minister of Lands delivered a public speech explaining that too many plot 
holders continued to experience difficulties in accessing long-term titles (CRO) especially due to 
financial hurdles causing issues of affordability and severe delays in the execution of 
regularisation projects by private companies.7 For this reason, the government retrieved the RL 
programme targeting another 500,000 plots in Dar es Salaam to provide them easier access to 
 
5 In addition to the phases of planning and surveying, the issuance of CRO can take several months. For 
example, in Kimara, it can take longer than eighteen months after the payment of fees. 
6 Since 2015, the Municipalities are five, including Ubungo and Kigamboni, which are detachments of 




tenure security (Figure 2). In this case, the government staff, including many students specialising 
in surveying and geomatics at the Ardhi Institute in Morogoro, adopted digital tools to demarcate 
plot boundaries and record plot holders’ details. The deployment of low-paid staff and low-cost 
technology enabled speedy data collection and kept the RL price at 5,000 TSh. In fact, 60,000 
plots were identified in the first month. By January 2020, information had been collected for about 
134,000 new plots. Just under 26,000 plot holders had been billed and 21% of those had paid for 
their RL. Declaring this programme a success, the government has plans to formalise another 1 
million urban plots, including outside of Dar es Salaam, under the Land Tenure Improvement 
Project (World Bank, 2020). 
 
1.2.5 Dar es Salaam  
The context of this thesis is the city of Dar es Salaam, where the pilot programmes of 
formalisation and regularisation described above have taken place. The urbanisation of Dar es 
Salaam has been relatively swift. Its origins can be traced to the 17th century when elite African 
and Persian traders settled around Mzizima, a small fishing village on Dar’s Mrima coast. By 
1862 its harbour and economy had developed enough that the Sultan of Zanzibar declared it a 
'new town’, solidifying its success as a commercial centre. In 1891 it was declared the seat of 
German Colonial administration: a move that possibly sealed its fate as the country’s fastest 
growing urban centre (Brennan et al., 2007). Like many other developing countries, Tanzania 
has a high urbanisation rate, driven primarily by population growth and sustained rural to urban 
migration: today, about a third of the population lives in urban areas (World Bank, 2020: 4). It 
is estimated that Dar es Salaam is home to more than 7 million inhabitants and has an annual 
population growth rate of about 8 percent (World Population Review, 2021).8 Not only is it the 
most populous city in East Africa: with a projected population of over 10 million, it will become 
one of the continent’s megacities by the early 2030s (World Bank, 2020: 5). Given the 
deficiencies of formal land supply and urban planning, urbanisation dynamics are governed by 
informal institutions of land access, use and development (Kombe and Kreibich, 2000; Panman, 
2020). Crucially, they provide relatively high levels of tenure security. Local leaders are key 
figures of informal land institutions. The mtaa chairman (mwenyekiti) is an unpaid elected 
political figure, supported by a government appointed executive officer holding a bureaucratic 
position. The chairman selects and works closely with street leaders and their assistants 
(wajumbe). Working both within and outside of formal government structures, these leaders 
typically engage in processes of informal land transfer and dispute arbitration, despite not 






Because of its historical and current trajectory, Dar es Salaam is not entirely comparable to 
many other Tanzanian urban contexts. First, it is a primate city in Tanzania. Based on the last 
Census data (2012), its 4.4 million inhabitants constituted approximately 10% of the national 
population and one third of all urbanites in the country (32.8%).9 Conversely, the second and 
third largest cities, Mwanza and Mbeya, had population sizes under 1 million. Second, Dar es 
Salaam has a distinctive economic profile compared to other Tanzanian cities. Its major harbour 
on the Indian Ocean attracts commerce and transportation activities oriented to the global 
market. Thus, it is the country’s largest commercial city and engine of economic growth 
(MLHHSD, 2016b: 42). Third, the coverage of unplanned settlements is much higher in Dar es 
Salaam than other cities. With massive influx of people and a severe deficit of formal housing, 
informal land markets have become very lively in Dar es Salaam (Kombe and Kreibich, 2000; 
Magina et al., 2020). Whilst, as noted above, in the early 2000s, 80% of Dar es Salaam was 
occupied by unplanned settlements, this was a much higher rate compared to Mwanza, Mbeya 
and Arusha (World Bank, 2019). For these reasons, some dynamics such as rising competition 
for urban land, increasing land values, contrasting land uses, expanding peripheries and co-
existing formal and informal institutions of land management, which might be common to other 
Tanzanian cities, certainly scale up in the context of Dar es Salaam. For instance, there is an 
intensification of land conflict in the proliferating peri-urban areas (Wolf et al., 2018; World 
Bank, 2020). Thus, responses to formalisation and regularisation programmes might differ here 
from other Tanzanian cities. 
 
For many aspects, Dar es Salaam might be well representative of other large cities in Sub-
Saharan Africa with exceptionally lively dynamics of urbanisation, dense unplanned areas, 
sprawling peripheries, informal land markets, evolving land institutions and legal dualism. For 
instance, Nairobi in Kenya is also amongst the most populous cities of Africa. Growing by 50% 
in the ten years between 1999 and 2009, Nairobi reached over 3 million inhabitants by the last 
2009 Census (Bird et al., 2017). Like Dar es Salaam, there is a severe undersupply of formal 
housing in Nairobi, which has forced incoming residents to establish themselves in slums. 
Similarly, local chiefs play an important role in the informal allocation and management of land 
(Joireman and Vanderpoel, 2011). Furthermore, Kenya also inherited a colonial dual system of 
land tenure and, as noted in section 1.2.1, it embarked on a post-independence land reform 
presenting several similarities with Tanzania (McAuslan, 2013). As Dar es Salaam, Nairobi 
hosts some projects of unplanned settlements regularisation and upgrade (e.g. the KISIP 
project).10 However, informal land institutions, actors, relations, and processes are substantially 
different in this context. For instance, in Nairobi, most slum dwellers pay rents to slum 
 
9 Author’s calculation, based on Tanzania Census Dashboard (NBS, 2012). Retrieved from 
dataforall.org/dashboard/tanzania/ 
10 Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Programmes.  
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landlords, typically government officials and politicians, even if land is not privately owned 
(Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008). Local chiefs are appointed by the Provincial Administration and 
they are regularly rotated around the city. They exercise power and abuse, for example by 
favouring the residents of the same ethnicity in the rental market (Marx et al., 2019). Relatedly, 
land access is associated with a long history of government corruption and waves of violence 
(Cheeseman, 2008; Southall, 2005), whereas the same levels of patronage, corruption, and 
violence are not documented in Dar es Salaam. Finally, it is important to note that in Kenya land 
can be held as freehold, while interim titles are not provided, and ownership registration is 
always subject to planning and surveying. In sum, despite of similar trajectories of urbanisation 
and land reform, Dar es Salaam presents important context specific traits. 
 
1.3 Summary of PhD 
1.3.1 Overview of chapters  
Chapter 2 ‘Neighbourhood effects on uptake of interim title deeds in Dar es Salaam’ studies 
whether peer-effects play a role in explaining households’ short- and long-term choices of 
formalisation with intermediary property rights (Residential Licence). It utilises administrative 
cadastral data and a pseudo-diff-in-diff strategy to study the propensity for plot owners to take-
up the land title following the behaviour of their proximate neighbours. The paper finds 
evidence of peer-effects in the initial stage of the programme, when the uncertainty about the 
perceived relative benefits from formalisation is higher. Furthermore, peer-effects occur among 
adjacent neighbours. Compared to any other pair living 50 meters apart, adjacent neighbours are 
25% more likely to uptake in the same month, and 14% more likely to uptake within six months 
of one another. Results are robust across multiple definitions of neighbourhood and restrictions 
on plot geometry and density. A balancing test demonstrates that there is no sorting within very 
small neighbourhoods. My analysis shows that peer-effects are not heterogenous across old and 
new settlers. This chapter further examines some potential mechanisms for peer-effects among 
adjacent neighbours. I propose that frequent and salient interactions around land tenure 
strengthen social learning among contiguous plot owners. Furthermore, I suggest that non-
private returns to formalisation increase with spatial proximity and motivate coordination in 
uptake. Primarily, the paper contributes to literature on the determinants of demand for formal 
titles and the substitutability of formal and informal property rights. It also adds to prior studies 
examining social learning in the adoption of development policies, and neighbourhood effects in 
urban areas. 
 
Chapter 3 ‘From policy to institution: a descriptive norm of tenure formalisation in Dar es 
Salaam’s unplanned settlements’ further explores the role of interdependencies in plot owners’ 
decisions to uptake interim titles, as observed in Chapter 2. This chapter examines if an informal 
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institution – i.e. rule or norm of behaviour – motivates collective choices of formalisation, 
thereby driving patterns of coordination in the neighbourhood. Analysing primary data that we 
collected from two surveys with 1,363 and 243 respondents across Dar es Salaam’s unplanned 
settlements, this chapter finds that the policy has embedded into an institution-in-use: a 
descriptive norm determining interdependent preferences for formalisation. In fact, plot owners 
have positive normative beliefs concerning the formalisation policies (85%), but they uptake 
and renew conditional on the behaviour and advice of their neighbours (64%) and local leaders 
(57%), because these provide essential information as to the real benefits and the process of 
acquiring the Residential Licence. However, plot owners know few others who have or endorse 
the licence; thus, they have scarce social incentives to formalise, including from local leaders. 
Overall, the paper demonstrates that the Residential Licence policy rallies considerable social 
support as plot owners conform to an institution-in-use that prescribes formalisation, despite of 
low actual uptake. This chapter adds to the previous one by confirming that social learning is 
the main mechanism of peer-effects. Further, it contributes to literature on the demand for 
formal titles by demonstrating that low uptake is not necessarily the result of low social support. 
Finally, it offers an important methodological contribution to measure the social embeddedness 
of formalisation policies in specific spatial-temporal contexts. 
 
Chapter 4 ‘Informal practices of formal property: local leaders and land formalisation in Dar es 
Salaam’ (co-authored) further unpacks the role of local leaders for the construction of, and the 
transition to, formal property. This chapter draws on extensive qualitative research, including 
in-depth interviews that we conducted with over seventy local leaders, municipal officers, 
lawyers and bank officers. It examines the situated practices that make land into formal property 
and explores how this is negotiated by multiple actors within, at the interface, and outside of the 
state. Local leaders are neighbourhood chairmen, executive officers, and other community 
representatives with formal and informal mandates to govern land in the unplanned settlements. 
Chapter 3 argued that they are key figures in the community, and plot owners would follow 
their advice to make choices of formalisation. This chapter (4) demonstrates that local leaders 
are also essential to legitimise and operationalise the instruments of formal property in the 
making: the cadastral database and the ‘survey’ map. Thus, the formalisation process 
incorporates – instead of replacing – informal dynamics of mutual recognition of public 
authority and property. This chapter adds to the previous one by arguing that the lowest level of 
government mediates the transition to formal property both for non-state and state actors. 
Indeed, it concludes that the central government cannot construct and manage a formal property 
apparatus without the support of the local public authority and informal practices of property 
recognition. By implementing informality as a lens to deconstruct state and law into their 
contingent and individualised practices, this chapter contributes to arguments on the 
informality-formality nexus, the co-constitution of rights and authority, and the informalisation 
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of the state. Furthermore, it adds to research on processes of formalisation suggesting that titling 
projects cannot possibly impose an idealised model of property upon society. 
 
Chapter 5 ‘Eliciting demand for title deeds: Lab-in-the-field evidence from urban Tanzania’ (co-
authored) turns to study a pilot programme offering full property rights (Certificate of Right of 
Occupancy) in two neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam. With only 13% uptake in two years, 
academic literature and interview material suggest that the costs of registration exceed demand, 
making full statutory rights unaffordable and socially exclusive. This chapter measures the local 
demand for titles and proposes leveraging the knowledge of local leaders to inform a better 
pricing strategy. We conduct two lab-in-the-field experiments with 90 local leaders and 146 
property owners. We first elicit their demand for titles through the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) method, finding that roughly 40% of plot owners in our sample are willing to pay fees 
equal to the monthly income of a typical household. Thus, demand is substantial, while largely 
below current fees. We then ask if local leaders can help predict this demand ex-ante. Results 
show that they have accurate information about the aggregate demand curve in their 
neighbourhoods and they can distinguish variation in willingness-to-pay across plot owners. An 
incentive scheme of cash prizes can correct for inaccuracy or misreporting. This chapter adds to 
the previous ones by further demonstrating that there is a demand for formal titles in Dar es 
Salaam and local leaders could effectively support the transition to formal property. Indeed, 
they can inform a pricing strategy that raises the uptake of titles and covers the project costs by 
lowering prices across the board and by price discriminating across high and low willingness-to-
pay plot owners. The chapter contributes to literature studying the use of non-state agents to 
target subsidies or collect revenues, and prior work eliciting willingness-to-pay for non-market 
goods. 
 
1.3.2 Overview of study areas  
The study areas are illustrated in Figure 1. Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis focus on the first phase 
of the RL programme, which was presented in section 1.2.4. This programme extended across 
approximately 160 mitaa (sub-wards), from the city centre to the urban periphery. Chapter 2 
uses administrative data of all 220,000 plots eligible for the uptake of RL under this programme 
from 2004 to 2017. Data presented in Chapter 3 are the result of representative surveys of 1,363 
and 243 plot holders in fifty-two mitaa eligible for the uptake of RL across the city. In these 
mitaa, we conducted interviews with local leaders and ethnographic observation of their 
activities, which constitute the empirical material of Chapter 4. Thus, data collection occurred in 
diverse unplanned settlements, which are representative of the whole area under the RL 
programme of Dar es Salaam, as explained in the methodology section of Chapter 3. 
28 
 
Settlements under the RL programme present a wide variety of characteristics. First, they are 
situated in distinct administrative units (Municipalities) within Dar es Salaam and at various 
distances from the CBD (from two to nineteen kilometres). This is reflected in different land 
values and market access, depending on both distance to CBD and transport network quality. 
For example, looking at current government land values in the unplanned settlements eligible 
for RL in Ilala, they range from 50,000 TSh to 120,000 TSh per square meter (Gongolamboto 
and Miembeni, respectively). Some settlements were located along the new Bus-Rapid-
Transport (BRT) lines, and easily accessible. Others required two hours on the local daladala 
(small bus) and a bajaj (auto rickshaw) drive for us to reach them. On the other side, these 
settlements present different characteristics of plot density and size, housing and infrastructure 
quality, occupation, tenure, and socio-economic profile of plot holders. These are influenced by 
distance from CBD, morphology and soil, proximity to hazardous land, the presence of local 
leaders and many other factors.  
 
For example, closer to the CBD, in Kinondoni Municipality, Manzese is one of the most 
saturated unplanned settlements of Dar es Salaam. This is visible in the dense, overcrowded, 
and low-quality building construction, lack of open space, and very limited infrastructure 
provision. In Temeke, Keko Mwanga and Keko Machungwa represent pockets of informality 
amidst highly developed industrial land. Here, the expectation of imminent acquisition by the 
formal sector influences land investment and attitudes to formalisation. Also, Ilala Municipality 
offers a wide variety of settlement conditions. At the border with the formal city, Malapa has 
higher rates of two-storey buildings and a lively rental market. A little further from the CBD, 
Kombo and Miembeni were involved in the City Infrastructure Upgrade Programme,11 and 
received some infrastructure and service upgrades. In proximity to the Msimbazi river, which is 
responsible for frequent and devastating flooding, the quality of housing and infrastructure is 
very poor. Houses are built of bricks and corrugated iron sheets. Dirt roads are severely 
impaired. The Municipality is crossed by the Nyerere Road, which connects the airport to the 
city centre. Mogo, Stakishari, Uwanja wa Ndege and other settlements along this artery are 
relatively richer. Plots are larger, with lower density housing and some green space. Moving 
towards the peri-urban, such as in Gongolamboto, it is possible to find walled or fenced 
properties, with beautiful habitations and internal courtyards. These traits are typical of the 
rising middle class, who relocate from the city centre to the expanding suburbs in search of their 
rural idyll and investment opportunities (Mercer, 2017). 
 
 
11 The City Infrastructure Upgrade Programme (CIUP) was divided in two phases (2005-2008; 2008-
2011) that covered 31 communities of Dar es Salaam delivering infrastructural upgrades and services in 
the unplanned settlements.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on regularisation with full property rights, studying the uptake of CRO in two 
mitaa of the Kimara Ward, Kilungule A and B, where the government started a pilot project of 
regularisation in 2016, as explained in section 1.2.3. This area locates along the Morogoro Road 
and is easily accessible by BRT. Whilst further away from the CBD (approximately 12 
kilometres), Kilungule A and B border the unplanned settlements included in the first phase of 
the RL programme (e.g. Ubungo Kibo and Msewe). In fact, they present similar characteristics 
compared to the peripheral settlements discussed above. For example, the typical income of 
Kilungule A and B is between 160,000 TSh and 200,000 TSh, just like one of its neighbouring 
mtaa, Ubungo Msewe, under the RL programme. Indeed, the communities of Kilungule A and 
B are, to a large extent, middleclass. This is reflected in relatively larger plot size and good 
quality housing. The urbanisation of this area did not start until the 2000s, when first residents 
purchased farm or forest land informally, converting the local landscape into a residential 
neighbourhood. In this context, processes and outcomes of regularisation might differ from 
saturated areas where a longer history of urbanisation has produced overcrowding, low quality 
housing, lack of infrastructure, and rising land conflicts. However, Kilungule A and B are 
representative of most unplanned settlements in the expanding suburbs of Dar es Salaam at 
infancy or consolidated stage. In fact, they provide a unique opportunity to study the uptake of 
CROs within a large-scale regularisation scheme in the city.12 
 
1.3.3 Overview of main contributions  
Engaging with an inter-disciplinary literature, this research offers several contributions to 
academic knowledge, as articulated in each individual chapter. In terms of research 
methodology, this PhD demonstrates that different methods can be combined to probe and 
enrich knowledge on formalisation policies and their challenges of implementation in specific 
spatial-temporal contexts. For example, econometric modelling in Chapter 2 describes broad 
patterns of behaviour in choices of formalisation, while the institutional analysis of survey data 
in Chapter 3 provides a more nuanced understanding of their underlying mechanisms. In-depth 
interviews in Chapter 4 enable us to identify the key role played by local leaders during the 
formalisation process, and the experimental approach of Chapter 5 allows us to test one 
hypothesis regarding how their local knowledge could be leveraged to raise the uptake of titles. 
Overall, this endeavour responds to a lively epistemological and methodological debate in urban 
geography (e.g. Roy, 2016; Scott and Storper, 2015), attempting to address the challenge of 
producing both generalisable and context-specific knowledge. 
 
 
12 The pilot in Kimara triggered numerous regularisation initiatives by private companies, starting with 
the Goba project. However, these projects are still incomplete, so that it is not possible to study the uptake 
of CROs in these areas. 
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To briefly address the research questions outlined in section 1.1.3 above, this work finds that 
first, formalisation policies rally considerable social support in Dar es Salaam, despite low 
uptake. This underscores the need to differentiate between observed demand and social support 
for formalisation policies in research and policy making. Second, relative to the demand for 
formalisation, the PhD demonstrates that choices of formalisation with Residential Licences are 
interdependent in the population, mediated by social interactions. From this perspective, low 
demand might be the result of scarce social incentives for formalisation. Third, social 
interactions mediate the process of formalisation. Specifically, informal dynamics of property 
recognition by local leaders and neighbours are essential to legitimise and enable the formal 
property apparatus. Indeed, formalisation policies are negotiated in their local context of 
implementation. Fourth, the PhD concludes that it is possible to leverage social interactions to 
improve the current formalisation programmes. In this respect, the research provides some 
policy recommendations. 
 
Concerning the Residential Licence programme, my study suggests that plot owners need 
clearer and updated information on the continuation of this programme, its processes and costs. 
Indeed, social learning is the main driver of coordination in choices of formalisation to 
compensate for scarce and uncertain information from the government. Whilst more research is 
needed to test the most effective policy instruments, the general take-away is that well-designed 
formalisation policies should include social incentives for uptake and renewal. For example, in 
areas where plot owners underestimate the local rate of uptake, formalisation could be raised by 
updating their social expectations on other people’s behaviour. In most cases, periodic 
information campaigns could increase the rate of formalisation, especially if realised locally 
through the capillary action of the lower level public authority in the smallest neighbourhood 
units. Relative to Certificates of Right of Occupancy, the research highlights the need to lower 
the monetary costs of formalisation and implement a better pricing strategy leveraging the 
knowledge of local leaders. In a context where formalisation policies rally considerable social 
support, formalisation projects should be designed in order to meet the local demand by making 
statutory property rights affordable and socially inclusive. More generally, I recommend that 
key actors of informal institutions are not left behind in the transition to formal property. In fact, 
their public authority is constitutive of both informal and ‘more formal’ practices of property 
recognition. 
 
1.4 Ethical considerations  
Throughout my PhD, all research and data collection was subject to rigorous ethics approval at 
the LSE, ensuring that it was carried out in accordance with six central principles: i.e. to 
maximise social benefit while minimising risk and harm; to respect people’s rights and dignity; 
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to offer informed consent to voluntary participants; to maintain integrity and transparency 
throughout; to take responsibility for my research and dissemination with clear lines of 
accountability; and to ensure research independence throughout. Further, we obtained approval 
and permits from the appropriate Tanzanian authorities including the Commission for Science 
and Technology; the Regional Office of Dar es Salaam; the Municipalities of Kinondoni, 
Ubungo, Ilala and Temeke; and every ward and mtaa (sub-ward) involved in the study. 
 
The research took place across Dar es Salaam’s unplanned settlements in three phases 
consisting of two field surveys, in-depth interviews, and a lab-in-the-field experiment. For the 
surveys and interviews, our sample of mitaa followed three major road arteries (Morogoro, 
Nyerere and Kilwa), stretching from the CBD to about twenty kilometres from the city centre. 
Necessarily, the sampling strategy took account of accessibility by public transport (daladala 
and BRT) and by foot, but in no way did this influence our findings (at times we travelled more 
than two hours to reach our destination). 
 
During my fieldwork, I was affiliated to Ardhi University, which afforded us the opportunity to 
work with final year students and graduates, whom we trained as our enumerators and research 
assistants. Apart from ensuring their skills in delivering the questionnaires and interviews 
accurately, it was vital that they understood their own positionalities, learning how to facilitate a 
safe and open research environment by enabling respondents to co-own and co-shape the 
research process. As such, I worked with them constantly in the field, acting as their mentors, 
supervisors and colleagues, whilst helping to build local capacity. 
 
Importantly, all research was carried out with adults who were capable of making their own 
choices regarding participation. In all cases, we sought written or verbal informed consent. 
Participants were provided an information sheet in Swahili. This included a clear statement on: 
the research purpose and design, what their participation would involve, that their data would be 
stored safely on the LSE’s server and used for academic purposes only, and on their right to 
anonymity and confidentiality – all of which was read to them aloud. It was also stressed that 
their participation was voluntary, and they were free to withdraw at any point. For the surveys, 
completion of the questionnaire was considered proof of consent. For the interviews, consent 
was given in writing or digitally recorded – again with the participants’ consent. 
 
To undertake the surveys, local leaders introduced us to households in their neighbourhoods. 
This was essential given local customs and helped build initial trust with potential respondents. 
However, it was vital that the leaders did not act as ‘gatekeepers’ and that plot-owners felt free 
to opt out. As such, we implemented a strict randomised selection process that identified 
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clusters of potential respondents on a map before going to the field, thereby significantly 
reducing local leaders’ capacity to pick and choose.  
 
Importantly, each research phase passed the LSE review process at the Departmental level. 
However, the research in Chapter 5 required additional approval from the LSE Ethics 
Committee, which was successful. Briefly, our project included a willingness-to-pay elicitation 
exercise through the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method, which exposed participants to 
a lottery process, and provided monetary incentives in the form of subsidies to title deed 
acquisition. These issues raised important ethical concerns, which we addressed through careful 
research design and implementation. First, we sampled a pool of plot holders who had already 
been invoiced for the acquisition of a CRO: thus, we did not interfere with their capacity to 
acquire the title deed at the invoiced price, during or after the study. Second, we recognised that 
the lottery distributing discounts may cause distress in the form of anxiety or distrust, and we 
put in place adequate mechanisms to minimise this. For instance, we organised information and 
training sessions for all potential participants to ensure they could make informed individual 
choices regarding their participation in the study. In the interest of transparency and trust, we 
illustrated the mechanisms of the lottery process several weeks ahead of the research sessions. 
Furthermore, we conducted the lottery process in an open environment, where it could be 
observed by the local leaders. During the research sessions and just before the lottery process, 
we explicitly asked participants if they would like to drop from the study. Respondents 
understood that this would have no negative consequences to them and would not affect their 
capacity to acquire a title deed outside of the research project, should they wish to do so. As 
stated above, our research was undertaken on the foundations of informed consent and 
transparency, engaging with capable adult respondents who could withdraw from the study at 
any time. Therefore, we proved the ethical solidity of our research by demonstrating that: a) 
respondents had the capacity to foresee and manage the expected distress; c) respondents were 
capable of informed individual choices concerning their exposure to distress; and d) the 
potential benefits from the research exceeded the potential distress caused by the lottery process. 
More details can be found in section 5.14. 
 
Finally, all phases of research were conducted independently. Certainly, we received funding 
from the World Bank, IGC and the RGS-IBG (Slawson Award). Further, in Tanzania, I 
collected data from the MLHHSD and the Municipalities. However, none of these actors was a 
research ‘partner’ in that they had no involvement in, or influence upon, the research questions 
or design. Indeed, I have disseminated my research findings to these actors, always in an open 




1.5 Limitations, related research, and ways forward  
Despite its important contributions, this work presents several limitations. First, its scope is 
limited to a predominant urban focus and a defined geographical area. As discussed in section 
1.2.5, Dar es Salaam is one of the fastest urbanising cities of Africa. Land markets and urban 
investments are livelier here than in other areas, which may affect responses to formalisation 
policies. Thus, caution is needed when generalising context specific findings and policy 
recommendations to rural settings, other cities, or countries. Second, this work provides little 
insight into the geographical differences within the city, essentially treating Dar es Salaam as 
one homogenous context. Whilst the research design of most chapters (except Chapter 5) 
allowed the capture of within-city variation, this aspect is hardly discussed because results were 
found relatively homogenous across locations, at least relative to the objectives of this PhD. 
This does not preclude more geographically disaggregated analysis in the future. Other relevant 
aspects are not included in this PhD: some are developed into companion papers; others will be 
the subject of further research.  
 
With regards to research outputs that are not included in this PhD, Manara and Pani (2020b) 
discuss the urban land policy of Tanzania with a focus on its incremental approach to land 
tenure regularisation. We identify and illustrate key strategies that the government adopted to 
widen access to ownership registration, for example by lowering planning standards for 
regularisation schemes, fostering a private market of regularisation services, and setting a price 
ceiling to planning and surveying. Another of these strategies is the provision of interim land 
titles, through formalisation and the issuance of RLs. We offer a detailed analysis of the 
potential implications and shortcomings of such incremental approaches to tenure 
regularisation. For example, the loosening of planning standards has long-term consequences in 
terms of unplanned settlements’ upgrade. Policy changes create a high degree of 
unpredictability in the private market for regularisation affecting supply and project outcomes. 
The presence of overlaying and competing formal institutions of tenure constrains demand for 
interim land titles and their legitimacy in the eyes of credit organisations. In sum, incremental 
steps may introduce several layers of complexity in the trajectory to tenure security. The paper 
concludes that incremental approaches to tenure regularisation are supported by political 
interests aiming to raise consensus and revenues. 
 
Another research output (Manara and Pani 2020a) digs further into the implementation of RLs 
and CROs by credit organisations. A controversial tenet underpinning policies of land tenure 
regularisation is that the registration of ownership enables credit markets by allowing banks to 
avoid or manage risk associated with the collateralisation of unregistered land. This contrasts 
with empirical evidence showing that land tenure regularisation has failed to boost credit 
34 
 
markets in many developing countries, including Tanzania. Thus, formal institutions of property 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for the urban poor to access credit. We add to this literature 
by introducing new empirical evidence and by understanding this problem through the 
theoretical concept of institutional complementarity. We interview nine of the largest financial 
organisations in Dar es Salaam and collect information on their credit institutions: rules and 
conditions of access to loans, loan types and sizes associated to each category of collateral (i.e. 
unplanned and unregistered land, interim or full property rights). The paper demonstrates that 
financial organisations react to a complex and evolving land policy by producing and adjusting 
credit institutions to be complementary with a wide array of property institutions. As a result, 
banks are able to accept unregistered collateral with relatively low risk, and interim property 
rights provide scarce benefits of access to credit as they have limited legitimacy compared to 
full property rights.  
 
Most empirical chapters of this PhD explore issues related to the demand for RL and CRO in 
Dar es Salaam. However, they do not explicitly deal with the cost-benefit calculations of plot 
holders when they decide whether to uptake (or renew) a title document. Indeed, this PhD 
focuses on endogenous interactions within local communities and how they mediate the 
institutional transition to formal tenure. I investigate the perceived costs and benefits of land 
tenure registration and how they affect demand for RL and CRO respectively in other papers. 
Drawing on the administrative Household Survey conducted at the beginning of the RL 
programme, Manara and Pani (2020c) describe how key plot and plot holder characteristics 
correlate with choices of formalisation. We test economic assumptions relative to the drivers of 
demand for formalisation based on the plot holder’s gender, length of tenure, proximity to CBD, 
property value, distance from hazard, and local incidence of land disputes. Furthermore, the 
paper uses primary survey data from the Land Tenure Survey conducted as part of this PhD to 
examine plot owners’ assessments of the RL vis-à-vis the unregistered proof of ownership (sale 
agreement) and the longer-term lease CRO. In fact, plot holders believe that the CRO confers 
the highest benefits and wish they could take part in regularisation schemes providing CROs. 
Thus, the paper finds evidence of competing institutions reducing the perceived benefits from 
the RL.  
 
Finally, Manara and Regan (2020) explore the determinants of demand for full property rights 
(CRO) drawing on in-depth interviews realised during the lab-in-the-field experiment described 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis. All study participants revealed their willingness-to-pay for a CRO 
through the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) method in conjunction with a lottery process, 
and a subsample were interviewed on the expected costs and benefits from a title deed and their 
impacts on willingness-to-pay. We find that most plot holders associate the title deed with 
important private and public returns, which explains substantial demand for regularisation in the 
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study area. Expected benefits pertain primarily to security of tenure and, to a lower degree, 
access to credit. Low uptake is the result of three factors. First, the price of CRO exceeds 
willingness-to-pay for most respondents. Second, the survey process provides considerable 
benefits by enhancing tenure security, which reduces the need for title deed acquisition. Third, 
the title deed is not associated with immediate benefits, beyond those already provided by the 
survey stage. Thus, there is a tendency to delay and postpone uptake to later times when one of 
three things arises: the household budget, cash availability, or an immediate need for the title 
deed. The paper emphasises the importance of empirically grounded research investigating the 
determinants of demand for land titles (or lack thereof), including returns to different stages of 
the regularisation process, and short versus long-term perceived benefits.  
 
To conclude, this project has taken a necessarily limited approach to the problems of land tenure 
formalisation in developing cities, where several open questions require rigorous research 
relative to the social support, outcomes, design and implementation challenges of formalisation 
programmes. Specifically, in this thesis I focused on the demand for current policies offering 
RL and CRO in Dar es Salaam, and their implementation processes at the local level. However, 
I did not explore other important questions, for instance, relative to the political processes 
underpinning policy design and implementation. Furthermore, I did not question the design of 
formal land titles in comparison with pre-existing institutions of informal tenure. That is, what 
functions do the CRO and RL provide, in practice, on top of informal institutions, if any? I plan 
to expand this PhD into further research, for example, by conducting an ‘institutional 
archaeology’ (Ho, 2018) of the unplanned settlements to analyse the existing structure of 
informal institutions of land ownership, management and markets. With this analysis I aim to 
understand which functions they provide, which ones can be retained, and which ones must be 
disregarded or complemented. Alternative forms of property rights might be designed that are 
not tailored on the Western model and work in combination with pre-existing institutions. 
Another strand of future research will examine the outcomes of current formalisation policies, 
particularly in relation to rising wealth and gender inequality, both in urban Tanzania and 





Figure 1. Study areas  
 
The outer boundary is Dar es Salaam divided in three Municipalities (nowadays five): 
Kinondoni (west) Ilala (central), and Temeke (west). They are crossed by three main roads 
(dashed lines): from top to bottom, Morogoro, Nyerere and Kilwa Road, which we used to 
access the study areas. About 160 mitaa or sub-wards (grey) were included in the Residential 
Licence programme phase I, from two to twenty kilometres from the city centre. The research 
analyses administrative data covering all these mitaa. Further data was collected in fifty-two of 
these sub-wards (red), through two rounds of survey and interviews with local leaders. The blue 
area represents the Kimara Ward, where the government conducted a pilot programme of 




Figure 2. Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 
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Neighbourhood effects on uptake of interim 
title deeds in Dar es Salaam 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Land tenure formalisation policies underpin multiple – sometimes conflicting – rationales 
(Boone, 2019). On the one hand, economists argue that secure, legally enforceable and 
marketable land rights are a prerequisite for the development of unplanned settlements in 
developing countries (Collier et al., 2017; Lall et al., 2017). From this perspective, institutional 
frictions due to weak property rights and legal pluralism cause inefficient land and housing 
markets, resulting in private and public underinvestment (Bryan et al., 2019; Henderson et al., 
2020; Bird and Venables, 2020). Conversely, land titles can ease land markets, increase private 
investment in housing,13 and raise state capacity for coordinated land use planning and 
infrastructural provision. On the other hand, formal titles and land markets can promote 
inclusive urban development, for example protecting women from gendered inequalities 
concerning land access, ownership and control (Doss et al., 2015). Indeed, property registration 
and land markets still disadvantage women in Tanzania (Ali et al., 2016; Wineman and 
Liverpool-Tasie, 2017). In this respect, enhanced land rights can generate wide positive 
outcomes, for example increasing female participation in household decision-making (Meinzen-
Dick et al., 2019) and labour markets (Peterman, 2011).  
 
Yet, in many African cities land titling projects encounter important challenges and end up 
exacerbating inequality, legal pluralism and financial wastes (Ali et al., 2014). Among other 
major issues, the demand for formal titles remains low (ibid.). Because titling projects normally 
require large-scale state-led interventions through plot owners’ identification, land demarcation 
and surveying, scarce uptake entails massive financial losses and prevents the potential benefits 
of formalisation. This is observed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where formalisation programmes 
offering interim and full property rights register low uptake (e.g. Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 
2018, 2019). Investigating the determinants of formalisation choices is important to design 
registration programmes that meet local demand. In Dar es Salaam, as in many African cities, 
informal land tenure arrangements rely on local social relations at the neighbourhood level. 
These may generate interdependent preferences and social disincentives for formalisation, 
resulting in suboptimal uptake or multiple equilibria. Thus, this paper studies peer-effects in the 
 
13 Empirical evidence is found in Latin America (Field, 2005; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). 
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adoption of an interim property right – the Residential Licence (RL) – examining whether 
neighbours influence one another’s choices of formalisation. Ultimately, the paper aims to 
understand if policies introducing social incentives for uptake could increase the rate of 
formalisation in urban Tanzania. 
 
In 2002, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD) 
estimated that unplanned settlements housed 80% of residential buildings and the urban 
population (Kironde, 2006). Based on aerial photographs, some areas were classified as 
‘saturated’ and were selected for formalisation. The programme was meant to target the whole 
of the unplanned settlements – about 420,000 plots – in two phases with the following 
objectives: i) to enhance security of tenure by issuing RL; ii) increase government revenues 
through land rents; iii) create a registry facilitating land administration; and iv) curb the growth 
of unplanned areas (ibid.). It was foreseen that RLs would unlock private investment in housing, 
public revenues and institutional capacity for settlements upgrade. Therefore, in the longer term, 
formalised areas would be surveyed and planned, thereby becoming eligible for full statutory 
rights (ibid.). Phase I started in 2004 with the identification of around 220,000 plots across three 
Municipalities (Figures 1 and 2).14 Conditional on occupying non-hazardous land, plot owners 
could apply for a RL at their local Municipal office from May 2005. Figures 3 and 4 show the 
histograms of interviews and RLs issued per year, respectively. Uptake was concentrated in the 
early years of the programme. Around 50% of eligible plot owners have taken up a RL. 
However, only 12.5% currently have an active RL as a result of drops in uptake and low 
renewal.15 In response to such low demand, phase II was suspended until 2019 (Sheuya, 2010). 
Since then, another 130,000 plots have become eligible for the RL programme, but demand 
remains low.16 As the government plans to further extend the programme to 500,000 urban plots 
over the next few years, understanding the causes of low-demand is timely and policy-relevant. 
 
To identify peer-effects in the adoption of the RL, I study whether more proximate neighbours 
have a higher propensity to coordinate compared to more distant pairs of plot owners in small 
neighbourhoods. Section 2.5.1 explores patterns of coordination finding that three relationships 
of spatial proximity – first order contiguity, rank of proximity, and linear distance between plots 
– correlate with a higher propensity to coordinate in the early choices of formalisation (e.g. 
uptake). Thus, peer-effects are sizeable when there is higher uncertainty about the relative 
benefits of formal versus informal tenure, whereas later choices of formalisation (e.g. renewal) 
are more interdependent. To further investigate this preliminary evidence, section 2.5.2 deploys 
 
14 Nowadays five: Ilala, Kigamboni, Kinondoni, Ubungo and Temeke. However, Kigamboni has recently 
stopped the programme in some areas. 
15 Data from Temeke Municipality. Out of 78,896 eligible plots, 20.6% had taken up and renewed at least 
once; 12.5% still had an active RL in 2017. 
16 By May 2019, 12% of eligible plot owners had acquired the RL. 
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a causal pseudo diff-in-diff strategy identifying if the uptake of one plot owner causes the 
uptake of their neighbours in the early stages of the programme, and the timing of peer-effects. 
This section finds that the propensity to coordinate is higher for adjacent plots, while other 
measures of spatial proximity have non-significant effects. For example, compared to any other 
pair living 50 meters apart, adjacent neighbours are 25% more likely to uptake in the same 
month; and 14% more likely to uptake within six months of each other. These results are 
validated by a balancing test, ruling out the hypothesis of sorting among adjacent neighbours 
conditioning on small reference groups, and several robustness checks. Section 2.5.3 illustrates 
that peer-effects are not heterogeneous across old and new settlers. Section 2.6 turns to discuss 
and examine some potential mechanisms for peer-effects among adjacent neighbours. I propose 
that adjacent neighbours have a higher propensity to coordinate because of frequent and salient 
interactions pertaining to land tenure. Furthermore, I suggest that peer-effects among them 
might be driven by non-private returns to formalisation increasing with spatial proximity. Other 
plausible channels are only discussed but remain unexplored due to data limitations.  
 
Prior studies on the demand for land titles estimated the price elasticity of demand in some 
African cities (Bezu and Holden, 2014). Manara and Regan (2020) – Chapter 5 of this thesis – 
find that demand for full statutory rights (Certificate of Right of Occupancy, CRO) is substantial 
in Dar es Salaam, although it does not meet current prices.  We elicit willingness-to-pay for 
CRO from a sample of plot holders in two communities of the Kimara Ward, where the 
government has initiated a pilot programme of regularization. Despite of low uptake of CRO 
(less than 13% in two years), demand is substantial: roughly 40% of plot owners are willing to 
pay fees equal to the monthly income of a typical household. However, there is an issue of 
affordability as the average price for a CRO is more than 2.7 times higher than mean 
willingness-to-pay in our sample.  
 
Beyond few studies describing demand for land titles, the determinants of demand for 
formalisation remain largely underexplored in quantitative research. Related literature addresses 
the issue of an informal social contract pre-existing formalisation programmes, which might 
cause low demand for titles if formal tenure fails to substitute for informal institutions. In fact, 
empirical work demonstrates that social and ethnic links have an important role in informal 
rental markets (Macours, 2014; Marx et al., 2019). Further, the age, the established nature of a 
community, and the presence of a squatter organiser increase perceived tenure security 
(Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). In this case, informal property rights can effectively substitute for 
formal titles (ibid.). 
  
Going back to the work of Platteau (1996) among others, this argument has found recent 
developments. For example, Letrouit and Selod (2020) propose a model where, in the presence 
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of asymmetric information on the levels of tenure security associated with formal and informal 
tenure, bilateral trusted relationships can substitute for costly registration. In a study closely 
related to mine, Collin (2020) estimated that a 10% increase in the percentage of co-ethnic 
neighbours correlates with a 6% decrease in the probability of acquiring interim property rights 
(RL) in Dar es Salaam. Thus, he concludes that ethnic links can substitute for statutory property 
rights by generating high levels of perceived tenure security. Similarly, Panman (2020) argues 
that strong informal institutions can provide the same security as formal titles in this context. 
 
Overall, these studies suggest that informal institutions and social interactions can produce 
social incentives (or disincentives) for formalisation, mediating the demand for statutory 
property rights. In fact, Collin (2017) found that the probability that a plot owner acquires full 
property rights (CRO) in Dar es Salaam increases by 14-15 percentage points with each 
neighbour who takes up. This effect is large (equivalent to a 50 percent price discount) and 
dependent on geographic proximity. Peer-effects run through the physical distance of plots 
rather than social networks of acquaintance. For the author, this evidence points towards a 
complementarity channel, whereby individuals follow the behaviour of others because the risk 
of eviction reduces with the number of titled plots.  
 
The primary contributions of this paper are to literature on the demand for formal titles. Adding 
to Collin (2017, 2020), first this paper documents peer-effects in the adoption of interim 
property rights, as opposed to full property rights. Second, my analysis examines peer-effects 
along several relations of spatial proximity, beyond linear distance between plots or ethnic links. 
Specifically, I discuss channels of peer-effects among adjacent neighbours, including 
complementarities and social learning. Fourth, this paper studies peer-effects in short and long-
term choices of formalisation with RL, which are equally crucial because formalised plots often 
revert to an informal status (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2016; Gutierrez and Molina, 2020). 
Finally, my causal identification draws on an administrative dataset including all parcels eligible 
for the RL programme across the city. This eliminates concerns over the generalisability and 
scalability of results.  
 
Additionally, this paper contributes to other strands of literature. First, it adds to literature on 
peer-effects in the adoption of development technology (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley 
and Udry, 2010) by offering new evidence on the primary role of social learning. Second, it 
contributes to study neighbourhood effects in urban areas (Topa and Zenou, 2015) by providing 
a new application of the empirical strategy proposed by Bayer et al. (2008), which uses 
geographical distance as a proxy for social relations. Third, it contributes to illustrate the role of 
social relations in the informal land administration and land markets of urban Tanzania (e.g. 
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Kombe and Kreibich, 2002; Panman, 2020) by demonstrating that social interactions also 
mediate the demand for formalisation.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 introduces the paper’s setting and framework 
discussing the context of the RL programme and the conceptual motivation for the study. 
Section 2.3 presents the dataset used in this paper and some descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 
explains the identification strategies for empirical analysis. Section 2.5 illustrates the empirical 
findings on patterns of coordination and peer-effects in choices of formalisation. Potential 
channels are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 Setting and framework  
2.2.1 Land reform and the Residential Licence programme 
The National Land Policy of Tanzania, approved by the Parliament in 1995 and operationalised 
through the Land Acts in 1999, is considered an exemplary case of land tenure reform having 
pioneered a model for another twenty African countries (Manji, 2006). Its innovation was to 
acknowledge pre-existing systems of land law including customary rights in rural areas and 
informal rights in unplanned urban areas (McAuslan, 2002) by defining three types of property 
rights: Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO) in rural areas; Certificate of Right 
of Occupancy (CRO) and Residential Licence (RL) in urban areas. Compared to the CRO, 
which establishes a lease valid for 33, 66 or 99 years, the RL constitutes an interim property 
right, valid for up to just 5 years, after which it needs renewal.17 In 2004, the MLHHSD initiated 
the first phase of the RL programme in Dar es Salaam, which is the focus of this paper. 
 
Whilst both are typically obtained as part of large-scale formalisation efforts involving one or 
more neighbourhoods, acquiring a RL is cheaper and easier than a CRO. Indeed, the RL was 
specifically designed as an affordable option for the poor living in the unplanned settlements,18 
where the average monthly household income was 60,000 TSh (approximately 26 USD) in the 
early 2000s.19 Buying or renewing a RL requires a fixed payment of 5,600 TSh (approximately 
2.5 USD)20 and a variable annual land rent (calculated on land area and use) ranging from 568 
TSh and 20,512 TSh (0.25-$9 USD). Instead, the costs of CRO acquisition might be tenfold 
those of the RL.21 As a CRO can only be issued for planned or regularised land, it requires 
 
17 Until 2009, the validity was only for two years. 
18 The RL can be more affordable than the informal Sale Agreement (bill of sale). Typically, this requires 
a payment to the local leader equivalent to 10% of the transaction value (author’s interviews). 
19 Conversions use 2018 exchange rate. In 2018, the median household income was just above 100,000-
150,000 TSh per month (Land Tenure Survey, see details in Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
20 The costs for a RL have never accrued since they were first issued in 2005. 
21 The costs for a CRO are variable, depending on the number of plots surveyed under the same project. 
For example, in Ali et al. (2016) the price of survey, town planning and application fees is 100,000 TSh 
($44) per plot. In Manara and Regan (2020) – Chapter 5 of this thesis – the mean total price, including 
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processes of cadastral survey, urban planning and further bureaucracy taking several months or 
years.22 Conversely, the process of identifying plots under the RL programme is more 
expedient: they are not surveyed or planned, but simply identified and registered for their ‘status 
quo’. 23 After identification, plot owners can immediately apply for a RL, which is normally 
issued within thirty to sixty days.24 
 
On paper, the RL offers the same benefits of a CRO. In case of eviction, a three-year RL can 
provide the same level of compensation (Kironde, 2006). Additionally, the RL is legally 
transferable and collateralisable. However, because of its shorter validity, the advantages from 
RL are limited compared to a CRO. First, the RL can only decrease the perceived risk of 
imminent eviction and guarantee temporary tenure security. 25 Second, for several years, most 
credit organisations were reluctant to accept the RL as collateral, and today still apply 
unfavourable terms for loans pledged against the RL compared to the CRO. For instance, 
drawing on interviews with nine of the largest financial organisations in Dar es Salaam, Manara 
and Pani (2020a) find that the RL provides modest benefits in terms of access to credit 
compared to other collaterals. Financial organisations produce and adjust credit institutions to 
reduce risks associated with diverse collaterals (e.g. unregistered land, short and long-term 
leases), based on their de jure and de facto security. In fact, they also accept unregistered land as 
a valid collateral. Furthermore, they deem interim rights less secure than full property rights; 
therefore, they apply ceilings and unfavourable terms for loans pledged against the RL, whereas 
loans pledged against the CRO are virtually uncapped and more favourable.26   
 
Indeed, the RL is rarely used for the purposes of mortgaging or transferring land.27 As with 
numerous titling projects (Payne et al., 2009), there are important gaps between the on-paper 
and the de-facto benefits from the RL (Collin et al., 2015; Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2019; Parsa 
 
survey, town planning and acquisition fees, is 500,000 TSh per plot. These papers report data from 
different formalisation projects, occurring at distant locations in the city (where plot sizes are likely to 
vary) and almost ten years apart. 
22 Manara and Regan (2020) – Chapter 5 of this thesis – find that the issuance of a CRO can take longer 
than eighteen months after the payment. 
23 The process is expedient especially for plots identified during fieldwork activities, which stopped in 
December 2006. For other plots, the process can be cumbersome in terms of monetary and opportunity 
costs, because the plot owner must undertake an interview by the MLHHSD and arrange a visit of 
Municipal land officers to their plot. However, most plots were identified by 2006 (Figure 3) and this 
paper’s analysis focuses on those. 
24 Whilst it was initially announced that the acquisition process would take seven days maximum, power 
shortages and other technical issues often caused delays so that the process frequently took one or two 
months (Kironde, 2006; Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2019). 
25 In fact, the government could revoke the renewal option and suspend the RL programme, as has 
happened in Kigamboni Municipality. 
26 In practice, also in this case a maximum loan amount is defined by the bank single borrower limit and 
the collateral value. 
27 For example, in Temeke Municipality, approximately 2,000 RLs were collateralised and 2,400 RLs 
were legally transferred from 2005 to 2017 (out of 78,896 plots eligible for RL). 
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et al., 2011; Sheuya and Burra, 2016). Thus, the perceived and effective gains from 
formalisation might be low, especially in a context characterised by strong informal institutions 
of land ownership and lack of trust in the formal system (Panman, 2020). 
 
In 2018, we conducted a Land Tenure Survey of 1,363 plot owners in 138 survey clusters across 
the informal settlements eligible for RL (for more detail on survey design and implementation, 
see Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis). Plot owners who have ever acquired the RL 
(n=663) indicated the following predominant motivation: first, securing government 
compensation in case of eviction (51%); second, securing the plot from boundary conflicts 
(21%), third, ease inheritance (10%).28 Therefore, the main motivations pertain to tenure 
security, despite low perceived risk of government eviction. Rates of land disputes were around 
10%, both at the time of the RL project commencement and in 2018.29 Conversely, motivations 
for non-uptake of RL include: lack of information and awareness (52%); actual or expected 
hurdles in the processes of acquisition and renewal (44%); and the monetary costs (36%), 
particularly in terms of long-term commitment to land rents and renewal fees. Thus, the main 
deterrents to uptake are the uncertainty regarding the relative benefits of formality versus 
informality, and the bureaucracy for RL acquisition and renewal. Indeed, the government only 
provided information in the early stages of the programme, during the phase of plot-
identification in the field. 
 
2.2.2 Conceptual motivation for examining peer-effects in choices of formalisation 
In Dar es Salaam, as in many African cities, land and housing markets rely on informal 
institutions enforced through social relations at the neighbourhood level. As Kombe and 
Kreibich (2002: 8) put it:  
“‘Social recognition’ of an individual’s rights on land by other settlers, especially the 
adjoining landowners, by local leaders and relatives or friends is the key factor 
guaranteeing security of tenure”. 
In a context where social interactions are key to defining and validating informal tenure 
arrangements, individual choices of uptake can generate interdependent preferences, social 
incentives or disincentives for formalisation, resulting in peer-effects. On one side, social 
learning may compensate for asymmetric information on the relative gains from formalisation 
versus informality. In this case, observing others taking up provides a positive signal on the 
relative benefits and costs of formalisation. On the other, there might be strategic 
 
28 Only 7% of respondents indicated accessing formal credit as their predominant motivation. 
29 According to the Household Socio-Economic Survey, land disputes involved 9.2% of plots interviewed 
in the period 2004-2006. Similarly, the Land Tenure Survey found around 9.7% plots with pending 
disputes in 2018. 
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complementarities in choices of formalisation, associated to non-private returns from formal 
titles. In this case, any additional uptake increases the benefits of formalisation and/or the costs 
of informality. For example, related to the predominant motivations for uptake indicated above, 
the risk of eviction decreases as the number of titled plots increases.30 Furthermore, any 
anticipated infrastructural upgrade will only occur if a critical mass of plot owners contributes 
via land rents and other forms of participation (e.g. cash, labour).  
 
Notably, in urban Tanzania the informal contract of ownership involves the plot owner, their 
adjacent neighbours and their local leaders as external enforcers, including the mtaa chairman, 
executive officers, and wajumbe. The mtaa is the lower level administrative unit (sub-ward), 
comprised of a few thousand plots. Chairmen and executive officers belong to the government 
structure. The mtaa chairman is a political figure, elected by residents. The mtaa executive 
officer is a bureaucrat appointed by the government. Other leaders, called wajumbe, administer 
a few hundred plots (shina) with the help of some assistants. These leaders do not belong to the 
government apparatus. Their mandate and their practices can be deemed informal. 
 
Together local leaders and neighbours know the history of the plot and provide essential 
witnesses validating the informal contract to third parties (Manara and Pani, 2020b – Chapter 4 
of this thesis). For example, they are involved in the informal arbitration of land disputes. The 
government hears them during processes of formalisation and eviction. Middlemen, prospective 
buyers, and loan officers collect from them essential information regarding the plot and the plot 
holder before deciding to purchase or pledge land. Thus, adjacent plot owners define one 
another’s informal social contract and determine its validity to third parties, impacting on the 
risks, costs and benefits of informality.31 
 
It follows that peer-effects may be higher among adjacent neighbours. First, adjacent neighbours 
can be more effective at updating information on the perceived relative benefits of formalisation 
versus informality. On the one side, frequent and salient interactions pertaining to land matters 
increase the opportunity to exchange information on choices, experiences and expectations 
concerning land tenure. On the other, the tenure security levels of adjacent neighbours are 
strongly correlated; for example, they have similar risks and costs of eviction and land 
disputes.32 Thus, the information provided by adjacent neighbours is more relatable. For these 
reasons, social learning might be higher among adjacent neighbours.  
 
30 Land titles will increase compensation costs and disincentivise the government from eviction. 
31 For example, there are several accounts of plot owners losing part of their plot due to adjacent 
neighbours validating the double purchase or encroachment of this land by illegitimate occupiers. 
32 Often eviction occurs at the micro-scale (e.g. to create or enlarge a road). Similarly, factors affecting 
compensation are likely to correlate for adjacent plot owners. Furthermore, these have similar risks of 
land disputes, depending on the predisposition of proximate neighbours to encroach on other plots. 
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Second, non-private returns to formalisation might increase with spatial proximity. For instance, 
plot owners will have higher returns from land titles if private and public investment increases 
in the vicinity of their plots; notably, through the government providing public goods locally.33 
In addition, there are further non-private returns to formalisation when it comes to adjacent 
neighbours who are part of one another’s informal contract. In this case, the adjacent neighbour 
who takes up the RL effectively revokes the social contract and undermines its validity for all 
parties involved. This increases the risks and costs of informality for the plot owner who 
remains untitled. For example, the informal process of dispute arbitration might become 
ineffective in case of encroachment by adjacent neighbours with statutory protection, thereby 
raising the risks of informal tenure. 
 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics  
2.3.1 Data sources 
From the MLHHSD, I collected the GIS map of parcel layouts (Figure 2) and the Household 
Socio-Economic Survey fielded during the early stages of the RL programme. A map of plots 
eligible for the programme was produced through a collective exercise of boundary 
identification involving the Ministry officer, plot owner, local leaders and adjacent neighbours 
as witnesses. Plots’ contours were initially drawn by hand on areal pictures in the field and then 
transferred to GIS without the support of coordinates, which caused numerous mistakes. 
However, it was possible for plot owners to have them amended afterwards (author’s 
interviews).34 The Household Socio-Economic Survey is the most extensive database of the 
unplanned settlements in Dar es Salaam. For all plots in mitaa under the RL programme, it 
records micro-data on plots’ occupation and development, including information on buildings 
and infrastructure. Challenges in the use of this data include accuracy and missing values. 
Indeed, surveyors could not visit the same plot repeatedly, and sometimes interviewed a 
household member instead of the plot owner. For the main analysis, I use variables that are 
widely populated and accurate, either extrapolated from the plots’ shapefile, or observed 
directly by the surveyor (e.g. road access).35 Field interviews ceased in December 2006 (Figure 
3). Subsequently, plot owners could go to the MLHHSD to undertake the interview. From the 
Municipalities of Ilala, Kinondoni, Ubungo and Temeke,36 I obtained records of Residential 
Licence payments detailing choices of formalisation, including the date of RL acquisition. Data 
 
Finally, adjacent neighbours share the same local leaders, determining the probability and costs of land 
dispute resolution. 
33 Community taps, paved roads, and drainage systems increase the property value more if located in the 
proximity of the property. 
34 This imposed an additional process and extra opportunity costs to plot owners. 
35 Other variables include data on income and employment, not used in this paper due to many missing 
values. 
36 Ubungo’s records are kept at the Kinondoni Municipal Office. The fifth Municipality of Dar es Salaam 
(Kigamboni) has stopped the RL programme in some areas. 
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on land rent payment and RL renewal are only available at Temeke Municipality. As other 
Municipalities maintain manual and non-systematic records of these transactions, long-term 
choices of formalisation will be studied on a smaller sample of plots in Temeke.  
 
2.3.2 Sampling considerations and pairing strategy 
There are 220,829 unique plot identifiers matching across the GIS map and the Household 
Socio-Economic Survey. Roughly 188,568 plot owners were identified and interviewed by 
2017; if in non-hazardous areas, these are eligible for the RL. For this paper, I sampled 158,204 
plots eligible for formalisation since the beginning of the programme (non-hazardous, identified 
and interviewed in the field by December 2006).37 Because I am interested in studying the 
heterogeneity of peer-effects for old and new settlers, I restrict the sample to plot owners with 
observed year of arrival and I remain with a dataset of 130,006 individual plot observations.38 
For the analysis, plots are paired to create reference groups according to four definitions: for 
fixed radius neighbourhoods, I pair all plots within 50 meters or 100 meters distance. For fixed-
n neighbourhoods, I match each plot with their 15 or 60 closest observable neighbours. Using 
survey data from a central neighbourhood in Dar es Salaam, Collin (2020) finds that plot 
owners tend to know their neighbours living within 50 meters. I also adopt the 100 meters 
radius to account for the lower density of peripheral locations and, more generally, to test for the 
robustness of results. The thresholds for the fixed-n neighbourhoods were chosen because 15 
and 60 represent the fifty percentile of the number of neighbours within 50 meters and 100 
meters respectively. A matrix of rook contiguity was created using the GeoDa. This relationship 
captures the boundary relationship that I am interested in studying (differently from queen 
contiguity). Other spatial relationships of interest include second order rook contiguity, rank of 
proximity, and linear distance between plots’ centroids.  
 
2.3.3 Data descriptives  
Summary statistics for sampled plots are presented in Tables 1 and 2, describing individual and 
pairwise characteristics respectively. From Table 1, most interviews occurred in 2005 (83%) 
and in Temeke Municipality (42%). The mean year of arrival is 1993; 83% of plots owners have 
completed construction, 91% live on their plots, 37% have tenants. Plot area and building value 
are about 280 sqm and 7,200,000 TSh respectively. On average, there are 2 households and 7.6 
people per plot. Some plots have road access (47%), electricity (39%), a system of waste 
collection (35%), and some source of water provision (29%), including private connection, well, 
 
37 This restriction excludes self-selected plot owners, who went to the Ministry to undertake the interview 
since 2007.   
38 Applying this sample restriction enables me to use the same sample for the main and the heterogeneity 
analyses. For robustness I repeat the main analysis on the full sample, finding similar results.  
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or community tap.39 The vast majority indicated one or more priorities for neighbourhood 
upgrading activities (91%); 60% are willing to share the costs of upgrades (with labour or cash), 
suggesting some cooperative attitude and the intention to invest in the area. In fact, 40% are 
ready to contribute cash. Of the sampled plots, 44% have taken up their RL by August 2007, 
and, for those, the mean number of days between their interview and their application for RL is 
211 (equivalent to 7 months). In Temeke Municipality, 30% paid the first-year’s land rent and 
16% renewed their RL two years after uptake. Here, 13% have active RL by August 2017. From 
Table 2, the baseline propensity to coordinate on uptake by August 2007 is, on average, 54% 
across different reference groups.40 The mean number of days between two uptakes is 93 
(roughly 3 months). In Temeke, the baseline propensity to coordinate on the first-year’s land 
rent payment, the second-year renewal, and having an active RL by August 2017 are, on 
average, 59%, 73% and 77% respectively, across different reference groups. Around 20 percent 
of paired plots are rook adjacent in the smaller reference groups, while about 5 percent are rook 
adjacent in the larger reference groups. 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝛼ū𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽ā𝑗𝑖 + 𝑥′𝑝𝑖 𝛾 + 𝜆𝑦𝑖 + 𝜆𝑚𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖                                                        (1) 
Table 3 shows results from descriptive OLS regressions of the form above (1), where 𝑢𝑖 is an 
indicator equal to 1 if plot owner i has taken up the RL by August 2007. The regressor of 
interest is ū𝑗𝑖 defined as the mean uptake of plot owners j neighbours to i (either first order 
adjacent, within 50 meters or 100 meters distance). Controls include the neighbours’ mean year 
of arrival, ā𝑗𝑖; a vector of plot characteristics (listed in Table 1) related to plot owner i, 𝑥′𝑝𝑖; i’s 
interview year and sub-ward (mtaa) fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the mtaa level. On 
average across all specifications, an increase of one standard deviation in the plot owner’s year 
of arrival (equivalent to 11.4 years) correlates with a 5% increase in their propensity to uptake. 
To understand the magnitude of this coefficient, I note that a 10% increase in property value 
raises the likelihood of uptake by 1% (not shown). This suggests that newcomers might have 
higher incentives for formalisation, for example associated with lower tenure security, as argued 
in the literature (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). Whilst plot owners’ choices of formalisation do not 
correlate with their neighbours’ mean year of arrival, I find evidence of spatial correlation in 
uptake. For example, the plot owner is 11% more likely to acquire the RL when the mean 
uptake of their adjacent neighbours increases by one standard deviation, equivalent to 33% 
(column 2), and 15% more likely if the mean uptake of their neighbours within 100 meters 
increases by one standard deviation, equivalent to 14% (column 4). Overall, this descriptive 
evidence supports the hypothesis that there is coordination in choices of formalisation, as this 
 
39 The remaining 71% purchase drinking water. 
40 Paired plot owners are said to coordinate if both or none have taken up by a certain threshold date. 
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paper investigates in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. Furthermore, this evidence suggests that plot 
owners’ choices are influenced by their length of tenure. In fact, if newcomers are particularly 
uncertain about their tenure security and the gains from formalisation, they might be more 
inclined to follow the behaviour of their peers. Heterogeneity in peer-effects is discussed in 
section 2.5.3.    
 
2.4 Empirical set-up  
The causal estimation of peer-effects is complicated by several challenges to identification 
(Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001). In fact, collective behaviour could be caused by the spatial 
correlation of observable and unobservable characteristics (sorting) or local shocks (correlated 
effects). For example, uptake might be higher in wealthier neighbourhoods because plot owners 
are relatively better off, independently of peer-effects. Similarly, local shocks such as natural 
hazards, neighbourhood infrastructure or community leaders might affect the local rate of 
uptake, regardless of peer-effects. Another issue is simultaneity, whereby it is challenging to 
identify the direction of peer-effect (who influences whom). Solutions to these problems include 
experimental or quasi-experimental approaches introducing a source of exogenous variation in 
the behaviour of selected neighbours (treatment) or the structure of the neighbourhood (De 
Giorgi et al., 2010; Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Gibbons et al., 2013).  
 
One quasi-experimental approach is formulated in Bayer et al. (2008).41 In the absence of actual 
observations of individual networks, their paper draws on census data to estimate referral effects 
in the labour market. Their strategy uses pairs of residents in large neighbourhoods, defined as 
the Census Block or the Ten Closest Blocks. Depending on the definition of neighbourhood 
used, their pairs are either symmetric and transitive, or asymmetric and non-transitive. For the 
Census Block definition, if B belongs to the neighbourhood of A, then A is included in the 
neighbourhood of B (symmetry). If B and C belong to the neighbourhood of A, then C belongs 
to B’s neighbourhood and B belongs to C’s (transitivity). For the Ten Closest Blocks definition, 
if B belongs to the neighbourhood of A, the latter might be excluded from the neighbourhood of 
B (asymmetry). If B and C belong to the neighbourhood of A, C can be excluded from B’s 
neighbourhood and B can be excluded from C’s (intransitivity). In all cases, two individuals 
living in the same block will always belong to the same neighbourhood and will be paired with 
the same individuals.  
 
To identify referral effects, Bayer et al. (2008) compare the propensity to work in the same 
block for: i) pairs living in the same block, and ii) pairs living in the same neighbourhood (but 
 
41 Later applications and developments of this empirical approach are found in Hellerstein et al. (2014), 
Helmers and Patnam (2014), Patacchini and Zenou (2012a, b) and Schmutte (2015). 
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not in the same block). Thus, the variable of interest is a spatial relationship of living in the 
same block, which enables the authors to identify referral effects based on two assumptions. 
First, that geographical distance proxies for social relations. That is, pairs living in the same 
block are more likely to have social relations compared to others. Second, that there is a random 
allocation of individuals to blocks within neighbourhoods. That is, residents may sort to 
neighbourhoods, but not to specific blocks, due to the thinness of land markets. Therefore, if 
pairs living in the same block have a higher propensity to work in the same block, this will be 
caused by referral (peer-effects) and not by sorting. Furthermore, as individuals appear in 
multiple pairs, this strategy allows the authors to control for two individual fixed effects, 
absorbing the individuals’ idiosyncratic behaviour and unobservable characteristics. 
 
I adopt a similar strategy to study peer-effects in choices of formalisation with RL. Specifically, 
I will describe the propensity to coordinate for more versus less proximate pairs in small 
neighbourhoods, defined by alternative criteria of fixed-radius distance or fixed-number of 
neighbours. As one important difference from Bayer et al. (2008), I have detailed individual 
locations, which has two advantages. First, for each individual in my dataset, I can construct a 
specific reference group around their location. This reinforces the assumption that geographical 
distance proxies for social relations. Second, I can control the spatial extent of the reference 
groups, therefore defining very small neighbourhoods where the assumption of randomness is 
sounder. Furthermore, I note that my pairing strategy generates intransitive pairs; for each A and 
B, there can be one or more C included in A’s reference group, but not in B’s. Depending on the 
definition of neighbourhood used, pairs are either symmetric (fixed-radius distance) or 
asymmetric (fixed-number of neighbours).  
 
I estimate equation (2), 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑖𝑗 𝛽 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗     (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is one of five pairwise outcomes: first, 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑗,2007 is an indicator equal to 1 
if both plot owners have made the same choice of uptake (or lack thereof) by August 2007. 
Second, 𝑙𝑛𝛥𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the natural logarithm of the number of days occurring between two 
uptakes. This outcome variable allows me to study the time between choices of formalisation. 
Other outcomes are 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗, which are indicators equal to one if 
both titled owners have made the same choice regarding paying the land rent or renewing the 
RL, one and two years after their uptake, respectively. Last, 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑗,2017 is an indicator 
equal to 1 if both, or neither, of the plot owners have an active RL by August 2017 (ten years 
after our initial outcome measurement). 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 measures alternative relationships of 
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spatial proximity, as defined below. In the presence of peer-effects, I expect that more 
proximate pairs have a higher propensity to coordinate on choices of formalisation (positive 𝛼). 
𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 is a dummy for plots sharing a boundary (first-order contiguity). Other measures of 
spatial proximity include 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘2𝑖𝑗, a dummy for second order contiguity; 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗, an ordinal 
rank of proximity;42 and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗, the distance between two plots’ centroids in linear and log 
form. These relations of spatial proximity are either symmetric – 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗, 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘2𝑖𝑗 and 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 – or asymmetric – 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗.  𝑥′𝑖𝑗 is a vector of controls including the difference 
between interview dates and a dummy for different sub-ward (mtaa). These capture some local 
shocks such as the local roll-out of the programme or the local politics of the lower level 
government.43 Some specifications control for additional pairwise characteristics. The equation 
includes two individual fixed effects for i and j, 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑗. Errors are clustered at the pair level, 
𝑖𝑗. Robustness checks apply some sample restrictions to minimize potential sources of bias 
due, for example, to plot geometry and density. 
  
Although the identifying assumption that there is a quasi-random allocation of plot owners in 
small geographical areas is intuitively sound, following Bayer et al. (2008) I perform a 
balancing test to verify that there is no correlation of observable characteristics for proximate 
plot owners compared to the larger reference group. I test for the correlation in neighbours’ 
observable characteristics, using the equation below: 
𝑋𝑗𝑖 = 𝛼 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝑗𝑖                                                                      (3)  
where X𝑗𝑖 is one of several plot characteristics relative to plot owner j neighbour to i: year of 
arrival, plot area, plot development (complete construction), building value, plot occupation (by 
owner and/or tenants), number of resident households and people, willingness to participate in 
upgrading activities (labour or cash), and willingness to contribute cash.44 The spatial 
relationship used is 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑗𝑖. Because adjacent neighbours are the most proximate, this 
relationship provides the sharpest balancing test. I capture individual fixed effects for i (𝜆𝑖) and 
test whether the characteristics of interest are different for adjacent versus non-adjacent plots 
(𝛼) in small neighbourhoods surrounding i (50- or 100-meters radius). To avoid the possibility 
that the same individuals are observed both as plot owners i and neighbours j (ibid.), the 
balancing test is performed on a subsample of plots selected through a raster grid method so that 
 
42 With 1 being the closest plot, 15 being the 15th closest plot, etc. 
43 The difference between interview dates is important because plot owners are not eligible to uptake until 
they undertake the interview. The politics of the lower level government (mtaa) may influence choices of 
formalisation as local leaders normally administer the informal land management. They are key figures in 
a community, and plot owners tend to listen to their advice on land matters, including choices of 
formalisation (Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
44 Area characteristics are not included because variance is minimal in small neighbourhoods. 
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they appear in the matrix either as plots i or j. Specifically, a raster grid of 150 by 150 meters 
was overlaid with a layer of plots’ centroids (for plots with non-missing data). For each grid 
point, I selected the closest plot as i, and their neighbours within 50 or 100 meters as j. This 
enables me to construct neighbourhoods around plot owners i and to control that these are not 
simultaneously observed in the neighbourhoods of other plot owners. Results are presented in 
Table 4.  Only a few characteristics are statistically significant: plot area, number of 
households, and people residing on plot. As most observables are balanced, it can be assumed 
that there is no correlation of unobservables between rook-adjacent neighbours, conditioning on 
the larger reference groups. 
  
The estimation approach of equation (2) enables me to detect patterns of coordination in choices 
of formalisation. To causally identify peer-effects and explore their heterogeneity and channels, 
I adopt a pseudo diff-in-diff approach, observing pairs i-j over time.45 Implementing equation 
(4), I study the behaviour of plot owner i following the uptake of their neighbour j and estimate 
whether more proximate pairs have a higher propensity to coordinate compared to the baseline 
propensity of pairs in the larger reference group. This identification also enables me to capture 
the timing of coordination, that is, when i is more likely to uptake following j. 
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) +  𝛾𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝑗 ζ + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜆𝑚(𝑖) + 𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗        (4) 
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗 is 1 if plot owner i, neighbour to j, has taken up a RL in calendar month m, 
comprised between May 2005 (first issuance of RL) and August 2007.46 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) is a 
categorical variable with values from t-1 to t+n, capturing the timing of j’s uptake. It is equal to 
t in the month of j’s uptake (event); t-1 one month before; t+1 one month after, etc. Pairs i-j are 
sampled if i had not taken up before j,47 and they are observed until i takes up, for a maximum of 
n months after the event. 48 The coefficient 𝛽 estimates monthly changes in the propensity to 
uptake for any i in the reference group (neighbourhood baseline). The coefficient of interest 𝛾, 
on the interaction term 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗, estimates the difference in the propensity to 
uptake for more versus less proximate i. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 and 𝑥′𝑖𝑗 are defined as above, measuring 
alternative relationships of spatial proximity and other pairwise characteristics. I control for 
 
45 Patterns of coordination described by results from equation (2) suggest that peer-effects influence the 
early choices of formalisation, but not the later choices. Therefore, the remainder of the analysis will 
focus on uptake only, as opposed to also considering choices of land rent payment or RL renewal. 
46 That is, from the month of first issuance of RL (May 2005) to the month of our first outcome 
measurement (August 2007) in equation (2). 
47 By sample restriction, i must take up at least one day after j or never. Note, this restriction eliminates 
simultaneity enabling me to capture the direction of peer-effects (the influence of j on i). 
48 A pair-observation is dropped when both plots have taken up, as i stops having a choice of uptake. 
Thus, a pair might be observed less than n months following j’s uptake. 
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individual fixed effects on i, 𝜆𝑖, and monthly time trends, 𝜆𝑚(𝑖). Errors are clustered at the pair 
level, 𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗. I perform a battery of robustness checks as for equation (2). To measure 
heterogeneity in peer-effects, I estimate the same equation (4) on different subsamples of old 
settlers and newcomers, as explained in section 2.5.3. 
 
Finally, the last section of the paper explores some possible mechanisms of peer-effects among 
proximate neighbours. Some channels are discussed and examined, using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence, including descriptive statistics 49 and interviews with key 
government officials. For the quantitative analysis, I adopt a variant of identification (4), as 
described below (5), to study whether peer-effects among proximate neighbours result from 
higher social learning (channel 1) or from increased non-private returns to formalisation 
(channel 2). To examine these channels, I estimate: 
 
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗 = 𝛼 +   𝛽𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) +  𝛾𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗  
  + 𝜂𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑍𝑗𝑖 + 𝜇𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 × 𝑍𝑗𝑖 + φ𝑍𝑗𝑖 
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝑗 ζ + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜆𝑚(𝑖) + 𝑖𝑚(𝑖)𝑗        (5) 
where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is 1 if alternatively, plot owner j neighbour to i is an absentee landlord or is willing to 
contribute to neighbourhood upgrading activities. First, j is an absentee landowner if they do not 
occupy their plot (i.e. rented property). Second, willingness to contribute to neighbourhood 
upgrading activities is measured from a widely populated variable of the Household Socio-
Economic Survey, indicating whether plot owners would like to give time and/or cash towards 
their top three priority improvements.50 These variables proxy for the frequency and the saliency 
of information exchanges between i-j, or the expected returns to formalisation. I note that while 
the presence of an absentee landlord is likely exogenous, the willingness to contribute to local 
upgrade might be endogenous to i. In fact, each plot owner i has a negligible impact on their 
neighbours’ choices to occupy their plots versus being an absentee landlord. Instead, there 
might be spatial shocks creating correlation in the willingness to contribute to neighbourhood 
upgrade, which can bias the results. The coefficient of interest is 𝜇 measuring whether 𝑍𝑗𝑖 
introduces differentials in peer-effects. In practice, I only use one definition of spatial proximity, 
𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗, because results from equation (4) showed that peer-effects occur among first-order 
adjacent neighbours. Last, studying heterogeneity in peer-effects, I also estimate a version of 
 
49 From the Household Socio-Economic Survey described in the previous section of this paper, and 
primary survey data collected from this author and her colleague (Land Tenure Survey, see details in 
Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
50 Specifically, plot owners were asked, “do you see a need for neighbourhood upgrade?”; “Rank up to 
three upgrade priorities from this list” – options included water source, local roads, drainage system, solid 




(5), where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is a variable for newcomer, on two subsamples of old and new settlers. Several 
definitions of 𝑍𝑗𝑖  are adopted: a dummy indicating if neighbour j has arrived in the last five or 
two years; or the number of years stayed in continuous and log form.51 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Patterns of coordination in choices of formalisation  
Table 5 reports results from equation (2) including basic sample restrictions and controls.52 
Looking first at Panel A, where the indicator for spatial proximity is a dummy for first order 
rook adjacent plots, we find patterns of coordination in the early choices of formalisation. Two 
years into the programme, by August 2007, the propensity that plot owners have made the same 
choice of uptake is 2.6% higher for rook adjacent plots compared to the reference group 
(column 1). Moreover, the number of days between two applications for RL is 12% shorter for 
rook adjacent plots compared to others (column 2). Further, these plots are 2.3% more likely to 
either both pay or not pay the first-year’s land rent (column 3). This is suggestive of 
coordinating behaviour between adjacent plots concerning both the choices and the timing of 
first uptake. Conversely, there is milder evidence of coordination on subsequent choices of 
formalisation. In fact, the propensity that rook adjacent plots make the same choices of first-
time renewal is 0.5% higher than the baseline in the reference group (column 4). Similarly, the 
propensity to coordinate on holding an active RL by 2017 is 0.4% higher (column 5). Therefore, 
later choices of formalisation are more likely influenced by independent factors (e.g. individual 
experience of the RL). 
  
In the next panels, I study other relationships of spatial proximity and include controls for other 
pairwise characteristics. Coefficients on first order rook adjacency remain statistically 
significant after controlling for second order adjacency (Panel B), rank of proximity (Panel C), 
linear distance between plots (Panel D), and other pairwise plots’ characteristics (Panel E), 
despite some drop in magnitude, particularly when the linear distance between plots is 
controlled for. Notably, coefficients on the rank of proximity and linear distance are statistically 
significant for the early choices of uptake (columns 1-2). When distance increases by one 
standard deviation (11 meters) the propensity to coordinate on early uptake decreases by 0.8% 
and the number of days between applications increases by 3%. Similarly, the effects of a one 
standard deviation increase in rank (equivalent to 7.5 positions) are -0.6% and +2% 
 
51 The two-years dummy implies that j arrived after the programme announcement and/or 
commencement. Results are only shown for the five-years’ definition. 
52 Sample restrictions: plot area between 60 and 3,000 sqm, number of rook adjacent between 1 and 7, 
roughly corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentile of the variables’ distribution. Further, the number of 
rook neighbours must be smaller than the number of non-rook neighbours in the reference group. Basic 
controls include the number of days between the two plots’ interviews and a dummy for different mtaa. 
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respectively. Overall, this table suggests that: first, the propensity to coordinate remains the 
highest for first order rook adjacent neighbours; second, there is virtually no difference between 
second order rook adjacent neighbours and any other pairs in the reference network; and third, 
more generally, coordination is higher for closer neighbours compared to more distant ones. 
This suggests that peer-effects are higher for neighbours sharing a boundary but persist in the 
larger reference network decaying with distance. 
 
Robustness 
Robustness checks on identification (2) verify that results are not driven by the reference group 
definition (50 meters radius) or by outlier plots, with specific features (e.g. plot area) 
determining either too few or too many neighbours. 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the spatial relation of interest. In 
Table 6, each panel adopts a different reference group: 15 closest neighbours, 100 meters 
radius, and 60 closest neighbours. Results are robust in all definitions of reference group and for 
all outcome variables. As it should be expected, there are slight magnitude increases when 
conditioning on the larger reference groups, because rook adjacent plots are now compared to 
more distant neighbours. Table 7 uses the 50 meters radius reference group. Each panel applies 
sample restrictions to minimize the potential bias associated with plots’ geometry and density. 
Indeed, attributes like the area and shape of plots determine the number of rook and non-rook 
neighbours per plot owner and potentially affect the coefficient of interest. Broadly, restrictions 
in panels A, B and D cut the lowest and upper ten percentiles of the variables’ distribution. 
Panel A reduces the sample to plots with areas between 100 and 1,000 sqm. Panel B selects 
plots with 2 to 5 rook adjacent neighbours. Panel C restricts each plot’s reference group to an 
equal number of rook and non-rook neighbours. Panel D includes only plots with 6 to 27 
neighbours in the 50 meters radius. In all cases, the coefficients remain substantially unaltered 
demonstrating the robustness of my main results. 
 
2.5.2 Peer-effects in choices of formalisation 
To further explore my preliminary evidence of coordination in the early choices of 
formalisation, this section deploys a causal empirical strategy described by equation (4). This 
enables me to estimate whether the uptake of j causes the uptake of i, measuring the effect for 
rook plots compared to others in the larger reference group. Further, I can determine the timing 
of peer-effects and whether this differs for rook versus non-rook neighbours. I start by adopting 
the smaller reference group, 50 meters radius. Results from the main specification are shown in 
Table 8 column 1 and Figure 5a. For all plot owners i who have not taken up before j, the 
propensity to uptake increases sharply after this event, particularly in the same or the following 
month. This suggests that: first, j’s uptake is associated with a rise in the overall neighbourhood 
uptake. Second, this increase is steeper in the immediate aftermath of j’s uptake. Third, this rise 
61 
 
is higher for rook adjacent neighbours compared to others. To understand the magnitude of this 
effect, for each time period I compare the propensity to uptake for rook versus non-rook 
neighbours (the latter provides a baseline of the local trend). The propensity to uptake in the 
same month is 25% higher for neighbours i adjacent to j. One month after the event, the 
propensity to uptake is, for rook neighbours, 18% higher than the baseline. In the subsequent 
periods, this effect drops smoothly, reaching 14% in t+6. I note that the constant term on 
𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗, describing the behaviour of adjacent plot owners at time t-1, is negative. This occurs 
across all specifications (including in Tables 9 and 10). Preliminary investigations reveal that 
this is mechanical and due to the fixed-effects estimation strategy.  
 
Columns 2-4 introduce other spatial relationships: second order adjacency (𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘2𝑖𝑗), rank of 
proximity, and linear distance between plots, respectively. Importantly, these do not affect the 
outcome variable, nor the coefficients of 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗. Indeed, they are not statistically significant, or 
their magnitude is zero (linear distance). This suggests that boundary relationships explain a 
large part of peer-effects in small neighbourhoods, as opposed to simple word-of-mouth or plot 
owners gathering in the local public meetings. In fact, in these cases, we would observe negative 
coefficients on distance (assuming that word-of-mouth decreases smoothly with spatial 
distance) or no peer-effects at all (because most neighbours attend the same meetings, there 
should not be peer-effects among adjacent neighbours). 
 
Robustness 
In Tables 9 and 10 I conduct several robustness checks. Table 9 column 1 adopts a fixed-n 
reference group (n=15). Broadly speaking, coefficients describe a similar pattern with peer-
effects reaching a peak one month after j’s uptake. However, peer-effects are relatively smaller 
in size compared to my main results: from 20% in t to 6% in t+6. Columns 2 and 5 cut the 
bottom and top 10th percentiles of plot area and neighbourhood density respectively, leading to 
minor drops in peer-effects for adjacent neighbours. In column 4, for each plot we consider an 
equal number of rook and non-rook neighbours. Restricting the reference group reduces peer-
effects for rook neighbours compared to others, as should be expected. In column 3, I consider 
plots with 2 to 5 adjacent neighbours.53 For those, the propensity to uptake increases to 27% and 
18% of the baseline in t and t+6 respectively. 
  
In Table 10, I change some features of the sampling strategy. In column 1, all pairs are 
observed at all time periods, instead of dropping if i takes up.54 Thus, I am capturing the 
 
53 Corresponding to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution. 




cumulative peer-effects (Figure 5b) confirming that the propensity to uptake is higher for rook 
neighbours at all periods after the event. In column 2, I remove the sampling restriction 
imposing that i must be interviewed before t-1.55 Peer-effects remain higher for rook 
neighbours, suggesting that j’s uptake may push their adjacent neighbours to first take the 
interview and then the RL. Column 3 observes pairs where j takes up between January and June 
2006. Whilst the pattern is similar, peer-effects increase compared to my main specification: for 
rook neighbours the propensity to uptake after j is between 36% and 22% higher than the 
baseline. Finally, column 4 extends observations to twelve time periods, suggesting that the 
pattern described by my main specification continues over time (Figure 5c). 
 
To conclude, despite some variation in the size of the effects, this section provides evidence that 
the uptake of j causes an increase in the uptake of their rook adjacent plot owners compared to 
others. All specifications suggest that peer-effects are more sizeable soon after the event. 
Beyond period t+1, a plateau is reached. Whilst the rise in the overall neighbourhood uptake 
might be the result of sorting or correlated effects (e.g. the area having recently become eligible 
for RL), the difference between rook and non-rook neighbours is evidence of peer-effects. It is 
also suggestive of boundary channels for peer-coordination. 
 
2.5.3 Heterogeneity in peer-effects 
My highlight finding is that there are peer-effects in RL adoption, especially in the early choices 
of formalisation. In the remainder of this section, I will examine heterogeneity in peer-effects 
for old and new settlers. The literature suggests that informal plot owners have an idiosyncratic 
level of perceived tenure security, which increases with the number of years spent on the land. 
Similarly, the established nature of a community also contributes to a perception of tenure 
security (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). On the one side, descriptive results in section 2.3.3 
suggested that newcomers are more likely to uptake the RL, regardless of what their peers do. 
Consistent with the literature, this might result from higher perceived tenure insecurity related 
to their length of tenure. On the other side, increased insecurity may cause newcomers to be 
more responsive to peer behaviour. In the absence of reliable information on the returns from 
formalisation, they will update their expectations based on the behaviour of others who know 
the informal land management system better, including its risks and costs. In this case, we 
would observe higher peer-effects for plot owners who are new to the area. Yet, because these 
forces might go in the opposite direction, for example when the local uptake is low, in practice 
it might be hard to capture heterogeneity in peer-effects. 
 
 
55 In the main specification, a pair is sampled conditional on i having been interviewed before j’s uptake. 
This restriction ensures that i was already eligible for RL before the event, and therefore their lack of 
uptake constituted a choice. 
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My empirical analysis does not provide evidence of heterogeneity. First, I implement equation 
(4) on two subsamples of plot owners who arrived either by 1987 or from 2002, corresponding 
to the first and last quartile of the distribution of length of tenure. Results are presented in Table 
11, columns 1 and 2. Both old and new settlers coordinate with their proximate neighbours more 
than others. Indeed, peer-effects are similar in size to our main specification in Table 8 column 
1, and they are not statistically different across subsamples. Second, I implement a version of 
equation (5) where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is a dummy for newcomer (arrived in the last five years) on the same 
subsamples. 56 Results are shown in Table 11, columns 3 and 4. In this case, I measure whether 
old and new settlers have different propensities to take up following a newcomer. The signs of 
the coefficients suggest that old settlers are less likely (column 3), while new settlers are more 
likely (column 4) to coordinate with newcomers. However, the confidence intervals are large. 
Thus, despite the reasoning above, empirical evidence illustrates that length of tenure does not 
determine heterogeneity in peer-effects. 
 
2.6 Mechanisms  
This final section turns to discuss and examine some potential mechanisms of peer-effects. If 
those resulted from word-of-mouth occurring randomly or local public meetings, we would not 
observe higher peer-effects among adjacent neighbours (conditioning on small reference groups 
of 50 meters or 15 closest neighbours). Instead, peer-effects have a preferential boundary 
channel. Testing for the correlation of observable characteristics in small neighbourhoods, 
results in Table 4 demonstrated that peer-effects among adjacent neighbours cannot be driven 
by sorting mechanisms. I consider two alternative channels, drawing on the discussion in 
Section 2.2.2. First, social learning might be higher among adjacent neighbours as an effect of 
frequent and salient interactions concerning land matters. From this perspective, the adjacent 
neighbour’s uptake is more effective at updating information on the expected relative benefits of 
formalisation versus informality. Second, there are non-private returns from neighbours’ uptake, 
which increase with spatial proximity. That is, the plot owner receives the highest returns to 
formalisation when their most proximate neighbours have taken up too. To study these 
mechanisms, I will use primary survey data collected by this author and her colleague in 2018 
(Land Tenure Survey, detailed in the next Chapter of this thesis), as well as the Household 
Socio Economic Survey (2004-2006) presented in section 2.3.1. The last paragraph draws on 
interviews with key government officials to suggest why neighbours might be more prone to 




56 Results are robust to other measurements of newcomer, including a dummy for ‘arrived in the last two 
years’, and number of ‘years stayed’ in continuous and log form (available upon request). 
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2.6.1 Frequent and salient interactions increase social learning 
The first channel of peer-effects proposes that adjacent neighbours have a higher propensity to 
coordinate because they have more frequent and salient interactions compared to other pairs in 
small neighbourhoods. On the one side, the occurrence of daily and random interactions 
between adjacent neighbours is likely magnified in a context where the indoor spaces are small, 
overcrowded and poorly ventilated; thus, households spend a great deal of time and perform 
housekeeping tasks outdoors nearby their houses. On the other, adjacent neighbours are part of 
one another’s informal social contract. As elaborated in section 2.2.2, they are often involved as 
witnesses in the informal processes to arbitrate disputes, sell or pledge land, leading to salient 
interactions pertaining to land ownership. Frequent and salient interactions increase the 
opportunity to discuss perceptions, choices and experiences relative to informal tenure and the 
process of formalisation. Indeed, this is supported by descriptive evidence from the 2018 
survey, presented in Table 12. On average, respondents often meet and engage in conversation 
with 5 out of 9 close neighbours: mostly their adjacent neighbours and the local leader (column 
1). 57 Further, knowing well one additional neighbour increases their capacity to predict the local 
rate of uptake correctly (column 2).58  
 
I examine the proposed channel using a version of equation (5) where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is a dummy for 
absentee landlord. I expect to observe no peer-effects in this case, because the frequency and 
saliency of social interactions with absentee landlords decrease to the level of any other 
neighbour, if not below. Results are in Table 13. In column 1, local trends and their interactions 
with the rook dummy remain similar to my main specification in Table 8 column 1. That is, 
there are peer-effects among adjacent neighbours. However, in column 2, all interactions with 
the dummy for absentee landlord have negative signs. The first set of interactions, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗)× 
𝑍𝑗𝑖, are not statistically significant, suggesting that plot owners are similarly inclined to follow 
the local trend, regardless of their neighbours’ status (present or absentee). Instead, the triple 
interactions, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗)× 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗× 𝑍𝑗𝑖, are statistically significant, suggesting that peer-
effects are lower when the adjacent neighbour who takes up is an absentee landlord. Coefficient 
sizes vary across time periods. For example, at time t, plot owners are 16% less likely to uptake 
following an absentee adjacent neighbour, compared to one living locally. At time t+6, the 
differential is 19% lower than the baseline. The lowest peak is found at t+2 (-4%), although the 
coefficient is not significant. In sum, plot owners have a higher propensity to coordinate with 
their adjacent neighbours living locally. This evidence lends credibility to the hypothesis that 
 
57 Respondents were interviewed in clusters of ten including their local leader (survey cluster). They were 
shown a list with their names and nicknames. They were asked “Which ones do you know well, meaning 
you often meet and entertain in conversation with, including on important issues?” 
58 Following the question above, respondents were asked “How many of them do you think have ever 
taken up a RL?” 
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the channel of peer-effects resides in the frequency and the saliency of social interactions 
increasing social learning between adjacent neighbours. 
 
2.6.2 The proximity of titled plots increases non-private returns to formalisation 
The second channel proposes that adjacent neighbours have a higher propensity to coordinate 
because of non-private returns from formalisation increasing with spatial proximity. That is, the 
plot owner receives the highest returns to formalisation when their most proximate neighbours 
have taken up too. For example, property values increase with the quality of adjacent properties 
and infrastructure. Thus, local private and public investment can result in higher compensation, 
lower risk of eviction, and enhanced perceived tenure security. 59 Table 14 reports descriptive 
statistics from the Household Socio-Economic survey. Around 91% of plot owners identified 
some need for infrastructural upgrade and ranked among their top three priorities: water supply 
(90%), local roads (63%), drainage system (61%), solid waste collection (31%) and 
environmental improvements (20%). Relatedly, Table 15 shows that community or on plot 
water taps, road access, waste collection, and security from hazards are internalised in the 
property values estimated by Municipal officers.60 This evidence confirms that infrastructural 
improvements could increase the returns to formalisation by further raising property values. In 
fact, community taps, paved roads, and drainage systems increase the property value more if 
located in the proximity of the property. 
 
I examine this proposed channel with a specification of equation (5) where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is 1 if the 
neighbour is willing to contribute to upgrade activities (via cash or labour). In this case, we 
should observe higher peer-effects because the expected returns to formalisation increase with 
the number of contributors raising the likelihood of local upgrade. In fact, the provision of 
public goods depends on revenues (i.e. land taxes including RL payments) as well as other 
contributions (i.e. cash or labour participation in upgrade activities). Results are reported in 
Table 13. In column 3, time trends and propensities to coordinate with adjacent neighbours 
remain statistically significant and similar in size to my main specification in Table 8 column 1. 
In column 4, the interactions 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗)× 𝑍𝑗𝑖 are always positive, large – with magnitude 
comparable to peer-effects – and statistically significant. Similarly, coefficients on the triple 
interactions, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝑗)× 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗× 𝑍𝑗𝑖, are positive, of similar size and mostly 
significant, although standard errors are larger. This evidence suggests that first, at the 
neighbourhood level, plot owners are more likely to uptake following others who are willing to 
contribute to upgrade. Second, if these are adjacent neighbours, they are even more inclined to 
 
59 Because eviction becomes more expensive for the government. 




coordinate. For example, at time t, the plot owner is 18% more likely to uptake following their 
adjacent neighbour who is willing to contribute (compared to unwilling). This effect drops to 
7.5% in period t+6 and finds its lowest peak in period t+5 (+2%), although this coefficient is not 
significant. Thus, peer-effects are the highest if the neighbour who takes up is rook adjacent and 
willing to contribute to upgrade, thereby raising the chances of local infrastructural 
improvements. This evidence is consistent with the proposed channel suggesting that non-
private returns to formalisation increase with the spatial proximity of titled neighbours. 
 
2.6.3 Other channels of peer-effects  
Other plausible channels remain unexplored due to data limitations. Importantly, I note that the 
tenure security levels of adjacent neighbours are strongly correlated. In fact, except from the 
risk of inheritance dispute, which is idiosyncratic to the household, adjacent plots have similar, 
if not identical, risks of eviction and land disputes, as well as similar probabilities of 
compensation and dispute resolution. In fact, large-scale evictions are infrequent in Dar es 
Salaam. More often, evictions occur at the micro-scale to create or enlarge roads for 
infrastructure. Thus, perceived risks of eviction are local. Similarly, factors affecting 
compensation are likely to correlate for adjacent plots, as discussed in the prior paragraph. 
Furthermore, adjacent neighbours have similar risks of land disputes depending on the 
predisposition of proximate neighbours to encroach on contiguous plots. Finally, adjacent 
neighbours share the same local leaders and other witnesses, which determine similar 
probabilities and costs of informal dispute resolution. This has twofold implications. First, 
social learning might be higher among adjacent neighbours because their informal status is more 
relatable. Second, there are further non-private returns to formalisation, beyond those already 
discussed in section 2.6.2. Specifically, the adjacent neighbour who takes up the RL effectively 
revokes the social contract of informal ownership and undermines its validity for all parties 
involved. This increases the risks and costs of informality for the plot owner who remains 
untitled. For example, the informal process of dispute arbitration might become ineffective in 
case of encroachment by adjacent neighbours with statutory protection. In this case, i cannot 
invoke the statutory protection of the Municipality unless they have a RL too, whilst j could 
refuse to accept an informal arbitration. For i, this might increase the perceived risk of j 
encroaching on their plot. 
 
Concerning the timing of peer-effects, one plausible explanation is offered by interviews with 
municipal officers. Making sense of my results, they suggested that peer-effects at the 
neighbourhood level might be caused by referrals on the opportunity costs of the RL acquisition 
process. They explained that in the early stages of the programme when demand was higher, 
Municipalities were severely underequipped and unable to service all customers efficiently. 
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Anecdotally, just a few months into the programme, some offices had already run out of official 
government paper and had to stop issuing RL documents for several weeks, until the Ministry 
provided a new supply. A plot owner who had managed to successfully acquire the RL would 
then encourage their neighbours that the process was running and reasonably easy to navigate. 
This is certainly one plausible explanation of peer-effects in small neighbourhoods, especially in 
a context where plot owners worry about the process of RL acquisition, as mentioned in section 
2.2.1. Adding to the mechanisms presented above, this interpretation might also illuminate why 
neighbours have a higher propensity to uptake in the immediate aftermath of one another, when 
the process of acquisition is likely to have remained smooth. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This paper set out to examine peer-effects in the adoption of formal titles studying the RL 
programme in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Whilst the programme offered interim property rights 
to approximately 180,000 households, accounting for half of the estimated plots in the city’s 
unplanned settlements, the uptake rate is modest and concentrated in the early stages of the 
programme. Around 50% of eligible plot owners have taken up a RL. However, only 12.5% 
currently have an active RL as a result of drops in uptake and low renewal. In a context of 
scarce information and high uncertainty on the relative benefits of formalisation versus the 
social contract of informal tenure, it is plausible that the behaviour of some plot owners has 
functioned as a signal for others. In fact, the paper found spatial patterns of coordination in 
choices of formalisation, especially concerning the early choices and the timing of uptake. 
Furthermore, the paper provided evidence of peer-effects among adjacent plot owners. These 
are large in magnitude: for example, the propensity to uptake in the same month is 25% higher 
for adjacent neighbours compared to other pairs in small neighbourhoods. It is suggested that 
peer-effects are not heterogeneous across old and new settlers. Exploring two plausible 
mechanisms, I proposed that adjacent neighbours have a higher propensity to coordinate 
because of frequent and salient interactions pertaining to land tenure. Furthermore, I presented 
empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that non-private returns to formalisation 
increase with spatial proximity. Thus, higher social learning and strategic complementarities 
might explain peer-effects among adjacent neighbours. Other channels have remained 
unexplored for data limitations and warrant further investigation.  
 
Overall, these findings are policy relevant and suggest avenues for academic research. On the 
one hand, policy makers should be aware of the social multiplier effect of formalisation choices. 
Literature demonstrates that careful policy design can intervene on coordinated behaviour, when 
this is found to impinge upon the realisation of individual preferences or positive collective 
outcomes (Bicchieri, 2006). On the other hand, to inform well-designed policy instruments, 
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more empirical research is needed, investigating the causes of peer-effects and whether they 
effectively prevent the realisation of desirable outcomes in the private and public interest. 
Finally, this paper highlighted that formalised plots often revert to an informal status. It 
emerged that later choices of uptake and renewal are driven by independent motivations, which 





Figure 1. Residential Licence programme phase I (2004-2006). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence program phase I. 
 





Figure 3. Interviews per year. 
 
 
Notes: Histogram of number of plots identified and interviewed per year (2004-2017). 
 
 
Figure 4. Uptake of RL per year. 
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Figure 5. Peer-effects in RL adoption. 
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Notes: Figure 5 plots results from equation (4), with 95% confidence bands. Adopting a pseudo diff-in-
diff approach, I observe the behaviour of plot owner i following the uptake of their neighbour j and 
estimate whether more proximate i (Rook1) have higher propensity to coordinate compared to the 
baseline propensity of any i in the larger reference group (Control). On the vertical axis, coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. The horizonal axis represents monthly time periods from t-1 to t+n. Time period t 
corresponds to the month of j’s uptake. A pair i-j is sampled if the plot owner i had not taken up before j 
(by period t). The pair is dropped if i takes up and has no longer a choice of uptake. The blue line 
(Control) describes the local trend, that is, the propensity to uptake at the neighbourhood level. The red 
line (Rook1) describes the propensity to uptake for first order adjacent neighbours. Gaps between the 
lines must be interpreted as differences in the propensity to uptake for adjacent versus non-adjacent plot 
owners i. Sub-figure 5a reports results from my main specification in Table 8 column 1, defined as 
above. Sub-figures 5b and 5c change some features of the sampling strategy. In Sub-figure 5b, all pairs 
are observed at all time periods, instead of dropping if i takes up. Thus, it illustrates the cumulative peer-
effects (Table 10 column 1). In Sub-figure 5c, observations are extended over twelve time periods after t, 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of individual plots’ characteristics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Panel A  
Interview Year    
2004 130,006 0.08 0.27 
2005 130,006 0.83 0.37 
2006 130,006 0.09 0.29 
Municipality    
Ilala 130,006 0.27 0.44 
Kinondoni/Ubungo 130,006 0.31 0.46 
Temeke/Kigamboni 130,006 0.42 0.49 
    
Uptake by 2007 130,006 0.44 0.50 
DaysUptake- Interview (ln) 56,052 5.35 1.15 
Paid land rent  21,070 0.30 0.46 
Paid renewal 21,070 0.16 0.37 
Active by 2017 55,175 0.13 0.34 
    
Plot area (ln) 130,006 5.64 0.70 
Distance CBD (m) 130,006 8647.39 3139.59 
Distance hazard (m) 130,006 214.94 212.40 
Year Arrival 130,006 1993.33 11.40 
    
Panel B  
Plot developed 126,952 0.83 0.38 
Property value (ln) 110,460 15.79 1.05 
Owner lives on plot 124,982 0.91 0.28 
Has tenants 124,982 0.37 0.48 
No. resident households 124,750 2.10 1.89 
No. resident people 122,323 7.58 4.76 
Has road access 126,903 0.47 0.50 
Has water provision 125,550 0.29 0.46 
Has electricity 118,774 0.39 0.49 
Has waste collected 119,977 0.35 0.48 
Willing to contribute 130,006 0.60 0.49 
Willing to pay cash 124,669 0.40 0.49 
 
Notes: Panel A summarises data from the municipal cadastral database covering the full selected sample 
of plots eligible for RL (n=130,006). Panel B summarises data from the Socio-Economic Survey 








































      













      













      













      
Notes: Plots in the dataset are paired to create reference groups according to four definitions. For fixed 
radius neighbourhoods, I pair all plots within 50 meters or 100 meters distance. For fixed-n 
neighbourhoods, I match each plot with their 15 or 60 closest observable neighbours. Column 1 describes 
the mean and standard deviation of first order rook adjacent pairs in these neighbourhoods. Columns 2-6 
summarise the mean and standard deviation of pairwise choices of formalisation. These are used to study 




Table 3. Spatial correlation in the uptake of RL. 
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(.0007) 













   .4638*** 
(.0215) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mtaa FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  82,072 76,401 81,606 82,063 
R2 .1023 .1109 .1128 .1111 
                  *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Results from OLS regressions, equation (1). The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if 
plot owner i has taken up the RL by 2007, two years into the programme. The table shows the coefficients 
of selected regressors of interest. These include mean year of arrival and mean uptake in i’s 
neighbourhood. Column 2 uses only first order rook adjacent neighbours. Columns 3 and 4 use the 50 
meters and 100 meters neighbourhoods, respectively. All models control for i’s plot characteristics: plot 
area, distance to CBD, distance to hazard, plot development, property value, owner occupancy, has 
tenants, number of resident households, number of resident people, road access, water provision, 
electricity, waste collection, is willing to contribute to upgrade, is willing to pay cash for upgrade. Fixed 
effects for i’s interview year and mtaa (sub-ward) included in all models. Robust standard errors clustered 





































































FE (i) Yes Yes 
N i 3,318 2,313 
Obs 40,662 115,637 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Results from balancing test, equation (3). Observations are neighbours j of plot owner i. I test 
whether adjacent neighbours present statistically different characteristics compared to non-adjacent 
neighbours surrounding i. Each coefficient in the table corresponds to one regression, which uses j’s 
characteristic as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the characteristic used. The regressor is a 
dummy equal to 1 if neighbour j is rook adjacent to i (𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗). Columns 2 and 3 use neighbours j within 
50 meters and 100 meters from i, respectively. Fixed effects for individual i included in all models. 





































Obs  1,961,516 427,268 113,140 113,140 762,519 




























Obs  1,961,515 427,268 113,140 113,140 762,519 


























Obs  1,961,515 427,268 113,140 113,140 762,518 


























Obs  1,961,516 427,268 113,140 113,140 762,519 


















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  1,788,206 390,970 101,209 101,209 689,041 
R2 .2294 .4060 .5302 .7525 .7380 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Results from equation (2). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 meters from 
each other. The dependent variables describe choices of formalisation by i and j. The dependent variables 
are: an indicator equal to 1 if both or none have taken up the RL by August 2007 (Column 1); the natural 
logarithm of the number of days between i’s and j’s uptakes (Column 2); an indicator equal to 1 if both or 
none have paid the first-year’s land rent (Column 3); an indicator equal to 1 if both or none have renewed 
their RL two years after uptake (Column 4); an indicator equal to 1 if both or none have active RL by 
August 2017 (Column 5). Summary statistics of dependent variables are illustrated in Table 2. The 
regressors of interests measure the spatial proximity of i and j. Panel A uses an indicator equal to 1 if they 
are first order adjacent (sharing a boundary). Panel B uses indicators for first and second order adjacent 
plots. Panel C uses an indicator for first order adjacent plots and a rank of proximity. Panel D uses an 
indicator for first order adjacent plots and the linear distance between plots. Panel E includes additional 
controls: pairwise plot characteristics listed in Table 1. All models control for the difference between i’s 
and j’s interview dates and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects for individuals i and j 




































Obs  7,085,999 1,535,378 420,188 420,188 2,787,601 
R2 .1276 .2513 .3499 .6647 .7034 
 













Obs  1,779,454 383,803 118,916 118,916 758,965 
R2 .2498 .4376 .5193 .7448 .7249 
 













Obs  6,725,340 1,436,953 454,226 454,226 2,939,529 
R2 .1364 .2621 .3372 .6558 .6973 
      
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Robustness of results from equation (2). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j. The dependent 
variables describe choices of formalisation by i and j. For the definitions of the different dependent 
variables, see notes to Table 5. The regressor of interest is an indicator equal to 1 if i and j are first order 
adjacent (sharing a boundary). Panel A samples all pairs living 100 meters from each other. Panels B and 
C use pairs created by matching each plot owner i with their 15 or 60 closest neighbours, respectively. All 
models control for the difference between i’s and j’s interview dates and a dummy for different mtaa 
(sub-ward). Fixed effects for individuals i and j are included in all models. Robust standard errors 




































Obs  1,722,271 378,881 104,986 104,986 703,475 















Obs  1,355,498 292,160 76,372 76,372 526,645 















Obs  752,716 147,624 39,646 39,646 316,020 















Obs  1,438,943 305,682 104,099 104,099 692,175 
R2 .2498 .4317 .5228 .7477 .7356 
      
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Robustness of results from equation (2). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 
meters from one another. The dependent variables describe choices of formalisation by i and j. For the 
definitions of the different dependent variables, see notes to Table 5. The regressor of interest is an 
indicator equal to 1 if i and j are first order adjacent (sharing a boundary). Panel A restricts the sample to 
plots with area between 100 and 1,000 sqm. Panel B selects plots with 2 to 5 rook adjacent neighbours. 
Panel C restricts each plot’s reference group to an equal number of rook and non-rook neighbours. Panel 
D includes only plots with 6 to 27 neighbours in the 50 meters radius. All models control for the 
difference between i’s and j’s interview dates and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects 





Table 8. Peer-effects in RL adoption. 
 
























































(0.0004)   

































































Rook2  0.0000 
(0.0001) 
  
Rank   0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 
Distance(m)    0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N i 99,730 99,730 99,730 99,730 
N j 50,812 50,812 50,812 50,812 
Obs 4,151,357 4,151,357 4,151,357 4,151,357 
R2 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052 
                   *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Results from equation (4). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 meters from one another. 
Pairs are observed over eight time periods, from t-1 to t+6¸corresponding to calendar months from May 2005 to 
August 2007. Time period t corresponds to the month of j’s uptake. A pair i-j is sampled if plot owner i had not taken 
up before j (by period t). I observe the behaviour of i for a maximum of seven months after j’s uptake. The pair is 
dropped from the sample if i takes up and has no longer a choice of uptake. The dependent variable is an indicator 
equal to 1 if plot owner i has taken up a RL in the time period of interest. Time periods are interacted with an 
indicator equal to 1 if i and j are first order adjacent (sharing a boundary). Coefficients on time periods capture the 
neighbourhood trends of uptake. Coefficients on the interaction terms estimate the difference in the propensity to 
uptake for rook versus non-rook plot owners i (peer-effects). Additional measures of spatial proximity are included in 
models 2-4: an indicator for second order adjacent plots (Column 2); a rank of plots’ proximity (Column 3); and the 
linear distance between plots (Column 4). All models control for the difference between i’s and j’s interview dates 
and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects for individual i and monthly time trends are included in all 




Table 9. Peer-effects in RL adoption. Robustness Part I. 
 

























































































































































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N i 103,548 92,636 79,919 83,934 83,805 
N j 51,306 47,426 41,193 49,675 42,144 
Obs 3,711,805 3,648,237 2,861,657 1,568,154 3,001,407 
R2 0.2103 0.2069 0.2074 0.2261 0.2093 
   *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
 
Notes: Robustness of results from equation (4). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 
meters from one another (except for Column 1). The main sample, dependent variable and explanatory 
variables are described in notes to Table 8. In this table, column 1 adopts a fixed-n reference group 
(n=15), instead of the 50 meters radius. Column 2 restricts the sample to plots with area between 100 and 
1,000 sqm. Column 3 restricts the sample to plots with 2 to 5 adjacent neighbours. In column 4, for each 
plot I sample an equal number of rook and non-rook neighbours. Column 5 samples plots with 6 to 27 
neighbours in the 50 meters radius. All models control for the difference between i’s and j’s interview 
dates and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects for individual i and monthly time trends 




Table 10. Peer-effects in RL adoption. Robustness Part II. 
 

























































t+9    0.0412*** 
(0.0006) 








































































   0.0068*** 
(0.0007) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N i 99,731 107,207 83,310 94,766 
N j 50,812 50,950 22,813 35,953 
Obs 4,522,379 4,594,084 1,933,047 4,949,402 
R2 0.5433 0.1974 0.2372 0.1913 
                       *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01.  
 
Notes: Robustness of results from equation (4). Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 
meters from one another. The main sample, dependent variable and explanatory variables are described in 
notes to Table 8. This table adopts different samples. In column 1, pairs are observed at all time periods, 
instead of dropping if i takes up. In column 2, I remove the sampling restriction imposing that i must be 
interviewed before t-1. Column 3 observes pairs where j takes up between January and June 2006. 
Column 4 extends observations to twelve time periods after j’s uptake. All models control for the 
difference between i’s and j’s interview dates and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects 
for individual i and monthly time trends are included in all models. Robust standard errors clustered in i 




Table 11. Heterogeneity for old and new settlers. 
     *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
 
Notes: Columns 1-2 present results from equation (4) estimated on two subsamples of old and new 
settlers. Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living within 50 meters from one another. The main 
sample, dependent variable and explanatory variables are described in notes to Table 8. Column 1 
samples plot owners i arrived by 1987 (lowest quartile of length of tenure). Column 2 samples plot 
owners i arrived from 2002 (upper quartile of length of tenure). Columns 3-4 present partial results from 
equation (5) estimated on the same subsamples of old (Column 3) and new settlers (Column 4). Time 
trends and interactions with rook indicators are not reported in this table. I report the interactions of these 
variables with an indicator equal to 1 if neighbour j is a newcomer (arrived in the last five years). 
Coefficients on the triple interactions measure differences in peer-effects, that is, the propensity of plot 
owner i to uptake following the behaviour of rook newcomers versus other adjacent neighbours. All 
models control for the difference between i’s and j’s interview dates and a dummy for different mtaa 
(sub-ward). Fixed effects for individual i and monthly time trends are included in all models. Robust 
standard errors clustered in i and j in parentheses.  
 (1) 
i old settler 
(2) 
i new settler 
 (3) 
i old settler  
 




i new settler  
 
𝑍𝑗𝑖  = 1 if j is 
newcomer  





























































































































Controls Yes Yes Controls Yes Yes 
N i 26,846 24,933 N i 26,846 24,933 
N j 36,423 41,889 N j 36,423 41,889 
Obs 1,278,819 894,251 Obs 1,278,819 894,251 
R2 0.2038 0.2068 R2 0.2038 0.2068 
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Y= Correct Prediction 
(rate of first uptake) 
 
   
Neighbours known well 










   
Controls - Yes 
Obs 1,363 1,363 
R2 - 0.3593 
               *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: As part of the Land Tenure Survey, respondents were interviewed in clusters of ten including 
themselves, their local leader, and eight neighbours (survey cluster). They were shown a list with their 
names and nicknames. They were asked “Which ones do you know well, meaning you often meet and 
entertain in conversation with, including on important issues?”; “How many of them do you think have 
ever taken up a RL?” Column 1 shows mean and standard deviation of their responses. Column 2 presents 
coefficients of correlation from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 
if the respondent predicts the rate of first uptake correctly. The regressor is the number of neighbours 
known well. Regressions control for the respondent’s status (leader or plot owner), gender, age, year of 
arrival, education level and pending land disputes. Fixed effects for the survey cluster included. Robust 




Table 13. Channels. Social learning and complementarities. 
𝑍𝑗𝑖  = 1 if j is absentee landlord 𝑍𝑗𝑖  = 1 if j is willing to contribute 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  𝑍𝑗𝑖  0.0018**  
(0.0007) 
























































t+6#𝑍𝑗𝑖  0.0038*** 
(0.0009) 

































































t+6#rook1#𝑍𝑗𝑖  0.0029** 
(0.0017) 
  Controls Yes   Controls Yes 
  N i 99,125   N i 62,245 
  N j 49,050   N j 49,560 
  Obs 4,036,387   Obs 2,736,345 
  R2 0.2057   R2 0.1988 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
 
Notes: Columns 1-2 report results from one specification of equation (5) where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is equal to 1 if j is an 
absentee landlord. Columns 3-4 report results from one specification of equation (5) where 𝑍𝑗𝑖 is equal to 
1 if j is willing to contribute to neighbourhood upgrade.  Observations are pairs of plot owners i-j living 
within 50 meters from one another. The sample, dependent variable and explanatory variables are 
described in notes to Table 8. Time and rook indicators are further interacted with 𝑍𝑗𝑖. Coefficients on the 
triple interactions estimate differences in peer-effects. In Column 2, they measure the propensity of plot 
owner i to uptake following the behaviour of rook absentee landlords compared to other adjacent 
neighbours living on their plot. In Column 4, they measure the propensity of plot owner i to uptake 
following the behaviour of rook neighbours willing to contribute to upgrade compared to other adjacent 
neighbours (unwilling to contribute). All models control for the difference between i’s and j’s interview 
dates and a dummy for different mtaa (sub-ward). Fixed effects for individual i and monthly time trends 




Table 14. Channel 2: supporting evidence Part I. 
Ranked in top 3 priorities for upgrade 
  
                                                Mean 
 
Water supply 0.90 
Local roads 0.63 
Drainage system 0.61 
Solid waste collection 0.31 
Environmental safety 0.20 
Street lights 0.02 
Public toilet 0.01 
Obs 171,829 
Notes: As part of the Household Socio-Economic Survey, plot owners were asked: “Do you see a need for 
neighbourhood upgrade?”; “Rank up to three upgrade priorities from this list”. Overall, 91% of respondents 
indicated at least one priority. The table reports the mean of each infrastructural improvement ranked within 




Table 15. Channel 2: supporting evidence Part II. 
OLS 
Y= Property Value (ln) 
 
Water supply 
(baseline = buys) 
 
On plot tap .2652*** 
(.0272) 
Neighbour tap -.0176 
(.0192) 
Community tap .1299*** 
(.0463) 
Water well -.0306 
(.0263) 
Has road access .1619*** 
(.0133) 
Has waste collection .1207*** 
(.0147) 















Mtaa FE Yes 
Obs 46,982 
R2 0.2533 
                                                   *p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01. 
Notes: Results from OLS regression. The dependent variable is the property value in log form (from the 
Household Socio-Economic Survey). The table shows selected regressors of interest and their coefficients 
of correlation. Controls include distance from CBD, plot area, land use, state of construction (complete, 
under construction, vacant), building footprint and materials (roof and walls). The sample is restricted to 
plots with non-missing data. Fixed effects for mtaa (sub-ward) included. Robust standard errors clustered 
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From policy to institution: a descriptive 
norm of tenure formalisation in Dar es 
Salaam’s unplanned settlements 
 
3.1 Introduction 
With around 1 billion people living in unplanned settlements world-wide (UN-Habitat, 2020), 
international organisations and governments promote land tenure reforms aiming to replace 
non-statutory tenure with “secure, legally enforceable and marketable land rights” (Collier et al., 
2017: 2). According to economic theory (ibid.), statutory rights will stimulate private and public 
investment in land by increasing tenure security and access to formal credit. Furthermore, 
formalisation will enable governments to raise revenues, plan and provide for public services. 
Yet, formalisation programmes are controversial and present numerous challenges of 
implementation (Boone, 2019; Payne et al., 2009). For example, the demand for formal titles 
remains low in many African cities (e.g. Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018). This paper explores 
the motivations for low demand of interim statutory property rights – the Residential Licence 
(RL)  – in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Since 2005, about 180,000 plot owners have been eligible 
to obtain this temporary document, which needs renewing every five years. However, rates of 
uptake and renewal have been moderate to low: 50% and 12.5% respectively. As the 
programme will be extended to another 630,000 plots over the next few years,61 understanding 
the drivers of low demand is both timely and policy relevant.  
 
A growing literature argues that social embeddedness is key for the successful implementation 
of titling policies (e.g. Peters, 2009) as institutions cannot be designed and enforced 
exogenously (Ho, 2016a). Rather, they are perceived, practiced and they evolve through 
endogenous social interactions (ibid.). Thus, the social support of communities is necessary for 
statutory rights to become operational, otherwise formalisation risks producing ‘low-credibility’ 
or ‘empty’ institutions with little effect on social actors’ behaviour (Ho, 2016b). Adding to this 
literature, this paper adopts an institutional analytical approach to investigate the level of social 
support rallied by the RL policy. Precisely, I examine if the policy prescription has 
‘materialised’ in the endogenous social interactions of communities, embedding from an 
institution-in-form to an institution-in-use, from paper to practice. To address this question, I 
apply the analytic framework developed by Cristina Bicchieri (2017) to elicit plot owners’ 
 
61 Of which, 130,000 plots have already been identified in 2019. 
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social expectations and preferences on formalisation. Data was collected through a survey in 
two rounds with 1,363 and 243 respondents respectively.  
 
The paper finds that, despite their actual choices of formalisation, plot owners conform to an 
institution-in-use that prescribes uptake and renewal of the RL. In fact, they have positive 
normative beliefs regarding the RL: they think it is good and one should uptake and renew. 
However, plot owners have conditional preferences for formalisation, based on the behaviour 
and advice of their neighbours and local leaders. This suggests that the policy rallies a high 
degree of social support, and yet the rate of formalisation is low because plot owners lack social 
incentives to comply with the institution-in-use. Notably, many plot owners underestimate the 
local rate of uptake. In fact, they rarely talk about their choices or opinions on formalisation 
with one another and with their local leaders. Thus, the policy “fail(s) to materialise in actors’ 
endogenous interactions” (Ho, 2016b: 1149) beyond some threshold levels providing the 
perception that the institution-in-use is enforced or shared. Hence, the RL policy presents the 
characteristics of an ‘empty’ institution. 
 
Crucially, the paper provides evidence advancing an on-going debate on the importance of 
social embeddedness for the success of formalisation policies in specific spatial-temporal 
contexts. Additionally, it responds to the growing interest of property rights scholars and 
geographers for novel empirical methods to study institutions and institutional change in field 
settings. The paper proceeds as follows: section 3.2 presents the background of land tenure 
formalisation in Dar es Salaam with a focus on the RL programme. Section 3.3 discusses the 
issue of institutional embeddedness and frames the research problem. Section 3.4 describes the 
analytic framework and outlines the paper’s key contributions. Section 3.5 illustrates the data 
collection process. Results and conclusions are discussed in sections 3.6 and 3.7. 
 
3.2 Unplanned settlements and land tenure formalisation in Dar es Salaam 
Founded in the second half of the 19th century as an administrative and commercial centre under 
German rule, Dar es Salaam is a relatively young city, characterised by a rapidly increasing 
urbanisation rate and a pattern of sprawling low-density development (Brennan et al., 2007; 
Kironde, 1994; Lupala, 2002). Colonial and post-independence governments adopted explicitly 
anti-urban policies and systematically under-supplied housing and infrastructure, thereby 
causing the uncontrolled growth of unplanned settlements in Dar es Salaam. This led to the 
development of an informal land management system, compensating for the deficit of formally 
registered and serviced land by providing housing to the urban poor and the incoming migrants 




During the 1960s, the first post-independence government nationalised all land and attempted a 
slum clearance strategy in Dar es Salaam through the eviction and resettlement of squatters 
occupying settlements inconsistent with the 1968 masterplan. However, this strategy was hardly 
implemented due to popular resistance. Instead, by the early 1970s the government decided to 
recognise and upgrade the unplanned settlements incorporating them in the new 1979 
masterplan. Whilst this spurred numerous upgrading schemes, they were not scaled up to meet 
demand. Thus, unplanned settlements continued to shape the city’s development. In fact, in 
2003/2004, just before the start of the Residential Licence programme, it was estimated that 
unplanned settlements accommodated some 400,000 housing units, equivalent to 80% of all 
residential buildings (Kironde, 2006: 83). 
 
Importantly, the urban planning policies mentioned above did not address the issue of land 
tenure. Indeed, this was first regulated by the 1995 National Land Policy and the 1999 Land Act 
declaring that, “residents in unplanned settlements shall have their rights recorded and 
maintained by the relevant land allocating authority” (URT, 1995: 19). The country’s land 
reform was strongly impacted by international development policy advice, with the Tanzanian 
government becoming an exemplary proponent of neoliberal development (Green, 2014). In 
fact, important influences from the World Bank and De Soto’s Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy promoted urban formalisation policies as a tool to enable land and credit markets 
(e.g. Briggs, 2011).  
 
Crucially, the land reform established diverse types of property rights in urban and rural areas 
(e.g. Gastorn, 2010). In order to receive full statutory rights in urban areas, plot owners must 
apply for a Certificate of Right of Occupancy (CRO), corresponding to a leasehold of 33, 66, or 
99 years. Furthermore, the Land Act (URT, 1999, Section 23) enables and regulates the 
provision of the Residential Licence (RL), a derivative statutory right allowing for incremental 
land tenure formalisation in urban areas. The RL grants to any person without another formal 
title (i.e. CRO), the right to occupy non-hazardous land for a limited period, currently five 
years, which can be renewed.  
 
Overall, the RL programme has three main objectives (Kironde, 2006): first, to widen access to 
formal tenure in the unplanned settlements under regularisation schemes; second, to collect 
cadastral information and raise revenues to support upgrading activities making unplanned 
settlements eligible for CRO in the longer term; and third, in alignment with the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (1998), to empower lower income residents, providing them with a legal 




In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development 
(MLHHSD), designated Dar es Salaam for a pilot programme in two phases. Phase one targeted 
the consolidated unplanned settlements characterised by the highest density dwellings and the 
poorest quality infrastructure. This phase covered about 220,000 plots, roughly half of the 
informal buildings in the city (Figure 1). Since 2005, eligible plot owners in these areas can 
choose – but they are not obliged to – uptake the RL. 62  Yet, conditional on uptake, they must 
renew the document every five years. Whilst considerably cheaper, 63 on paper the RL offers the 
same benefits as full leasehold (CRO): compensation in case of eviction, 64 and statutory 
protection in case of ownership, boundary and inheritance disputes with third parties. Further, it 
enables the legal transfer and the collateralisation of land with mainstream banks.  
 
Nonetheless, the RL programme had moderate uptake, approximately 50%, concentrated in the 
first two years. Whilst the uptake rate decreased in time, a minority kept renewing their RL, so 
that only 12.5% of plot owners currently have an active RL. In 2018, our survey of the 
unplanned settlements covered by the RL programme (see details in section 3.5) found that 
2.6% of plot owners hold CRO, 31.5% have unregistered documents (i.e. Sale Agreement), 
whilst 11.9% rely on verbal validation from neighbours and local leaders. Due to scarce success, 
phase two of the programme was halted until 2019 (Figure 2). 
 
Considering the low rate of formalisation in urban Tanzania (Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018), 
some scholars suggest that formal titles may not provide perceived or actual benefits (e.g. 
Briggs, 2011). In fact, there are relevant gaps between the on-paper, the de facto, and the 
perceived benefits of the RL. For example, this property right offers limited advantage in terms 
of accessing formal credit from mainstream banks (Manara and Pani, 2020a;65 Parsa et al. 
2011). Thus, some studies look at the expected benefits and costs of the RL to explain choices 
of formalisation, or lack thereof (Kironde, 2006; Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2019; Sheuya and 
Burra, 2016). Overall, they suggest that plot owners formalise primarily to enhance their 
perceived tenure security. Instead, those who do not formalise lack financial resources, key 
information, or immediate needs for formalisation.  
 
62 Plot owners are eligible for a RL conditional on being identified as the rightful owners by their local 
leaders and neighbours, and occupying plots in non-hazardous areas (n=177,052 by August 2017). 
63 The mean fees for a RL are about 5,600 TSh, plus annual land rent. Instead, in a recent project the 
mean costs of surveying and titling a plot with CRO are 538,000 TSh, plus annual land rent (Manara and 
Regan, 2020 – Chapter 5 of this thesis). 
64 By law, a RL held for a minimum of three years provides the same level of compensation of a CRO 
(URT, 1999, Section 23). 
65 In summary, drawing on interviews with nine of the largest financial organisations in Dar es Salaam, 
we find that the RL is neither necessary nor sufficient for the urban poor to access credit. On the one 
hand, banks also accept unregistered land as a valid collateral. On the other, they deem interim rights less 
secure than full property rights; therefore, they apply ceilings and unfavourable terms for loans pledged 
against the RL, whereas the CRO is attached to relatively better conditions. 
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Other studies contend that choices of uptake and renewal are impacted by group characteristics 
and social relations. Notably, Collin (2020) demonstrates that plot owners belonging to ethnic 
enclaves are less likely to formalise. This might depend on ethnic ties generating higher levels 
of perceived tenure security in the neighbourhood. Based on quantitative analysis of 
administrative cadastral data, Manara (2020) – Chapter 2 of this thesis – found spatial patterns 
of coordination in choices of formalisation arguing that adjacent neighbours influence each 
other in the initial stages of the programme. It is proposed that this is the result of social 
learning. In a context of scarce information and high uncertainty on the relative benefits of 
formalisation versus the social contract of informal tenure, the behaviour of some plot owners 
may have functioned as a signal for others. This study has two implications: first, by showing 
that social relations impact on plot owners’ choices, it underscores the importance of examining 
wider motivations for formalisation, beyond a mere calculation of expected costs and benefits. 
Second, evidence of coordination suggests that plot owners might be conforming to an 
institution driving choices of formalisation at the community level, as this paper will further 
investigate.  
 
3.3 Institutional embeddedness: from institution-in-form to institution-in-use 
Formalisation policies are controversial and divisive because on one side, they are motivated by 
contrasting visions and conflicting goals, such as market-enhancing and market-constraining 
strategies (Boone, 2019). On the other, empirical work on land titling projects has illuminated 
struggles of implementation and enforcement, demonstrating that the outcomes of land reform 
depend on contextual factors (Boone, 2019; Bromley, 2009; Sikor and Müller, 2009). In fact, in 
many instances, titling projects have found low demand, failed to deliver the expected 
outcomes, or produced unintended consequences (e.g. Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Gilbert, 2012; 
Payne et al., 2009).  
 
Importantly, some scholars suggest that the social validation of local communities is key to 
operationalise property rights (Payne, 2002; Platteau, 1996). In fact, “land tenure is a social 
relation…embedded in social relations”: property cannot be separated from its cultural, political 
and social matrices (Peters, 2009: 1318). Thus, for Ho (2016a) “a developing country can only 
hope to strengthen property rights…inasmuch as these newly desired institutions are perceived 
as credible by actors on the ground” (p. 1128). Ho’s broader critique focuses on the inadequacy 
of the neo-liberal and neo-classical postulates underpinning formalisation: first, that formal, 
private and secure rights have a causal effect on economic growth and development; second, 




In response to these critiques, he argues that there is no demonstrated correlation between 
institutional form and performance across contexts. Moreover, institutions emerge 
endogenously and unintentionally, through the continuous interactions of multiple agents in 
given spatial-temporal contexts. As Ho (2014: 16) puts it: 
“Social actors’ game is not one in which institutions can be intentionally formed by an 
external agency, such as a ministry… Contrarily, the game knows no external agency 
because all are in the game, be they state, civic or corporate actors, while the institutions 
that govern the game are the autonomous results of endogenous power differences and 
interactions between actors” (emphasis in original text). 
The Credibility Thesis on property rights, as proposed by Ho (2014, 2016a, 2018, 2020) and 
further developed by several scholars (see special issues TJPS, 2016; LUP, 2018; LUP, 2020), 
posits that institutions are performed and persist if they are functionally adapted to contexts and 
therefore credible. Credibility depends on the perception that an institution is common or jointly 
shared. Thus, credibility does not refer to the individuals’ acceptance of an institution, but to the 
individuals’ expectations that other actors abide by that institution and will act accordingly. In 
this sense, social relations and expectations are central to credibility. ‘Non-credible’ institutions 
may emerge when some actors, in a higher position of power (e.g. the central ruler) attempt to 
design and enforce new institutions, which do not match the functions of the pre-existing 
arrangements (Ho, 2016b). In this case, a new institution with no or little credibility will be 
characterised by social contestation and rising conflict. It will either “fail to materialize in 
actors’ endogenous interactions”, disappear or change over time (p. 1149). In fact, social actors 
can reinterpret and adapt institutions to their own context (Dopfer et al., 2004; Morgan and 
Olsen, 2011; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
 
On the contrary, ‘empty’ institutions emerge when, by “tacit agreement”, the government does 
not enforce the new institution, tolerating the institutional status-quo in order to avoid conflict 
(Ho, 2016: 1148). Therefore, empty institutions are “socially accepted, little contested and, in 
effect, to a certain degree credible” (p. 1147, emphasis in original), but they are neither enforced 
nor perceived as common. Thus, they will remain ‘symbolic’, ‘ineffective’ or ‘ignored’: “a 
paper agreement or a hollow shell with little or even negative impact on the behaviour of social 
actors” (Ho, 2014: 14-15). It follows from the discussion above that social embeddedness is key 
for the implementation of institutions. In fact, institutions are perceived, practiced and they 
evolve through endogenous social interactions.  
 
Whilst a growing scholarship convincingly articulates the importance of social embeddedness 
for the success of titling projects in specific contexts, there is a need to experiment and 
consolidate methods to ‘unpack institutions’ (Ho, 2016a) and assess the social support rallied by 
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policies promoting institutional fixes in their contexts of implementation. Adopting a new 
methodological approach, this paper proposes that the credibility of an institution can be 
measured by testing whether the corresponding policy has materialised in the endogenous social 
interactions of local communities, thereby translating from an institution-in-form to an 
institution-in-use, from paper to practice. 
 
To be clear, by institutions I do not mean agents or organisations: that is, the public authority 
designing or enforcing institutions exogenously (e.g. Ministry, Municipality). Instead, this paper 
adopts a definition of institutions as rules, norms and strategies: shared linguistic statements 
describing “opportunities and constraints that prescribe, permit or advise actions or outcomes” 
(Ostrom, 2005: 138). For example, institutions might be defined by policy prescriptions, laws or 
practices on property rights. From Ostrom (ibid.), I borrow the distinction between institution-
in-form and in-use. The former is designed and codified in policies or laws, but not necessarily 
enforced nor followed in practice. Instead, the latter is practiced through endogenous social 
interactions.  
 
In this paper, the policy prescription that eligible plot owners should uptake and must renew the 
RL is an institution-in-form. This paper examines if the RL policy has embedded into an 
institution-in-use performed through social interactions, its content (whether it prescribes or 
proscribes formalisation) and the conditions of compliance with it. The low rate of formalisation 
with the RL suggests that this property right might be perceived as a ‘non-credible’ or ‘empty’ 
institution, failing to meet the social values and the functions of pre-existing land tenure 
arrangements. To explore this issue, I will adopt an innovative analytic framework described in 
the next section. 
 
3.4 Analysing institutions-in-use: analytic framework 
Across disciplines, scholars involved with institutional analysis (e.g. Voigt, 2018), formalisation 
of property rights (e.g. Ho, 2016a) and geographical studies (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) agree 
that a major challenge of institutional analysis is making theoretical notions operational for 
empirical research. This is especially difficult when testing for and analysing institutions-in-use 
in field settings. First, unlike laws and policies, institutions-in-use cannot be inferred from 
written text. Precisely, the focus must be placed on institutional practices, instead of 
institutional design or coding. Second, institutions-in-use cannot be inferred from observed 
behaviour and inductive reasoning. In fact, the observed behaviour might result from occasional 
disobedience or systematic violation of the institution-in-use. Third, it is challenging to have 
respondents state their institutions-in-use. Indeed, individuals might be unwilling or incapable to 
openly identify which institutions they conform to.  
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In this paper, I do not infer institutions from written text, observed behaviour or respondents’ 
reporting, therefore avoiding the methodological hurdles mentioned above. Instead, I adopt the 
analytic framework developed by the philosopher Cristina Bicchieri (2006, 2017), which allows 
the identification and measurement of institutions-in-use in field settings. Importantly, Bicchieri 
proposes some operational definitions of institutions that can be used to examine institutions 
empirically with survey and interview data. For this distinctive feature, her framework is quite 
unique. In the field, it has found some application, including Bicchieri’s own work in 
developing contexts on the motives for child marriage (Bicchieri et al., 2014) and practices of 
open defecation (Bicchieri et al., 2018). 
 
As mentioned above, Manara (2020) – Chapter 2 of this thesis – argued that plot owners 
coordinated on choices of formalisation with RL suggesting that an institution-in-use might 
drive the uptake of the RL. In fact, a pattern of behaviour might simply be a habit (not an 
institution), caused by personal factual and/or normative beliefs, which happen to be common in 
the population (Bicchieri, 2017: 16). In this case, based on independent prudential, rational or 
moral reasons, individuals make unconditional choices converging into patterns.  
 
Instead, institutions are social constructs crafted to create predictability and order in social life 
by regulating expectations of other people’s behaviour and beliefs. Individuals conforming to 
institutions make choices based on their social expectations of what others do (empirical 
expectations) or think ought to be done (normative expectations) (p. 19; 35). Thus, institutions 
generate conditional preferences for actions and outcomes resulting in interdependent choices 
and patterns of behaviour. Institutions include rules, social and descriptive norms. Descriptive 
norms like fads, fashions and conventions create regularities of behaviour by signalling what is 
appropriate, good, praised. Hence, individuals coordinate as an effect of learning from one 
another. Conversely, social norms incentivise coordination through social sanctions, for 
instance, internal and external emotional payoff, pride and guilt, approval and disapproval, or 
social ostracism. Finally, rules incentivise coordination through regulated sanctions, such as 
fines and penalties. 
 
For example, considering the observed pattern of behaviour, let us hypothesise that plot owners 
conform to a proscriptive institution of the type one must/should not uptake and renew the RL 
(in content, contrary to the institution-in-form). This statement might be simple advice 
expressing rational or prudential concerns about the RL (e.g. costs exceed benefits; there is no 
need for it; the process is cumbersome). Alternatively, it might be a proscription combined with 
disincentives for uptake and renewal (i.e. unregulated or regulated sanctions). If the pattern of 
behaviour is a habit, plot owners make independent choices based on their personal beliefs only. 
If an institution drives behaviour, plot owners do not uptake and renew because others do 
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and/or advise that. If the institutional statement is a descriptive norm, they learn from the 
behaviour and advice of others that the RL is bad and it is in their best interest to not formalise. 
Finally, if the institution is a social norm or a rule, coordination is not primarily motivated by 
social learning. In this case, plot owners follow the behaviour and advice of others because they 
fear sanctions for choosing otherwise. They will be ashamed, ridiculed, isolated if the 
institution is a social norm. They will receive fines, penalties or other regulated sanctions if the 
institution is a rule. 









HABIT personal beliefs common personal beliefs advice 
DESCRIPTIVE NORM* social expectations self-interest in coordination advice 
SOCIAL NORM social expectations sanctions (unregulated) incentive 
RULE social expectations sanctions (regulated) incentive 
Table 1. Framework for institutional analysis. I use the terms in Bicchieri (2016). * Alternative 
definition: shared strategy. 
 
The key concepts guiding the empirical analysis of this paper are illustrated in Table 1. 
Following Bicchieri (2017), I will examine the personal beliefs and social expectations of plot 
owners as the ‘building blocks’ of their choices. What are the benefits and costs of acquiring the 
RL (personal factual beliefs)? Should one uptake and renew, and under what conditions 
(personal normative beliefs)? How many others do they expect have an active RL (social 
empirical expectations)? What do they expect others think ought to be done (social normative 
expectations)?  
 
Notably, an institution is a shared statement. Therefore, first I will test for the correspondence of 
social normative expectations in the population. Second, I will examine whether plot owners’ 
preferences for uptake and renewal are conditional on social expectations (what others do and/or 
think ought to be done). If plot owners’ choices are unconditional, that is, insensitive to social 
expectations, I will conclude that the pattern of behaviour is a habit, motivated by rational or 
prudential independent reasons only (personal beliefs). Conversely, if preferences for uptake 
and renewal change with social expectations, I will conclude that an institution-in-use drives the 
observed pattern of behaviour. Third, I will scrutinise the social incentives connected with 
uptake and renewal in order to distinguish which institution-in-use regulates behaviour, that is, 
rule, social or descriptive norm. Finally, I will problematise issues of legitimacy and compliance 




Before discussing the findings of this paper, I outline its key contributions. Firstly, the paper 
adds to literature on land tenure formalisation, particularly to studies concerned with the failures 
of titling projects, namely the low demand for titles (e.g. for the case of Dar es Salaam, Kironde, 
2006; Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018, 2019; Sheuya and Burra, 2016). My findings will 
illustrate that, despite of moderate uptake and low renewal rates, the RL policy rallies 
considerable social support. In fact, it has embedded into an institution-in-use that prescribes 
formalisation. However, scarce social interactions around the RL suggest that the institution is 
not enforced nor shared (empty). Thus, social interactions influence social expectations and 
drive the observed pattern of behaviour (low uptake and renewal rates). By analysing the social 
support of one specific titling policy in its context of implementation, the paper contributes to 
the Credibility Thesis of property rights, which rejects any normative positions that a-priori 
promote or condemn policies of tenure formalisation (e.g. Ho, 2016). Importantly, my 
endeavour is akin to the call of geographers for studies investigating how macro-political 
agendas and policies are ‘embedded’ and ‘transformed’ in their ‘downstream’ sites of adoption 
(e.g. Peck and Theodore, 2012).  
 
Secondly, the paper offers an important methodological contribution by implementing a novel 
method to address some challenges of empirical institutional research. Calls for methods to 
operationalise institutions, particularly institutions-in-use in field settings, are increasingly 
frequent across disciplines. For scholars studying the formalisation of property rights, the 
method adopted in this paper provides an alternative to other frameworks measuring 
institutional credibility. For example, the FAT framework that compares Formal, Actual and 
Targeted institutions (e.g. Krul and Ho, 2020; Nor-Hisham and Ho, 2016; Sun and Ho, 2020). 
For planners and geographers, this method will prove useful to investigate how institutions and 
institutional change are made and performed by organisations and individual agents from the 
bottom-up (e.g. Etzold et al., 2012; Gertler, 2018; Jessop, 2001; Peck, 2013; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013; Sotarauta, 2017). 
 
3.5 Survey design and sampling strategy 
We conducted a survey in two rounds to elicit plot owners’ personal beliefs around the RL and 
their social expectations concerning the behaviour and beliefs of others in the community.66 
Furthermore, the survey presented hypothetical scenarios and vignettes manipulating the social 
expectations of a fictional character in order to explore how preferences for uptake and renewal 
change conditionally on social expectations. Whilst we designed hypotheticals and vignettes 
closely following Bicchieri (2017), our survey is composed of short and long format 
 
66 For example, we asked, “How many plot owners on this list of your neighbours do you think have an 
active RL?”; “How many out of 100 neighbours in your mtaa do you think believe that one should have 
an active RL?” 
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questionnaires including open questions in the latter. A combination of closed and open 
questions enabled respondents to follow-up and elaborate on their responses, informing a more 
precise and nuanced interpretation of the findings. The scripts of the vignettes used for this 
study can be found in Appendix A.  
 
We conducted the first survey round between October and December 2018, interviewing 1,363 
plot owners with the short format questionnaire and pilot vignettes. In August 2019, we returned 
for a second survey round to field a longer questionnaire of closed and open questions, 
including the vignettes in Appendix A. The latter was administered to a subsample of 243 
respondents. Both questionnaires were delivered in Swahili by local university students.  
 
Several strategies were adopted to ensure the highest quality data collection: pilot 
questionnaires were tested in the field prior to both survey rounds, surveyors received extensive 
training, they worked in pairs and moved in groups under the supervision of the principal 
investigators (myself and another colleague) who attended each day of fieldwork. Furthermore, 
we made several contacts with the local government authorities before and on the day of the 
survey. To ensure rigour, random back-checks of questionnaires were done by telephone. When 
appropriate, we utilised a reward system assigning points to correct answers in order to 
incentivise accurate responses and address concerns typical of survey techniques, such as social 
desirability bias, experimenter demand effect or self-image maintenance. For example, 
respondents were rewarded if they could estimate how many neighbours have or approve of the 
RL (as according to our empirical data), which encouraged them to reflect carefully on their 
social expectations. Respondents received an allowance to compensate for their time on the 
second questionnaire, which took between one and two hours to complete. 
 
Our sampling strategy ensured that our sample is representative of the whole area eligible for 
the RL across the four municipalities of Ilala, Kinondoni, Temeke and Ubungo. As illustrated in 
Figures 3-5, we generated twenty-four geographical strata corresponding to buffers around 
meridians. By randomly selecting a fixed number of plots per buffer, we pulled a total of 138 
plots. During preliminary site visits, we identified the selected plot owners and formed clusters 
of ten respondents composed of the selected plot owner, the most proximate plot owners eligible 
for the RL and their local leader.67 The cluster is one of the reference networks proposed in the 
questionnaire when eliciting social expectations. The other is the mtaa, or sub-ward, that is, an 
administrative unit comprising up to several thousand plots.  
 
 
67 During site visits, we dropped absentee landlords as the questionnaire focussed on the local knowledge 
of neighbours’ behaviour and their normative positions relative to the RL. 
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Summary statistics in Table 2 demonstrate that the sample is representative of the population 
eligible for the RL concerning the rates of uptake and renewal. In terms of demographics, 
almost 48% of our respondents are female; 5% are 30 years old or younger, whilst 35% are 60 
or older; 64% have primary education, whist only 8% studied above secondary level. 
Concerning basic economic characteristics, 58% work in the informal economy; 12% have 
household monthly income in the lowest category (50,000 TSh or lower) while an equal share is 
in the highest category (500,000 TSh or higher). Furthermore, almost 39% arrived on their plot 
after the 2000s, that is, relatively close to the start of the RL programme. 
 
For the second questionnaire, we set out to draw a random subsample of two plot owners per 
cluster (276). A subsample was selected only if it was balanced (t-test < 1.96) alongside key 
characteristics of the original sample as listed in Table 3 column 1. Otherwise it was 
disregarded, and the computer proceeded with another draw until a balanced subsample was 
found. Because of time constraints, there were few opportunities to reschedule interviews for 
the second survey round. We therefore needed to replace the unavailable respondents with 
suitable reserves. After attrition, 243 respondents undertook the second questionnaire. 
Nonetheless, the final subsample is representative of the original population’s state of uptake 
and renewal, gender, year of arrival on plot, education and household monthly income, although 
it includes a higher proportion of leaders (+4%) and a relatively older population (Table 3 
column 2). 
 
Importantly, the empirical discussion of this paper focuses on selected aspects of the survey, 
such as normative beliefs, social expectations, and conditional preferences for formalisation to 
test for the presence of an institution-in-use. A companion paper discusses further empirical 
material from the survey, focusing on the rational or prudential reasons for formalisation (or 
lack thereof) (Manara and Pani, 2020b). This paper describes how key plot and plot holder 
characteristics correlate with choices of formalisation over time (e.g. plot holder’s gender, 
length of tenure, proximity to CBD, property value, distance from hazard, and local incidence of 
land disputes). Furthermore, it explores plot owners’ assessments of the RL benefits vis-à-vis 
the unregistered proof of ownership (sale agreement) and the longer-term lease CRO. Crucially, 
plot holders believe that the CRO confers the highest benefits and wish they could take part in 
regularisation schemes providing CROs. The presence of a competing institution (CRO) 
influences perceptions on the RL, thereby affecting demand for this interim title.  
 
Finally, any geographical reference is omitted in the present discussion. In fact, relative to this 
paper’s aims, findings are surprisingly homogenous across geographical areas (i.e. different 




3.6 An institution-in-use of RL uptake and renewal 
3.6.1 Normative beliefs and social expectations 
Despite the observed pattern of behaviour (moderate uptake and low renewal rates), our data 
shows that there is considerable social support for formalisation. In fact, in the first survey, a 
striking majority (over 85%) affirmed that they and most of their neighbours in the survey 
cluster deem it good to have an active RL and bad not to. The second survey confirmed that the 
majority have positive normative beliefs on formalisation as they think that plot owners in their 
mtaa (sub-ward) should uptake and renew the RL (83%). Such beliefs are accompanied with 
positive social expectations that most neighbours think the same (81%).  
 
Indeed, elaborating on the motivations for which the RL is good and should be taken up, 
respondents explained that this document provides “legal recognition” – “the right to own” – 
thereby generating feelings of “security” and “freedom”. Among its perceived benefits, the RL 
is deemed to lower the risks of government eviction and land disputes with third parties (i.e. 
boundary and inheritance conflicts). These were indicated as the primary motivations for uptake 
and renewal. Furthermore, asked about the functions of different proofs of ownership, the vast 
majority associated formal titles to increased land values, larger compensation in case of 
eviction and access to larger loans. In sum, the RL seems to provide important functions over 
and above the unregistered Sale Agreement.  
 
Crucially, we found that choices of formalisation encounter positive social sanctions at the 
community level. Almost all respondents would approve of a neighbour acquiring the RL, either 
tacitly (10%) or openly (88%), for example by making positive comments or congratulating the 
holder of the RL. A striking 75% believe that most neighbours would also react in a positive 
way. Indeed, no respondent expected disapproval to be the predominant reaction and half of the 
respondents did not expect any disapproval at all. Thus, a large social consensus for 
formalisation suggests that plot owners conform to the prescription: one must/should uptake and 
renew the RL. 
 
3.6.2 Conditional preferences for uptake and renewal 
To understand whether this prescription constitutes an institution, we analysed plot owners’ 
preferences for uptake and renewal. Utilising the vignettes in Appendix A, we asked 
respondents to imagine the behaviour of a fictional character attending a public meeting during 
which the issue of formalisation is raised. Would he take up and renew after finding out that the 
majority of other plot owners in the mtaa (defined as 50% or above) have or have not an active 
RL (vignettes A1-A2); approve or disapprove of uptake and renewal (vignettes B1-B2)? 
Results are presented in Table 4 columns 1-4. One in three respondents think that the fictional 
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character will follow the majority: he will uptake and renew only if at least half in the 
neighbourhood do so (30%) or approve of the RL (33%), but not otherwise. This suggests that a 
large share of the population have conditional preferences for uptake and renewal based on their 
social empirical and normative expectations of other people’s behaviour and normative beliefs. 
 
Respondents were asked to specify how many plot owners need to take up and renew before the 
fictional character decides likewise. At the opposite sides of the distribution in Figure 6, 34% 
and 3% of respondents provide evidence of unconditional preferences: they think that the 
fictional character will always or never have an active RL respectively, regardless of peer 
behaviour. Conversely, roughly two respondents in three (64%) believe that individual 
preferences for uptake and renewal are conditional on the behaviour of at least some others.  
 
Most respondents described a mechanism of social learning as they explained that the fictional 
character will follow the choice and recommendations of his fellow plot owners because they 
provide essential information, namely on the actual importance, benefits and needs for the RL. 
As one respondent put it, “whenever the majority follows on something, it must be 
advantageous” (ILA/GBT/C9). Thus, the fictional character “would be strongly motivated by 
seeing that many people have taken up. This will prove that the RL is important” 
(TMK/KNY/A5). Similarly, “since the community approves those having the RL, Mr X will be 
one hundred percent sure that it is good to have it. Then he will take up” (TMK/KBG/B1). 
 
Primarily, the fictional character will learn from his peers about the consequences of uptake and 
renewal. For example, if the majority do not have an active RL, he will doubt that the RL has 
any real benefits or there is an actual need for it; thus, he will not want to “waste his money” on 
the licence. Additionally, the behaviour of the majority might signal that the government is 
scarcely committed to the project, as there is no “enforcement” and “follow-up”. “Mr X will 
realise that those who haven’t taken up still get all the necessary services and nothing has been 
done to them in terms of penalties. Thus, he will not be motivated to take up” (KND/MNM/B7). 
 
Furthermore, some respondents added that the fictional character would coordinate with other 
plot owners in order to please them (social sanctions). In fact, “Mr X will not want to be 
different from the majority” (KND/MNM/B8). If they have not taken up and renewed, Mr X 
will “feel stupid” for doing the opposite; he will fear being “enquired” or “shamed” or even 
“segregated as a betrayer”. Conversely, if the majority have an active RL, “Mr X will take up in 
order to be socially acknowledged in the mtaa as one among those contributing to the 
development of the neighbourhood” (TMK/KZG/A2). In so doing, he will avoid feeling 




Even respondents with low sensitivity to social expectations (on the left side of Figure 6) 
provided evidence of a social learning mechanism. For example, some explained that the 
fictional character will take up and renew regardless of the behaviour and advice of most peers, 
because by attending the meeting he will get enough information from the minority who have an 
active RL or approve of it. From this perspective, the fictional character will then become a 
“role model” for the majority who are “lost”, “ignorant” or simply “scared” and need to be led 
by example. 
 
To further investigate if preferences are conditional on social normative expectations, we asked 
what the fictional character will choose when his local leaders either disapprove or approve of 
the RL (vignettes C1-C2). Because of the local government structure, each household normally 
refers to their elected mtaa leaders (street leaders) and wajumbe (branch leaders) for a variety of 
reasons, including to verify the personal identity of residents and their ownership of land for the 
purposes of issuing and renewing the RL, sorting land disputes, selling or collateralising land 
formally and informally. Thus, local leaders are prominent figures in a community (see Manara 
and Pani, 2020c – Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
 
Results are presented in Table 4 columns 5-6. Indeed, a staggering 57% of respondents 
provided evidence of conditional preference for uptake and renewal based on the normative 
expectations from leaders. Described by respondents as "those who lead", "the point of 
reference", “the most influential", leaders affect preferences more than peers (intended as at 
least half of the plot owners in the mtaa). 
 
First, the fictional character will trust that leaders “stand for the people”: they want their best 
and know how to achieve it, exactly as parental figures or role models. Thus, the plot owner will 
learn a great deal of information from the leaders’ advice, including on the importance, benefits 
and costs of the RL. Second, the fictional character will consider that leaders are the link 
between the central government and the people. Thus, their approval or disapproval must signal 
that the government has decided to either enforce or revoke the RL programme. Last, some 
explained that leaders "are the government": they "rule" the people who are supposed to 
implement their advice. Yet, very few made mention of social sanctions, that is, the fictional 
character following his leaders’ advice in order to please or secure their support. 
 
Finally, we presented respondents with vignettes B3 and C3, manipulating the normative and 
empirical expectations of the fictional character in the opposite direction: if the fictional 
character were to observe that most neighbours or leaders approve of the licence, whilst the 
local uptake and renewal rates are low, what would he choose to do? In fact, the first survey 
round revealed that in real life plot owners receive conflictual signals from their peers (and 
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possibly their leaders), whereby many approve of uptake and renewal even when they do not 
have an active RL. We therefore proposed a similar choice setting for two reasons. Empirically, 
it is the most relevant to the case-study. Theoretically, it provides an entry point to investigate 
non-compliance with the prescription one should uptake and renew. In fact, literature finds that 
non-compliance with norms might result from a conflict between normative and empirical 
expectations. For example, informed that the majority support – but do not adopt – some pro-
social behaviour, lab subjects follow the predominant self-serving behaviour instead of the pro-
social injunction (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). 
 
Table 4 column 7 shows that, for 95% of respondents, the fictional character prefers to take up 
and renew when most neighbours approve of the RL, regardless of the predominant behaviour. 
Similarly, in column 8, 98% of respondents think that the fictional character will take up and 
renew following the advice of his local leaders, independently of peer behaviour. In fact, 
respondents tended to justify the majority who do not uptake and renew, imaging that external 
constraints, namely low income, would prevent them from doing so. Instead, free from such 
constraints (as it was specified in all vignettes), the fictional character will be able to follow the 
advice received at the meeting. This suggests that positive normative expectations are strong 
motivators of uptake and renewal, even if empirical expectations conflict with the prescription. 
 
In summary, the analysis of conditional preferences suggests that choices of uptake and renewal 
are largely interdependent. Whilst plot owners have different levels of sensitivity to social 
expectations (Figure 6), only one in three have unconditional preferences, meaning that they 
would uptake and renew independently from peer behaviour. Moreover, plot owners’ 
preferences are conditional on the advice of local leaders. Based on this evidence, I argue that 
plot owners conform to an institutional statement which prescribes uptake and renewal, as was 
discussed in the previous section. In the remainder, I will address two further questions: what 
type of institution-in-use? And, what motivates low compliance? 
 
3.6.3 What type of institution-in-use? 
Most respondents contend that eligible plot owners must uptake and renew (78%) or they may 
uptake if they wish but must renew subject to acquiring the RL (11%). Yet, despite of the 
deontic must expressing a strong sense of obligation, the institution-in-use is not a rule, because 
respondents do not have consistent expectations nor shared understandings of regulated 
sanctions applying to plot owners who do not uptake and renew. First, almost a quarter are 
completely unaware on the issue of sanctions suggesting that they are not overly concerned 
about it (22%). Secondly, the rest imagine penalties in the form of monetary fines by the 
government but ignore the amount and terms of enforcement. Thirdly, only three respondents 
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ever had direct or indirect experience of fines for not renewing. Instead, many make 
assumptions by comparing the RL to the property tax system. Thus, because there is no shared 
expectation or even understanding of regulated sanctions specific to the prescription one 
must/should uptake and renew, this institution-in-use is not a rule. 
 
In order to distinguish whether it is a social or descriptive norm, I look at the role of social 
sanctions: if they motivate behaviour, the institution-in-use is a social norm. In fact, earlier I 
discussed that our respondents expect choices of uptake and renewal to receive positive social 
sanctions at the community level. Further, over 90% of them legitimise these reactions. At first 
sight, this might suggest that the institution-in-use is a social norm, accompanied with social 
sanctions.  
 
However, statistical evidence and thematic analysis of open responses to vignettes suggest that 
social sanctions do not motivate conditional preferences for formalisation. Indeed, presented 
with some multiple choice questions, approximately 81% of respondents indicated that the 
fictional character will follow his peers and his leaders because he learns from them, whereas 
only around 31% indicated that the fictional character will seek to please them. 68 In fact, only 
6% of respondents raised the issue of social sanctions in the open questions. Instead, the vast 
majority explained that learning is the primary channel of conditional preferences. To reiterate, 
the fictional character follows the behaviour and advice of others primarily because these are the 
vehicle of relevant information on the RL and the level of government enforcement. Whilst 
uptake and renewal might generate positive social sanctions, the latter do not motivate choices 
of formalisation. Thus, I conclude that the institution-in-use is a descriptive norm, not a social 
norm. 
 
3.6.4 What motivates low compliance? 
Whilst respondents conform to a descriptive norm that prescribes formalisation with the RL, 
they clearly do not comply with it. As demonstrated, this is not the result of low social support. 
In fact, there is a large consistency of personal and social normative beliefs that eligible plot 
owners must/should take up and renew, including from respondents with an expired RL or no 
RL at all. However, as shown, many plot owners have conditional preferences for formalisation, 
based on the behaviour and advice of their neighbours and local leaders. It is therefore possible 
that their conditions of compliance are not fulfilled, and they lack the necessary social 
incentives to formalise. Figure 7 indicates that about half of the respondents with conditional 
preferences for formalisation have social empirical expectations below their threshold levels. In 
 
68 The fictional character will follow the behaviour of his peers because he learns from them (86%); 
because he wants to be approved of or avoid their disapproval (28%). For peers’ advice: learning (79%); 
approval/disapproval (36%). For leaders’ advice: learning (79%); approval/disapproval (30%). 
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practice, this means that the fraction of plot owners that they expect to have an active RL is 
lower than the threshold after which they would themselves uptake or renew. Thus, their 
conditions of compliance are not met. 
 
This suggests that the institution-in-use does not materialise in the endogenous interactions of 
communities beyond some threshold levels, which provide the perception that the institution is 
enforced or shared. Indeed, plot owners have low revealed social expectations. I define revealed 
social expectations as those generated by actual experience. For example, 37% of respondents 
were never told by anyone that they had taken up or renewed their RL, while 50% were told by 
three people or less. As a result, among the population, there is a tendency to underestimate the 
local rate of uptake. In fact, only 27% of respondents can correctly estimate how many of their 
ten closest neighbours have ever taken up the RL and one out of three predict uptake to be 30% 
lower than the actual rate. This might disincentivise choices of formalisation for plot owners 
with conditional preferences.  
 
Furthermore, plot owners have low revealed normative expectations. Vignettes suggested that 
these are of primary importance as the fictional character will follow the advice of his 
neighbours and leaders, regardless of the local rate of formalisation (B3 and C3). Yet, plot 
owners rarely exchange normative inputs – beliefs and recommendations – on the RL. In fact, 
17% affirmed that they have never been advised to take up and renew, while 50% were advised 
on five occasions or less during the fifteen years of the programme.69  
 
Overall, this evidence suggests that compliance with the institution-in-use could be raised by 
triggering more social interactions around the RL, thereby updating the social expectations of 
plot owners on how many have the RL and recommend formalisation. Importantly, local leaders 
could be instrumental to this process. Indeed, respondents indicated that, at the beginnings of 
the programme, leaders were the most valuable source of information and the stronger influence 
on their choices of formalisation. However, nowadays local leaders lack the means to conduct 
appropriate campaigns and provide useful advice to plot owners. In fact, Municipalities only 
involved them in the early stages of the programme in order to identify plot owners and their 
boundaries, but their engagement has considerably decreased in time, as many leaders 
complained. Instead, as demonstrated in this paper, public meetings and social interactions 
around formalisation with the RL could generate and consolidate the perception that the policy 
prescription is enforced or shared. This could raise the rate of uptake and renewal among those 
– the majority – with conditional preferences for formalisation. 
 
 
69 Nobody reported having ever been advised against formalisation. 
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Before concluding, it is perhaps worth noting that the relevant social network is not limited to 
local leaders and neighbours. In fact, issues of formalisation are also discussed within the 
household and the extended family. Specifically, our respondents were advised by their 
household (63%), leaders (60%), other plot owners (48%) and more distant family members 
(40%). After the local leaders’ advice, respondents rated the household’s advice as the second 
most influential. Many suggested that their household would express “happiness”, “gratitude” 
and “relief” in the case of formalisation, thinking that the RL will help the family secure 
compensation and avoid land conflicts. Some added that their household members would also 
assist with the bureaucracy and the renewal payments. Such positive social sanctions and 
practical help further confirm that the policy has embedded into an institution-in-use raising a 
considerable level of social support.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Since 2005, the Residential Licence programme has encountered low demand with moderate 
uptake and low renewal rates. However, this paper has demonstrated that, despite the observed 
pattern of behaviour, plot owners conform to an institution-in-use that prescribes formalisation. 
Indeed, I found that the policy rallies a considerable degree of social support and has embedded 
from an institution-in-form to an institution-in-use, from paper to practice. Yet, I have also 
shown that the policy “fail(s) to materialise in actors’ endogenous interactions” (Ho, 2016b: 
1149) beyond some threshold levels, which might provide the perception that the institution-in-
use is enforced or shared. Hence, the policy prescription presents the characteristics of an empty 
institution. Whilst it is “socially accepted, little contested and, in effect, to a certain degree 
credible” (p. 1147, emphasis in original), it remains ‘symbolic’, ‘ineffective’ or ‘ignored’, and 
has little effect on the actual rate of formalisation. 
 
I constructed this argument through an institutional analysis approach, demonstrating that 
personal and social normative beliefs around the RL are positive and consistent in the 
population. Furthermore, plot owners’ preferences for uptake and renewal are conditional on 
social empirical and normative expectations on the behaviour and advice of their neighbours 
and local leaders. Adding to Manara (2020) – Chapter 2 of this thesis – this paper has concluded 
that the institution-in-use is a descriptive norm because coordination on choices of formalisation 
is motivated by social learning, not by fear of social sanctions. Yet, as shown, many plot owners 
underestimate the local rate of uptake and rarely receive normative inputs encouraging 
compliance with the norm. Thus, I have suggested that low demand for the RL is the result of 
scarce social interactions, which could provide essential information about the costs and 
benefits of the RL, the level of government enforcement, and the level of actual compliance 
with the institution-in-use.  
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In this context where the social consensus for formalisation is high, it would be possible to raise 
the rates of uptake and renewal in two ways. First, my study suggests that plot owners need 
clearer and regularly updated information on the continuation of the RL programme, its 
processes and costs. Indeed, coordination results from social learning to compensate for scarce 
and uncertain information from the government. In this respect, I recommend that the 
government organises periodic information campaigns through the capillary action of local 
leaders in small neighbourhoods. Second, I suggest triggering more social interactions around 
the RL and providing social incentives for formalisation. On the one hand, if local leaders 
endorsed the programme during public meetings, more plot owners with conditional preference 
for formalisation would likely choose to uptake and renew. On the other, in areas where plot 
owners underestimate the local rate of uptake, formalisation could be raised by updating their 
social expectations on other people’s behaviour. Whilst more research is needed to test the most 
effective policy instruments, the general take-away is that a better policy design should provide 
regular information and include social incentives for uptake and renewal.  
 
Using Dar es Salaam as its case-study, the paper has contributed to scholarship on land tenure 
formalisation in developing cities by focussing on one common challenge of implementation – 
the low demand for formal titles – and advancing an on-going debate on the importance of 
social embeddedness for the success of formalisation policies. Indeed, the paper has 
demonstrated that social expectations and interactions affect the demand for formal titles. 
Moreover, the behaviour of agents is not an accurate indicator of their consensus for 
formalisation. This underscores the need to examine the social support rallied by specific 
formalisation policies in given spatial-temporal contexts and with appropriate institutional 
methodologies, instead of adhering to normative positions that a-priori either promote or 
condemn titling projects. 
 
Finally, the paper has offered an important methodological contribution measuring the social 
support of an institution-in-form by testing for a corresponding institution-in-use and by 
analysing the latter with survey data on social expectations and conditional preferences. This 
approach provides an alternative to other methods to study institutional credibility, for example, 
by proxies or with the FAT framework (e.g. Ho, 2016a). More generally, it responds to the 
growing interest of property rights scholars and geographers for novel empirical methods to 






Figure 1. Residential Licence programme phase I (2004-2006). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence programme phase I. 
 
 
Figure 2. Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 




Figure 3. Sampling strategy. 
 
Notes: Starting from the border with the planned city centre (CDB represented by the star), we drew 
meridians every 1.3 kilometres on average; we offset each meridian by 200 meters creating a buffer of 
400 meters around the meridian (Figure 4, below); from each buffer, we randomly selected four to eight 
plots proportional to the length of the meridian (Figure 5, below). Our sampling strategy ensured that our 
sample is representative of the whole area eligible for the RL across the four municipalities of Ilala, 
Kinondoni, Temeke and Ubungo. Note, for pragmatic reasons, meridians were set out to cover areas 
accessible by public transport. Meridians are differently spaced across Municipalities to sample the 




Figure 4. Example of meridians and buffers. 
 
Notes: We offset each meridian by 200 meters creating a buffer of 400 meters around the meridian.  
 
Figure 5. Example of clusters along one meridian. 
 
Notes: Within each buffer (red hatchings), we randomly selected four to eight plots (triangles) 
proportional to the length of the meridian. During preliminary site visits, we identified the selected plot 
owners and formed clusters of ten respondents composed of the selected plot owner, the most proximate 




Figure 6. Histogram of threshold values. 
 
Notes: Respondents were asked to specify how many plot owners need to take up and renew before the 
fictional character decides likewise. Threshold values represent their responses. Negative responses 
indicate that the fictional character will always take up, regardless of other people’s behaviour (left side 
bar). Similarly, responses above 100 indicate that the fictional character will never take up (right side 
bar). A threshold value between 50 and 60 means that the fictional character will choose to formalise if 
between 50% and 60% of their peers have already done so. Bar heights represent percentages of 
respondents with the indicated threshold values. For example, roughly 12% of respondents have a 
threshold value between 50 and 60. 
 
Figure 7. Threshold values and social empirical expectations. 
 
Notes: Observations (dots) in the scatterplot correspond to respondents with conditional preferences for 
formalisation. On the horizontal axis, I plot their threshold values, as described in notes to Figure 6. On 
the vertical axis, I plot their social empirical expectations, that is, how many neighbours they expect to 
have an active RL (out of 100 in the same mtaa). For all observations on the line and below, social 
expectations are lower than or equal to threshold values. In these cases, conditions of compliance are not 





Table 2. Survey round 1: summary statistics. 
Notes:  Summary statistics of the sample in 
the first survey round (n=1,363). Column 1 
reports cadastral data on uptake and renewal 
of the RL. Colum 2 and 3 report mean and 
standard deviation of selected survey data. 
*Data for all Municipalities; ** Data for 
Temeke Municipality only.     
  
 Cadastre Survey Data 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Mean  Mean  Std. Dev.  
RL issued 0.49* 0.486  
Has RL    
yes- expired 0.365** 0.312 0.463 
yes- renewed 0.125** 0.175 0.380 
Municipality    
Kinondoni  0.176 0.381 
Ubungo  0.124 0.330 
Temeke  0.420 0.494 
Leader  0.092 0.290 
Female  0.478 0.500 
Age    
30-39  0.113 0.317 
40-49  0.241 0.428 
50-59  0.243 0.429 
60 plus  0.353 0.478 
Arrival in DSM    
before 1960  0.032 0.175 
1960s  0.107 0.309 
1970s  0.168 0.374 
1980s  0.168 0.374 
1990s  0.117 0.321 
2000s  0.046 0.210 
within 5 years  0.003 0.054 
Arrival on plot    
before 1960  0.006 0.076 
1960s  0.046 0.210 
1970s  0.090 0.286 
1980s  0.157 0.364 
1990s  0.259 0.438 
2000s  0.357 0.479 
within 5 years  0.019 0.137 
within 2 years  0.012 0.108 
Owns other plot in DSM  0.293 0.456 
No residents  9.154 5.704 
Has tenants  0.528 0.499 
Has disputes  0.097 0.296 
Education    
pre-primary  0.002 0.047 
primary  0.639 0.480 
secondary  0.172 0.377 
advanced secondary  0.010 0.097 
diploma  0.045 0.208 
bachelor  0.026 0.158 
postgraduate  0.012 0.108 
Employment sector    
formal  0.190 0.392 
not in employment  0.228 0.420 
Household Monthly  
Income (1,000TSh)  
50-100  0.219 0.414 
100-150  0.156 0.363 
150-200  0.110 0.314 
200-300  0.131 0.338 
300-500  0.148 0.355 
500-1m  0.086 0.281 
1m or more  0.034 0.181     
No income earners  1.660 0.964 
No dependent children  2.872 2.375     
Obs  1363  
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Table 3. Survey round 2: balancing. 
Variable (1) (2) 
      
Has RL   
yes- expired 0.312 -0.012 
 [0.463] (0.024) 
yes- active 0.175 -0.026 
 [0.380] (0.029) 
Leader 0.092 0.084** 
 [0.290] (0.036) 
Female 0.478 -0.038 
 [0.500] (0.021) 
Age   
40-60 0.483 0.087*** 
 [0.500] (0.030) 
60 plus 0.353 0.079*** 
 [0.478] (0.031) 
Arrival on plot   
1990s 0.259 0.024 
 [0.438] (0.027) 
2000s or later 0.388 -0.008 
 [0.487] (0.024) 
Education   
primary 0.639 -0.064 
 [0.480] (0.036) 
secondary 0.181 -0.065 
 [0.385] (0.041) 
above secondary 0.083 -0.058 
 [0.276] (0.049) 
Household Monthly  
Income (1,000TSh)  
50-100 0.219 -0.012 
 [0.414] (0.038) 
100-200 0.267 -0.029 
 [0.442] (0.037) 
200-500 0.279 0.033 
 [0.449] (0.036) 
500 or above 0.120 0.048 
 [0.325] (0.043)    
Obs 1363 1363 
       **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value< 0.01. 
Notes: Column 1 reports summary statistics of the sample in the first survey round, as in Table 2. 
Column 2 shows results from a balancing test. For each variable I run one OLS regression where the 
dependent variable is 1 if the plot owner has been selected in the subsample for the second survey round 




Table 4. Vignettes. 
 A1-A2 B1-B2 C1-C2 B3 C3 
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Yes  163 236 157 239 98 238 231 238 
Obs 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
Note: Respondents were asked if a fictional character will choose to formalise under different conditions, 
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3.11 Appendix A. Vignettes Scripts (English) 
SCENARIO A. Please imagine a fictional character Mr X living in your mtaa who has no land 
disputes with his neighbours. Mr X has enough money to pay the uptake and renewal fees of the 
RL, but he has never taken up or he stopped renewing some years ago. In any case, currently he 
does not have an up-to-date (active) RL.  
 
22 VIGNETTE A1: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that most plot owners in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) have 
NOT taken up and renewed. 
22.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




23 VIGNETTE A2: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that most plot owners in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) have 
taken up and renewed. 
23.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




24 In your opinion, out of 100 plot owners in the same mtaa, how many must take up 
and renew the RL before Mr X decides he will do the same? Please, complete the 
following sentence: 
24.b I think that Mr X will take up or renew the RL when at least …% of plot owners 
in his mtaa do it. 
 
Surveyor: If the respondent thinks Mr X will always take up and renew enter 0%; will never 
take up and renew enter 101%. 
Can you confirm the following sentence? 
24.1 [FOR ANY RESPONSE  
in RANGE (1% to 100%)]  
You think that if the number of plot owners who take up 
and renew is (…% -1%) or lower, Mr X will NOT take 
up or renew. 
24.2 [FOR RESPONSE (0%)]  You think that Mr X will always take up and renew, no 
matter what his neighbours do. 
24.3 [FOR RESPONSE 
(101%)]  
You think that Mr X will never take up and renew, no 
matter what his neighbours do. 
Surveyor: Proceed only if the respondent has responded “YES”: Otherwise, take him back to 
question above. 
 
25 In vignettes A you have responded that Mr X:   (tick one) 
25.1 If 22.1 & 23.1: Yes Will take and renew the RL in all cases, regardless of what 
others do. 
25.2 If 22.1 & 23.1: No Will never take and renew the RL, regardless of what others 
do. 
















TABLE APPLICABLE IF 22.1: No & 23.1: Yes 
27 Why do you think Mr X will follow the behaviour of his neighbours? 








27.3 [how about] Because he fears they might tease 






SCENARIO B. Now I am going to ask you to imagine a different scenario. Just to remind you:  
• Mr X is a fictional character living in your mtaa who has no land disputes with his 
neighbours.  
• He has enough money to pay the uptake and renewal fees of the RL. 
• Currently he does not have an up-to-date (active) RL. 
 
28 VIGNETTE B1: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that most people in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) 
DISAPPROVE of plot owners who have the RL. It is NOT known if most plot 
owners have the RL or not, but the majority of people think it is bad to have one.  
28.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




29 VIGNETTE B2: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that most people in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) APPROVE of 
plot owners who have the RL. It is NOT known if most plot owners have the RL or 
not, but the majority of people think it is good to have one.  
29.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




30 VIGNETTE B3: Now imagine that at a public meeting Mr X hears that most plot 
owners in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) have NOT taken up and renewed their 
RL. However, most people in the mtaa APPROVE of those plot owners who have an 
active RL. They think it is good to have one. 
30.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 








31 In vignettes B you have responded that Mr X:   (tick one) 
31.1 If 28.1, 29.1 & 30.1: Yes Will take and renew the RL in all cases, 
regardless of what others think. 
31.2 If 28.1, 29.1 & 30.1: No Will never take and renew the RL, regardless 
of what others think. 
31.3 If 28.1: No & 29.1: Yes & 30.1: Yes Will decide based on what most other plot 
owners think. 
 










TABLE APPLICABLE IF 28.1: No & 29.1: Yes & 30.1: Yes 
33 Why do you think Mr X will follow the advice/thoughts of his neighbours? 








33.3 [how about] Because he fears they might tease  






34 How will Mr X understand the situation described in vignette B3 where most plot 
owners in the mtaa have NOT taken up and renewed their RL even though many 





SCENARIO C. Now I am going to ask you to imagine a different scenario. Just to remind you:  
• Mr X is a fictional character living in your mtaa who has no land disputes with his 
neighbours.  
• He has enough money to pay the uptake and renewal fees of the RL. 
• Currently he does not have an up-to-date (active) RL.  
 
35 VIGNETTE C1: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that the leaders (chairman, executive officer and wajumbe) 
DISAPPROVE of plot owners who have the RL. It is NOT known if most plot 
owners have the RL or not, but the leaders think it is bad to have one.  
35.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 






36 VIGNETTE C2: Mr X joins a public meeting during which the issue of the RL is 
raised. He hears that the leaders (chairman, executive officer and wajumbe) 
APPROVE of plot owners who have the RL. It is NOT known if most plot owners 
have the RL or not, but the leaders think it is good to have one. 
36.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




37 VIGNETTE C3: Now imagine that at a public meeting Mr X hears that most plot 
owners in his mtaa (that is, more than 50%) have NOT taken up and renewed their 
RL. However, the leaders (chairman, executive officer and wajumbe) APPROVE of 
those plot owners who have an active RL. They think it is good to have one. 
37.1 In your opinion, will Mr X take up and renew after hearing this? Yes No 
Surveyor: Obviously, the respondent cannot be 100% sure, but what is Mr X most likely to 
do? 




38 In vignettes C you have responded that Mr X:   (tick one) 
38.1 If 35.1, 36.1, 37.1: Yes Will take and renew the RL in all cases, 
regardless of what leaders think. 
38.2 If 35.1, 36.1, 37.1: No Will never take and renew the RL, regardless 
of what leaders think. 
38.3 If 35.1: No & 36.1: Yes & 37.1: Yes Will decide based on what leaders think. 
 









TABLE APPLICABLE IF 35.1: No & 36.1: Yes & 37.1: Yes 
40 Why do you think Mr X will follow the advice/thoughts of his leaders? 








40.3 [how about] Because he fears they might tease 






41 How will Mr X understand the situation described in vignette C3 where most plot 
owners in the mtaa have NOT taken up and renewed their RL even though the leaders 







Informal practices of formal property: local 




Ananya Roy’s (2005, 2009a, b, 2011) account of informality as the by-product of the state has 
profoundly influenced recent scholarship on urban informality. She suggested that the state and 
its formal apparatus, including the planning system, produce informality by rendering the law 
“open-ended and subject to multiple interpretations and interests” (2009b: 80). This view has 
contributed to bring forward one particular interpretation of informality as a powerful “heuristic 
device (…) to deconstruct the very basis of state legitimacy and its various instruments: maps, 
surveys, zoning and, most importantly, the law” (Roy, 2011: 233; see also McFarlane, 2012). 
Despite its key contributions, such literature on urban informality has been characterised by a 
one directional perspective whereby the formal apparatus produces informality (Boanada-Fuchs 
and Fuchs, 2018). Instead, recent scholarship suggests that empirical research should also 
examine how informality influences or constitutes the formal apparatus of state and law. A 
special issue of the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (2019, volume 43, 
number 3) investigates the informality-state nexus through the notion of informality and five 
conceptual allies: governance, agency, legitimacy, sovereignty and legality. Importantly, this 
collection understands both informality and the state as relational processes (Boudreau, 2019). 
The state is an inconsistent, fragmented and negotiable organisation, an “institutionalised 
amalgamation of individual agencies” (Haid and Hilbrandt, 2019: 557). Informality emerges 
through flexibility and discretionary decision-making in governance practices, contingent and 
contested processes of legitimation, translations of the law, and everyday practices. As such, the 
state is not the backdrop against which informal activities are defined. Rather “informality is 
embedded in the constitution of states” (Haid and Hilbrandt, 2019: 552). In other words, the 
putative formal is constituted of informal practices. 
 
This paper explores how formal property is constructed and managed in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, through informal practices involving local leaders, the lowest level government who 
normally register and supervise informal arrangements on land. Spurred by the 1999 Land Act, 
the Residential Licence programme made around 180,000 plot owners eligible for interim 
statutory property rights, therefore promoting shifts of public authority and rule of law over 
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property relations: from the lowest to higher levels of government (i.e. Municipalities), from the 
informal social contract to formal law. Yet, fifteen years into the programme, local leaders 
remain centrally involved in recognising property relations through informal practices that help 
to legitimise and operationalise the formal instruments of property: the cadastral database and 
the ‘survey’ map. This demonstrates that formalisation and formal property are themselves 
informalised, constructed upon the local authority of leaders and the socially embedded rule of 
law. In fact, Municipalities and formal law cannot adequately replace those in the recognition of 
property relations.  
 
By contributing to deconstruct state and law into their contingent and individualised practices, 
the paper adds to literature on the formal-informal nexus and the informalisation of the African 
state. Particularly, we fill an empirical gap in this literature by looking at one underexplored set 
of state practices: the construction and management of urban formal property. Illuminating the 
inherently relational and contingent nature of formal property in-the-making, we demonstrate 
that formalisation cannot simply impose an idealised model of property upon society. Rather, 
property is actively negotiated and translated in and through specific enactments of state and 
law, which deserve more empirical and theoretical attention. Thus, the paper sheds new light 
onto practices of ‘boundary work’ in Dar es Salaam (Mercer, 2020) and ultimately underscores 
the need to theorise formalisation from the Global South. As Ghertner (2020) recently argued 
about non-privatised land tenure, we suggest that formalisation processes and formalised tenure 
also warrant further theorisation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we problematise notions of public authority 
and rule of law. Subsequently, we provide details on land tenure reform in Tanzania with a 
focus on the Residential Licence programme implemented in Dar es Salaam. We also present 
local leaders and their political and administrative tasks in urban contexts. Upon illustrating the 
methodology, the paper discusses the empirical material demonstrating that the construction of 
formal property incorporates informal dynamics of mutual recognition of public authority and 
property. The last section reflects on the paper’s conclusions. Occasionally, we utilise the word 
institution to refer to actors and organisations that promote, enforce, and embody sets of rules 
and norms, thereby governing social interactions. We do so in accordance with other scholars 
discussed in the paper in order to avoid any ambiguity, whereas typically we would conform to 
a stricter definition of institutions as rules and norms of behaviour (instead of the actors 




4.2 Practices of state and law 
Against a pathological approach to the African state, seen as collapsed, weak and fragile, recent 
scholarship has proposed alternative ways to conceptualise state and public authority in Africa 
(e.g. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010). This literature 
challenges the idea that states are well-defined and homogenous entities, external to society. 
Instead, it is argued, states are in-the-making and heterogeneous, composed of multiple actors. 
No single institution is state as such. Crucially, informality or practical norms are entrenched in 
the practices of the state, especially – but not exclusively – at the level of local government or 
street bureaucracy (Olivier de Sardan, 2014). Further, it is proposed that public authority does 
not exist prior to rights. Rather, it emerges through the conferment of rights, including to land 
and property (Boone, 2014; Lund, 2006, 2016; Lund and Boone, 2013). That is, “when an 
institution authorises, sanctions or validates certain rights, the respect and observance of these 
rights by people constitutes recognition of the authority of that particular institution” (Lund, 
2006: 676). Therefore, public authority and rights are mutually constitutive.  
 
From this perspective, a wide variety of “twilight” (ibid: 678) institutions within, at the 
interface, and outside of the formal state apparatus become public authority through day-to-day 
social relations generating “social” or “practical contracts of recognition” (Lund, 2016: 1209). 
For example, African cities are dominated by several state and non-state actors constituting 
alternative forms of public authority in a shifting relationship of competition, negotiation and 
cooperation (Auerbach et al., 2018). Empirical studies illustrate the agency of civil servants, 
residents’ organisations, social networks, and leaders as they engage in the governance of 
unplanned settlements by providing access to land, urban services and land use regulation, 
among others (e.g. Andersen et al., 2015a, b; Paller, 2019; Stacey, 2019; Stacey and Lund, 
2016). Similarly, the emergence and evolution of property rights are integrally linked to both 
state and social structures (Boone, 2018). Local state and non-state actors promote, monitor, and 
enforce the ‘everyday social contract of informality’,70 providing essential welfare functions in 
the unplanned settlements (Davy and Pellissery, 2013). 
 
In many cities, community leaders are central to the local dynamics of recognition of rights and 
authority. They exercise important political, administrative and regulatory functions (Bénit-
Gbaffou and Katsaura, 2014; Drivdal, 2016). For instance, they supervise and protect land 
tenure arrangements by informally validating land transactions and keeping registers of property 
(Earle, 2014). Depending on context, leaders might be part of the state apparatus, as local 
government, or receive some form of state protection. Yet, often they operate through semi-
 
70 Alternatively defined as ‘social order’ (Andersen et al., 2015a, b), ‘social contract’ (Stacey and Lund, 
2016), ‘social regulation’ (Kombe and Kreibich, 2001), or ‘context-developed code of conduct’ (Drivdal, 
2016). ‘Social contracts’ are “ententes that stabilised around rules and procedures” (Boone, 2018: 67). 
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formal or informal practices. Legitimacy is the attribute that transforms power into authority 
generating voluntary compliance with the rule-of-law; it is situated and relational, continuously 
constructed through contingent social relations (Connelly, 2011; Connelly et al., 2006). Thus, in 
order to be recognised as public authority, local leaders need to constantly negotiate legitimacy 
with other statutory agents, political parties and communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura, 
2014). For example, they gain legitimacy by negotiating with, and obtaining resources from, 
external government actors (pragmatic legitimacy); protecting the culturally ingrained and 
socially accepted values and beliefs (normative legitimacy); and enabling the taken-for-granted 
practices of communal life (cognitive legitimacy).71 
 
As for the state, the notion of a statutory law separated from social practices is a metaphysical 
effect, whereas the law is always practiced – performed by local agents producing contingent 
and individualised enactments (Blomley, 2014). As Mitchell (1991: 94) put it, “the mundane 
details of the legal process, all of which are particular social practices, are so arranged as to 
produce the effect that ‘law’ exists as a sort of abstract, formal framework, superimposed above 
social practice”. Against such “ideological rendering of the rule of law as formal, objective and 
depersonalised”, Kusiak (2019: 595) notes that the law is inherently ambiguous and needs 
translation by specific individuals negotiating between the text of the law, the social values 
underpinning the law and the real-life situation. Thus, crucially, legitimate applications of the 
law require translations drawing from “non-formalised implicit rules” or “common sense 
knowledge” (ibid.: 592). In fact, these configure the “socially embedded rule of law” (ibid.). 
Conversely, law that is applied without some degree of translation and in-formalisation – “bare 
legality” – might be perceived as illegitimate (ibid.).  
 
For Blomley, (2008, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) the law is not disembedded from society in a 
Polanyian sense.72 In fact, the law appears distinct and detached from society because it operates 
through bracketing: that is, through the production of legal categories naming entities and 
constraining sets of permissible activities. If on one side bracketing extricates or disentangles 
entities from their social relations, on the other, legal brackets are complex and contingent 
rearrangements of social relations. Indeed, legal brackets attempt to “stabilise and fix a 
boundary within which interactions take place more or less independently of the surrounding 
context” (Blomley, 2014: 135). Yet, a network of external social relations is necessary to 
legitimise and operationalise legal practices. For example, the legal fiction of a formal land 
transaction postulates three entities – the buyer, the seller, and the plot – disentangled from any 
social relations inherent to their forms. However, some external agents beyond the buyer and the 
 
71 Referring to Suchman’s (1995) distinction of sources of legitimacy. 
72 Referring to Karl Polanyi’s theory of social embeddedness in The Great Transformation (1944). 
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seller (e.g. their spouses, neighbours or leaders) must believe that the land transaction is 
legitimate and behave accordingly for it to be effective.  
 
Furthermore, legal bracketing can be exemplified by a process of land surveying. In fact, in its 
rendering of the legal parcel, a survey ideally severs land from its constitutive relations of 
society, ecology, history, indigeneity, etc. At the same time, the survey re-entangles the parcel 
in “dense networks” (ibid.: 140) of property registration, dispute resolution and markets 
involving complex reiterative enactments and sociotechnical processes (Blomley, 2013, 2015). 
Resonating with Blomley, Li (2014) notes that the survey as a new mode of inscription does not 
transform something concrete (land) into something abstract (legal parcel), but re-arranges the 
social relations with which land is entangled and extends the network of actors and devices 
connected to it. 
 
Importantly, these understandings of state, public authority, law and formal property prompt a 
re-orientation of empirical research on processes of land tenure formalisation in the Global 
South. Formalisation policies are often heavily criticised for imposing a Western model of 
statutory law, which does not fit the social contract of unplanned settlements (Peters, 2009; 
Sikor and Müller, 2009). Here, some commentators have spoken of “alien tenure models” 
(Bruce and Knox, 2009: 1360) presented as “simple solutions to complex problems” (Bromley, 
2009: 20). These critiques underscore the socially disembedded character of formalised 
property, suggesting that this explains challenges of policy implementation, including the low 
demand and the failing outcomes of many titling projects (e.g. Gilbert 2012; Payne et al., 2009). 
Indeed, in many contexts, formalisation has encountered scarce social support with formal 
property remaining a non-credible or empty institution (Ho, 2014). Conversely, it is argued that 
pre-existing informal rights persist over time as a result of their welfare functions – e.g. 
economic affordability and perceived security – producing high levels of social support (ibid.; 
see also Ghertner, 2020). 
 
Whilst providing important insights, these critiques do not challenge the misconception that an 
idealised model of formal property actually exists and can be imposed upon society. Instead, 
formal property is always – to some extent – informalised. Notably, the Western model of 
formal property emerged historically through contingent social practices (Blomley, 2013; 
Griffin, 2010). Still today, it is constantly translated and re-entangled into a socially embedded 
rule of law. For example, research on the Global North demonstrates that property owners resort 
to the legal system after their informal arrangements have fallen apart (Blandy et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, courts privilege the informal arbitration of disputes and may consider the 
unwritten informal contract between neighbours in their deliberations (ibid.; see Gillespie, 2011, 
for similar cases from the Global South). Thus, whilst a model of formal, private and secure 
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property may become ‘true’ and produce real consequences (Blomley, 2014), as the very 
emphasis on formalisation policies demonstrates, it will always manifest through contingent and 
individualised enactments as a result of informal practices deserving empirical and theoretical 
attention.  
 
From this perspective, it is misleading to believe that formal property may be imposed upon 
society or rejected altogether. More often, it will be implemented into some negotiated 
enactment of the model. Ultimately, critical legal scholarship argues that institutional fixes are 
necessarily limited. “In any given setting…[the] context will go far in shaping the practical 
meanings, uses and effectiveness of new regulatory structures and laws” (Boone et al., 2019: 
216). 
 
For instance, Ho (2018) conceptualises institutional change as a continuous and conflicting 
endogenous process, determined by the interaction of multiple actors. The government’s 
institutional design is “constrained, altered and cast into different institutional forms” dependent 
on actors’ interactions within and outside the state (p. 872). As a result, formal and informal 
institutions often co-exist in countless combinations (Ho, 2020). On the one side, pre-existing 
formal structures and veto players within the state can influence the unravelling of land law 
(Boone et al., 2019). On the other, decentralisation and local governance affect the 
implementation of land reforms (Pedersen, 2012). Furthermore, Cleaver (2002) has famously 
described processes of bricolage, whereby formal and informal institutions and rule of law 
combine and complement into hybridised forms. In this case, the pre-existent informal bestows 
legitimacy onto bureaucratic (formal) institutions making them legitimate and effective. Thus, 
in the transition from informal to formal institutions, a socially embedded rule of law emerges 
different from any idealised model of property. 
 
Precisely, our empirical material contributes to illuminate how a formal model of property is 
actively negotiated by multiple actors – within, at the interface, and outside of the state – 
through contingent and individualised enactments that translate the law and re-arrange social 
relations around property. Focusing on two instruments of formal property, the cadastral 
database and ‘survey’ map, we will demonstrate that processes of formalisation incorporate pre-
existent informal dynamics of recognition of public authority and property revolving around 
local leaders. Crucially, these help to legitimatise and operationalise the formal property 





Land law reform occupies an important place in the history and development trajectory of 
Tanzania. The shift from a colonial to a post-independence government has marked the 
beginning of a “rare example of a statist land tenure regime” in Africa (Boone and Nyeme, 
2015: 71). Whilst the colonial administration functioned through indirect rule by appointing 
chiefs to govern over ethnic territories outside of towns, post-independence expanded statist 
institutions and state agents, such as executive officers, development committees and other 
related offices (ibid.). Major changes in the land tenure regime, for example land 
nationalisation, the socialist turn and then neoliberalisation, led to reformulate both property 
rights and authority rules (Boone, 2018). Some scholars have criticised the evolution of 
Tanzania’s land law as excessively centralising, legalistic and bureaucratic (Shivji, 2006). 
Conversely, others suggest that statutory property rights have been incrementally inserted into 
and incorporated within pre-existing socio-cultural relations and practices of land use and 
ownership (McAuslan, 2002). In the remainder of this section, we will outline the development 
of tenure formalisation policies and the role of the local government in land administration, with 
a focus on contemporary Dar es Salaam.  
 
4.3.1 Tenure formalisation in Dar es Salaam 
As Pedersen (2016) notes, whilst a definitive shift towards private property rights in Tanzania 
can be traced to its agricultural policy of 1982-8373, it was not until the turn of the millennium 
that a ‘new wave’ of land ownership and governance reforms was introduced under the Land 
Act and Village Land Act of 1999. Seen by Manji (2006: 44) as ‘an exemplar’ of land reform 
processes in Africa, the Acts, although ‘market friendly’, were not simply designed to promote 
land markets through a system of legible property rights. Rather, they concomitantly aimed to 
enhance tenure security by providing legal recognition to existing interests and tenure 
arrangements (Pedersen, 2016). Notably, the reform recognised customary rights in rural areas, 
and the informal occupation of ‘squatters’ in urban areas, recommending that both would be 
registered and formalised under statutory rights. As Kironde (2006: 13) notes, land tenure in 
Tanzania currently involves a complex mix of statutory, customary, quasi-customary and 
informal arrangements, wherein the ‘cut-off’ between statutory and other institutions is often 
‘tenuous’ and arbitrary, especially in the peri-urban. 
 
Our survey of 1,363 households in the informal settlements covered by the Residential Licence 
programme across Dar es Salaam (for more detail, see Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis) 
showed that, as their most secure proof of ownership, 2.6% of plot owners have full statutory 
 
73 The agricultural policy (1982-83) sought to increase economic growth and reduce food shortages by 
encouraging commercial investment in agricultural production. 
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rights (Certificate of Right of Occupancy, CRO), 48.6% hold interim short-term statutory rights 
(Residential Licence, RL), 31.5% have informal documents (Sale Agreement, SA), whilst 
11.9% just rely on verbal validation of neighbours and local leaders.74 For clarity, the SA is an 
unregistered document signed by the buyer, the seller and some witnesses, either the sub-ward 
leader (mtaa leader) or the lawyer (Figure 1). It is often referred to as an informal proof of 
ownership precisely because it is not registered within a cadastre and the central government. 
Despite this, the SA can be enforced to sort out disputes in land tribunals (Dancer, 2015) or to 
access loans with mainstream banks (Manara and Pani, 2020a),75 therefore offering some degree 
of tenure security and other benefits.  
 
Conversely, the CRO and RL are registered documents providing statutory property rights. The 
CRO grants the highest tenure security, issued on planned, surveyed land and valid for either 
33, 66 or 99 years. As this land is rarely supplied de-novo by the planning authorities, in most 
cases the CRO is offered retroactively, after the formalisation of informal settlements. Sitting 
between the two is the RL (Figure 2), an interim property right brought into being through the 
1999 Land Act. The RL is offered in the unplanned urban and peri-urban areas under 
regularisation schemes. Although valid for just five years, it is renewable at less than 10% the 
cost of a CRO, making it broadly accessible to the city’s lower-income population. 
 
Under the auspices of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development 
(MLHHSD) and the Municipal authorities, the RL programme began in earnest in 2004, 
covering around 220,000 plots: roughly half of Dar es Salaam’s informal housing units at that 
time. Particularly, phase I of the programme was implemented in the most consolidated 
unplanned settlements with the highest density and the poorest quality infrastructure (Figure 3). 
Phase II targeted another 130,000 plots starting in 2019 (Figure 4). The programme aimed to 
assemble cadastral information and collect revenues from the RL fee and annual land rent in 
order to facilitate upgrading and make these settlements eligible for formalisation with CRO 
over the long run. In principle, the RL offers similar benefits to the CRO: compensation in case 
of eviction, statutory protection against boundary and inheritance disputes, and the possibility to 
legally transfer and collateralise land. The perceived and de facto costs and benefits of the RL, 
as well as plot-owners’ motivations to formalise or not, are examined in other papers by these 
 
74 Among RL (48.6%), only 17.4% were renewed. Among SA (31.5%), 21.3% were issued by the mtaa 
office, 8.1% by the wajumbe (this form of SA is discouraged by the government nowadays), 2.1 % by the 
advocate. 
75 In summary, drawing on interviews with nine of the largest financial organisations in Dar es Salaam, 
we find that formal land titles are neither necessary nor sufficient for the urban poor to access credit. 
Banks also accept unregistered land as a valid collateral. In the absence of official searches within a 
registry or a cadastre, they rely on the oral witnesses of local leaders and neighbours to collect relevant 
information on the rightful plot owner and the plot boundaries.   
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and other authors (Kusiluka and Chiwambo; 2019; Manara and Pani, 2020b;76 Parsa et al.; 2011; 
Sheuya and Burra; 2016). See also Manara (2020) – Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
4.3.2 The role of local leaders 
Since the country gained independence in 1961, its various attempts at decentralisation have 
sought to create diverse local administrative units aimed at extending key authorities and 
functions of government from the centre to the grass-roots level, thereby enabling community 
participation in decision-making (e.g. Decentralisation Policy, 1972; Local Government 
Authorities Acts, 1982). There are several differences in the structure of the local government 
and its involvement in land administration across rural and urban areas. Importantly, the Land 
Acts of 1999 created a hierarchy of formal land tribunals, from the village up to the ward and 
above. This provided formal channels to access higher levels of the state apparatus instead of 
relying on neocustomary institutions for the adjudication of land disputes and related matters 
(Boone and Nyeme, 2015).  
 
Yet, despite the bringing forward of statist land institutions, local leaders – operating within, at 
the interface and outside of the state apparatus – remain key figures in the land administration 
system of unplanned settlements, even though they have no formal role (Kombe and Kreibich, 
2000). In contemporary Dar es Salaam, below the municipal authority level, local urban 
governance occurs at both the ward and the sub-ward level. Otherwise known as ‘streets’, the 
mitaa (sub-wards) of Dar es Salaam are the smallest geographical units of urban governance, 
each with its own chairperson or ‘mtaa leader’ (mwenyekiti wa mtaa), a committee of six local 
representatives, an executive officer, and a number of ‘ten-cell leaders’ (wajumbe) who, 
alongside their assistants, keep watch over their washina or ‘branches’ (usually comprised of 
50-200 households). Whilst the executive officer is a paid employee of the government, the 
mwenyekiti and wajumbe are un-salaried political actors, motivated by the interests of 
community development, the chance of career advancement in the party and economic returns 
from individuals, in the form of informal gifts or payments. Leaders gain their legitimacy in two 
important ways. First, they are elected democratically by local residents.77 Second, through their 
 
76 Drawing on the administrative Household Socio-Economic Survey collected at the beginning of the RL 
programme, this paper describes how key plot and plot holder characteristics correlate with choices of 
formalisation over time. For example, the propensity to uptake is higher for newcomers who have 
occupied their plots for fewer years, and for plots with higher property value. Furthermore, we explore the 
prudential or rational motivations for RL uptake, embedded in the calculation of expected costs and 
benefits. We find that plot holders perceive substantial benefits from the RL, higher and above the 
unregistered proof of ownership (sale agreement). However, the long-term lease CRO is deemed to confer 
the highest benefits. We conclude that the presence of a competing institution (CRO) affects demand for 
RL. 
77 For the position of mtaa chairperson, individual mtaa residents apply to their own political party and 
one is selected for the local elections run by the National Election Committee every five years. For the 
position of mjumbe, residents may apply either through the mtaa office or the party office. Up to six are 
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administrative tasks, local leaders supervise and enforce the social contract of communities. 
 
The wajumbe have a long history of community-state-party representation dating back to the 
single party system (1964-1992) during which they were considered the local ‘eyes and ears’ of 
central government (Cross, 2013: 45). Whilst certainly diminished and relegated outside of the 
formal government apparatus, their position is still deemed useful, for example, in resolving 
land, community and family disputes, ensuring security (both physical and environmental), and 
providing vital links between residents, mtaa and political party.  
 
The mtaa system was set up just before the multi-party elections of 1995, but the functions of 
the mtaa chairman were defined in the 2000 revision of the Local Government Act (1982). Their 
contemporary role is vital in bridging central-local relations. For example, they liaise with the 
ward government and maintain records of residents and their properties on behalf of Tax 
Revenue Authority or other specific projects. Further, they issue letters of identification, for 
instance, to banks, schools and police offices. Crucially for this paper, they intervene in local 
land disputes and refer those beyond their capacity to the ward or Courts of Law. In sum, they 
act as senior administrators of “just about everything at the mtaa level” (interviewee, 2018), 
including the supply, exchange, development and regulation of informal land and services 
(Kombe and Kreibich, 2000). Importantly, some of these activities are informally mandated or 
regulated. Thus, it can be argued that mtaa leaders administer both the lower level formal 
government and the informal social contract of communities. 
 
Problematising the push towards land formalisation, Kombe and Kreibich (2000: 231-232) note 
that, similar to many other Sub-Saharan countries, Tanzania faced two contradictory challenges: 
“the increasing need for land management and the provision of infrastructure resulting from 
rapid urban growth, and the decreasing financial and administrative resources of the public 
sector”. For these authors, the ever-widening gap between the two meant that highly centralised 
actors, law, practices and standards of top-down urban management would not be sufficient to 
overcome such a ‘structural dilemma’. Instead, for building state’s capacity, they argued for 
‘reconciling’ and integrating formal and informal institutions, actors and processes. Particularly, 
each would draw on their relative legitimacies to help legitimise one another (ibid.; see also 
Kironde, 2006). 
 
Indeed, in the early stages of the RL programme, local leaders were involved in two important 
ways. First, municipalities mandated them to provide essential information, both through public 
 
chosen to stand for election by fellow residents of the specific shina (branch), who must be registered 
with the party. Yet, wajumbe are no longer recognised within the formal election system. Instead, their 
election is confined to processes within the mtaa and the party (interviewee, 2020). 
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meetings and door-to-door, to plot owners regarding the RL and how to acquire it. Second, mtaa 
leaders and wajumbe accompanied municipal surveyors to every plot, identifying the owners 
and verifying their boundaries with the adjacent neighbours before witnessing the boundary 
agreement in writing. Since the rollout stage, their involvement has considerably decreased. Yet, 
for plot owners and many other parties, local leaders remain key sources of authority and 
legitimacy in processes of formalisation. For instance, Manara (2020) – Chapter 3 of this thesis 
– finds that most plot owners relied on the advice of their local leaders when deciding whether 
to uptake the RL. They are regarded as key informants, representative of the central government 
and parental figures protecting the interests of communities. Indeed, Manara and Regan (2020) 
– Chapter 5 of this thesis – demonstrate that leaders hold accurate knowledge on plot owners in 
their areas and their demand for formalisation. 
 
In the remainder we will argue that, fifteen years into the RL programme, leaders remain 
centrally involved in recognising property relations, particularly, through practices legitimising 
and operationalising the formal instruments of property: the cadastral database and the ‘survey’ 
map. Notably, the central apparatus of government cannot construct and manage formal 
property without the support of local leaders and the socially embedded rule of law that they 
administer. Indeed, these embody the public authority and legitimacy that Lund and Boone 
(2013) argue are central to state’s capacity formation. 
 
4.4 Methodology  
The empirical material discussed below was collected as part of a larger project examining the 
RL programme of Dar es Salaam through mixed-methods research. In total, we spent over six 
months in the field during three rounds of fieldwork from August 2017 to August 2019. The 
data presented here come from semi-structured interviews with mtaa leaders (forty-five), 
municipal officers (six), employees of banks (eighteen) and lawyers (four). Where permission 
was granted, those were recorded and transcribed afterwards. Having such a wide array of 
respondents allowed for extensive triangulation of data. Furthermore, our research required 
close collaboration with local leaders for the realisation of two large-scale surveys of the 
informal settlements (with 1,363 and 243 respondents respectively). This experience enabled us 
to observe leaders’ interaction with plot owners, which was essential to see their public 
authority in action. Having attended many mtaa offices (Figure 5) for a variety of reasons (e.g. 
collecting research permits, getting contacts, etc.) and often for many hours at a time, we had 
further opportunities to be passive observers of leaders engaging in their tasks. Relevant 
episodes were recorded through extensive notes in our fieldwork diaries. Most interviews and 
conversations with local leaders occurred in their language (Swahili) with the assistance of 
graduates from Ardhi University acting as our translators. In the empirical sections that follow, 
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we draw upon data triangulated between sources using verbatim quotations, thereby ensuring 
the credibility, dependability and confirmability of data (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 
 
4.5 Informal practices of formal property 
4.5.1 Informalisation of the cadastre 
From a technical perspective, land tenure formalisation is an attempt to codify and register 
information on plots and plot owners, such as measurements, location, land use, and the plot 
owners’ identity, among other things. This information is kept in cadastral databases open to 
public consultation. The relevant public authority relies on the cadastre to provide and validate 
essential information to third parties interested in buying or mortgaging legally registered land.  
 
Concerning the RL programme, a cadastral database was created by the MLHHSD in the early 
stage of the project. Nowadays, each Municipality maintains their cadastre comprised of a 
database and a digital map. Packed into small rooms, behind a couple PCs, there are big piles of 
grey folders including the relevant paperwork of each RL issued (Figure 6). Here, private 
individuals, lawyers, and bank officers can come to conduct official searches and verify whether 
a RL document is “genuine”, authentic, within expiry and updated in terms of land rent 
payments. Further, Municipal cadastres record ownership transfers and whether the property has 
been pledged as collateral with a credit organisation. Thus, official cadastres should substitute 
unofficial repositories of information on registered plots. Similarly, Municipalities should 
replace local leaders as the public authority that recognises property relations. 
 
Yet, as we will demonstrate, the cadastral database alone and its formal apparatus cannot fulfil 
these tasks and adequately respond to the concerns of interested parties. In the presence of 
ambiguities relative to the plot location (the RL programme did not assign addresses), the 
ownership (de facto individual versus shared property), and the traceability of the registered plot 
owners, local leaders remain essential in confirming and complementing cadastral information 
on where the property is, who owns what, and who lives where. Formally mandated to write 
identification letters for their residents and informally involved in the exchange of unregistered 
land, local leaders are vital to operationalise and legitimise the cadastre, thereby enabling its 
functioning. 
 
In fact, the cadastre is operationalised – constructed and maintained – through practices of 
property recognition by local leaders, demonstrating that this instrument of formal property does 
not disentangle land from its local network of social relations. Notably, at the beginning of the 
programme, local leaders assisted the Ministry in the process of collecting information on plots 
and plot owners. Since then, they have remained central to the formal operations of transferring, 
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issuing and renewing the RL. For example, for a transfer to be registered in the database, four 
documents must be submitted to the Municipal office: sale agreement and transfer deed (both 
prepared by lawyers), official valuation report, and one form from the mtaa office: 
“As a first step, we receive a form from the mwenyekiti called Form of Change of 
Ownership’, which shows the past owner and the new one. This is the starting point 
because the mwenyekiti knows the people at his mtaa, so he informs us that a change has 
happened there. Because the mwenyekiti is the one who initialises anything in the mtaa, 
everything has to start from him” (RL Officer, Temeke Municipality). 
Having assumed that the sale agreement signed by a lawyer would satisfy the Municipality on 
the identity of the buyer and the seller of a plot, we asked what extra verification this form could 
offer: 
“With properties that are not planned, the ownership and boundaries of plots are 
recognised by the mwenyekiti and the executive officer. They help us to know who the real 
owner of the plot is, therefore there is no way that we can exclude them… people can 
cheat in front of the lawyers. Local leaders are the ones who know the plots because they 
live with the people” (RL Officer, Kinondoni Municipality). 
In other words, for the Municipality, local leaders remain the relevant public authority 
recognising property relations on all land, regardless of their RL and their registration within the 
cadastre. Further, this form mandates the mwenyekiti to manually update the register of plots, 
that is, a printed copy of the cadastral database received at the beginning of the RL project. 
Similarly, for the issuance of a RL, the mwenyekiti and executive officer must sign Form 73 
and recognise the rightful owner of the plot. One of our interviews with a lawyer was 
interrupted by a client returning from his mtaa office with this document. Relieved that the 
Municipality would finally process his case, the lawyer read to us the endorsement in support of 
her client’s application for the RL, signed by the mwenyekiti and the executive officer on the 
back of Form 73: 
“The businessman is also a godly man who cares about the world around him. We 
welcome him to the mtaa as he will increase and act as a catalyst for sustainable land 
development”.  
Thus, the social relations constitutive of informal property get re-arranged during formalisation 
through formal processes and documents, but they are never completely severed, as according to 
an idealised model of formal property. In fact, here they are central to the issuance of the RL. 
Furthermore, the same social relations might be involved in the operations to renew the RL. For 
example, in response to many complaints over boundary and ownership disputes on formally 
registered land, Ilala Municipality in the city centre now requires that plot owners submit, 
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together with their expired RL, an introduction letter from the mtaa leader and a renewal form, 
including a declaration that the land is not under dispute. This must be signed by the 
mwenyekiti and the executive officer, as well as by at least one neighbour. Hence, the 
operations of the cadastre continuously re-entangle land in networks of local public authority 
and social relations. 
 
Not only are local leaders central to operationalise the cadastre. During processes of sale and 
collateralisation of formally registered land, interested parties also refer to the mtaa office to 
further verify and supplement the information obtained with official searches from the cadastral 
database at the Municipality. In this sense, the public authority of local leaders is called upon to 
bestow further legitimacy onto an instrument of formal property. This demonstrates the 
complementarity of formal and informal practices in the recognition of property relations. Thus, 
whilst formalisation is meant to transfer authority over property relations from the informal 
social network to the formal apparatus composed of new actors and tools (e.g. central 
government and lawyers, cadastre and formal law), in this case formalised property remains 
essentially entangled in its local web of social relations. As an important example, often lawyers 
execute a sale agreement without consulting the cadastral database,78 but they always advise the 
buyers to conduct local searches in the field:  
“It’s the buyer’s due diligence to check with the neighbours and the mwenyekiti that the 
seller is the real owner of that plot and the plot has no dispute. The mwenyekiti knows the 
area well, while I’ll be sitting here in my office. You can try to bypass the mtaa 
temporarily, but you will need to go back eventually… how can you claim that you are 
the owner if the mwenyekiti does not stand for you?” (T.M.).  
When we asked lawyers whether they did not have any duty to verify basic information on 
plots, such as the ownership, size or boundaries, one referred to the principles of jurisprudence 
responding that, “this is immaterial to a lawyer”.  
“What is material”, he continued, “is that these people appeared before me and they 
agreed on the terms of the sale. The lawyer is just a witness of their contract. I execute 
the document… as to the correctness of the terms of the agreement, I cannot be involved. 
Some issues are material facts and others are legal facts… I am concerned with the 
latter” (S. P.). 
Borrowing his words, most material facts on plots and plot owners are typically verified through 
local searches, even for the sale of formally registered land and despite of cadastral searches. 
 
78 One lawyer estimated that only ten percent of his clients did cadastral searches before purchasing land. 
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Similar positions were expressed by the loan officers of nine mainstream credit organisations. 79  
In fact, banks deem official searches extremely useful to reduce the risk associated with the 
collateralisation of unregistered land, such as forged documents, encumbrances (other unpaid 
loans) and pending disputes. In order to minimise these risks, all banks have made cadastral 
searches compulsory. However, they will always complement these with local searches 
involving the mwenyekiti and the neighbours of plot owners applying for loans. For example, 
banks worry that the owners registered in the cadastre may have informally sold their plots, 
initiated a dispute, collateralised their land with a loan shark, or applied for a stronger title deed 
(CRO). This information would not display in the cadastral database and must be collected in 
the field, given its importance for the repossession of properties in case of default: 
“Official searches can satisfy us that the document is genuine, that is, authentic and not 
expired, and land rents were paid for…but other things, at the Municipality they do not 
know really” (Loan Officer, Commercial Bank).  
By involving the local authority and social relations to verify and supplement official searches, 
credit institutions call into question the public authority of the higher-level government 
(Municipality) and its formal instrument (cadastre). In fact, these cannot guarantee the RL as a 
secure collateral unless informal practices provide extra recognition of property relations, 
therefore bestowing further legitimacy onto the RL and the cadastral information attached to it. 
In sum, the cadastre needs complementary local searches to provide the desired security. 
 
4.5.2 Informalisation of the ‘survey’ map 
Processes of tenure formalisation start with the fixing of boundaries between private properties 
as well as between private and public land. In conjunction with cadastral information, the 
survey map normally removes most ambiguity on informal property relations, therefore 
decreasing the risk of boundary disputes. Further, the survey map makes property legible to 
individuals, chartered land surveyors, solicitors and courts to ease the arbitration of disputes.  
 
A relatively cheap and imprecise method was adopted to construct the RL map; thus, this is not 
a survey map proper. Following the collective identification of plot boundaries by local leaders 
and neighbours, these were initially drawn by hand on aerial pictures in the field. Subsequently, 
they were digitised and linked up to systems of measurements, coordinates and projections in 
 
79 Drawing on qualitative research with nine of the largest financial organisations in Dar es Salaam, 
Manara and Pani (2020a) engage in a detailed analysis of rules and conditions of access to loans, loan 
types and sizes associated with each category of collateral (i.e. unplanned and unregistered land, interim 
or full property rights). In so doing, this paper demonstrates that financial organisations react to a 
complex and evolving land policy by producing and adjusting credit institutions to be complementary 
with a wide array of property institutions. For example, banks involve local leaders to reduce risks 
associated with the unregistered collateral (sale agreement) and short-term lease (RL). 
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GIS. The RL map is kept in digital format at the relevant Municipal office that administers the 
cadastral database. Together with the register, each mtaa office received, on one occasion at the 
beginning of the project in 2005, a large-scale printed copy of the RL map covering its entire 
area, which was never updated thereafter (Figure 7). Further, plot owners acquiring the RL 
obtain a deed with a map displaying the layout of their property and some neighbouring plots 
(Figure 2). This document reports the square meters, but there are no linear measurements, 
coordinates, or building footprints. Government land officers and technical tools should 
therefore be involved to correctly decode the map in the deed. 
 
In fact, formalisation attempts to establish the authority of the central government on property 
and to define a formal process of land dispute resolution including land officers, technical 
instruments and the Court. In this way, for registered land, statutory law and formal processes 
should substitute the informal arbitration of boundary disputes by local leaders. Yet, as we will 
demonstrate, local leaders remain a primary public authority of conflict resolution legitimising 
and operationalising the RL map to arbitrate disputes on both formally registered and 
unregistered land. 
 
Local leaders influence the circumstances and the modalities in which the RL map is 
operationalised, that is, when it should be used to administer land disputes, by which public 
authority (Municipality or mtaa), and how it should be interpreted at the mtaa level without the 
support of technical tools. This underscores the public authority of local leaders as they mediate 
the intervention of other actors and processes in the recognition of property relations.  
 
For example, a minority of mtaa leaders prefer to involve the higher-level government when 
dealing with the RL map. In fact, some believe that this is the legitimate public authority to 
operationalise formal instruments of property, while others stress that expert knowledge and 
technical tools are necessary to correctly interpret the map. 
“Since the mtaa does not have the authority to use the RL, we don’t look at its map. We 
only use peaceful [informal] means… if we fail, we take the dispute to the ward committee. 
They are the ones who can use the RL and deal with these things” (Mwenyekiti wa mtaa 
17, hereafter ML).  
“In fact,” recounted another leader, “we don’t know how to read these things. We are not 
experts on land. At the Municipality, they are able to handle the map in a more intellectual 
way, they understand what they are looking at” (ML16).  
Deciding to withdraw from using the RL map to arbitrate disputes, these mtaa leaders recognise 
the mandate of higher-level state actors, the Ward and the Municipality, to administer property 
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relations via formal processes. In this sense, formalisation and formal instruments effectively 
transfer public authority from the lowest to the higher-level government.  
 
In other cases, instead, leaders preclude this transfer by avoiding any recourse to the RL map, 
which they do not recognise as a legitimate instrument: 
“It doesn't show dimensions and it is short lived, only valid for five years. Something 
might have happened to the plot area, like a sub-division, and the map on the RL wouldn't 
update that” (ML16). 
“The RL won’t help because plots here are un-surveyed, even the map at the back of the 
deed doesn’t show the precise boundaries as seen on the land… Maybe I should repeat 
this: these are informal settlements and there is no formal measurement,” emphasised 
another leader explaining how he normally approaches boundary disputes in his mtaa. “I 
personally use my own experience of the area and involve neighbours who know the history 
of the land. We listen to the plot owners: they are the ones who know the objects of their 
boundaries. So, if it’s a tree or tyre we ask them to show and the neighbours to confirm… 
Using the map we could go off track because it does not have clear measurements and we 
would not be fair” (ML32). 
Conversely, most leaders routinely operationalise the register and the map in order to resolve 
land disputes informally, before they escalate to the higher authority. Deciding to implement the 
map without recourse to the relevant state actor and through informal practices, these leaders 
consolidate their public authority on property relations. In so doing, often they bestow de facto 
legitimacy onto the RL map even when it is not valid de jure, because a plot owner has not 
acquired or renewed the formal document.  
 
For example, in one mtaa towards the city centre, which faced around fifty disputes per year, 
approximately half of the plot owners had never acquired a RL – the average across the city. 
Regardless, the mwenyekiti would use the register and the map to arbitrate disputes also on 
formally unregistered plots: 
“These instruments are still very important because they detail plots for everyone in this 
mtaa and have so much legal validity” (ML1).  
In fact, most leaders effectively managed to resolve disputes at the mtaa level, by 
operationalising the RL map without recourse to the higher authority, land experts and technical 
tools. To translate the legal prescriptions illustrated in the RL map from the abstract to the real-
world space, they combined the formal instrument of the map with other means of informal 
dispute arbitration. This illuminates well the re-entanglement of formal property within pre-
existing networks of local authority and social relations. Further, it demonstrates that formal 
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instruments of property might be operationalised through informal practices of translation 
mediated by the discretionary agency of local actors. 
 
Indeed, most leaders noted the importance of the RL map detailing the boundary and square 
meterage of the plot. Yet, without linear measurements shown in feet, like on the informal sale 
agreement (“which can be paced on the plot” – ML5), or without reference to informal markers 
such as trees, tyres and poles, how could this “government backed” instrument be understood by 
dwellers of the unplanned settlements, many of whom lacked a formal education? So, many 
leaders preferred to “keep the peace” by combining the RL map with more familiar and well-
understood informal instruments that bore the legitimacy of pre-existing informal practices and 
local “wisdom” (e.g. ML26). In this way, the RL eased – but certainly did not replace – the 
informal process of dispute arbitration. 
 
For instance, some leaders recounted that they operationalised the RL map by visiting the plot 
and involving the local social relations, like wajumbe and neighbours:  
“I think the oral history of the plot works well enough because some people insist that 
there is no use of the square meters and they know their plots well. Anyways… if there is 
a legal document the case doesn’t take that long and it generally goes much smoother. If 
you have a RL, it is easier to have people understand… nine out of ten disputes are 
settled this way and one will go to the ward” (ML29). 
In the absence of linear dimensions on the RL map, one respondent described how they 
operationalised the map by mimicking a practice that they had seen utilised by land officers: 
“When we go to the site we take bricks, because between one plot and another you should 
leave four bricks, two from each plot… Since the people trust the masons, we ask them to 
measure the plot as the area shows on the RL map” (ML34). 
“There was one case”, explained another mwenyekiti, “where the plot owner was 
complaining that the neighbour had extended up to his plot, which he knew because his 
boundary ended at a tree. So, we used the RL map to explain to the people that one 
should leave space for a footpath. And the tree was still there, so it was easy to reference 
where the footpath should be” (ML40). 
These examples demonstrate that local leaders operationalise the RL map in combination with 
informal means: oral history, physical markers and new practices adapted from the formal 
system. Inevitably, these produce contingent and individualised translations of the map, 
legitimised by recourse to informal actors and instruments. Practices of translation are perhaps 
better exemplified in the case of ML40 above. Here, the RL map provided an illustration of the 
legal prescription in abstract space, which supported the claim of the contestant and indicated a 
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resolution: the footpath must be left open. In conjunction, the natural marker provided a familiar 
and well-understood informal instrument, which facilitated the implementation of the legal 
prescription in the real-world space. In fact, the tree enabled the mwenyekiti to translate the RL 
map into a legitimate and operational resolution. Of course, we will never know if the footpath 
was opened precisely where illustrated on the map. 
 
4.5.3 Structural constraints to informal practices 
Through practices that legitimise and operationalise the cadastre and the map, we have 
discussed the agency of local leaders in the construction and management of formal property. 
Yet, before concluding, we must reflect upon the presence of structural constraints of the formal 
system affecting the agency of local leaders. For example, many of our respondents complained 
about the lack of updated registers and maps. In fact, several generations of leaders had 
manually updated their registers since they were first issued in 2005, and our respondents felt 
these were no longer reliable or easy to consult. The large-scale maps were now faded or falling 
apart (Figure 7), despite the diligence of leaders whom we observed carefully opening and 
folding the paper map on more than one occasion. Even worse, a few mitaa didn’t have these 
instruments at all, for example, because the ward had appropriated them following the division 
of an older mtaa into smaller units. Thus, in order to get the details for the Form of Change of 
Ownership and Form 73, or in case of boundary disputes, these leaders needed to travel to the 
ward office to consult the register and the map. This disincentivised their use and reduced the 
agency of local leaders. Indeed, Municipal officers confirmed that the mtaa leaders had often 
requested new registers and maps, but the Ministry did not have the resources to produce and 
distribute them. In sum, whilst local leaders and informal dynamics of property recognition are 
essential to the formal property apparatus, higher government actors maintain an important 
function, conditioning the agency of local leaders. Without access to the instruments of formal 
property, the mutual legitimation of formal and informal institutions that Kombe and Kreibich 
(2000, 2001) deem essential for a strengthened land management is inevitably compromised. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the situated practices that make land into formal property arguing that 
an idealised model of formal property cannot simply be imposed upon society. In fact, processes 
of formalisation inevitably produce context specific enactments of formal property, as illustrated 
by our case-study of the RL programme in Dar es Salaam. Central to our argument, we 
demonstrated that informal practices of property recognition by the local leaders are vital to 
legitimise and operationalise the instruments of formal property: the cadastral database and the 
‘survey’ map, which are therefore informalised. For example, our evidence has shown that local 
leaders are essential to the construction and maintenance of the cadastral database, as the 
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Municipality necessarily involves them in the identification and recognition of plot owners for 
the purposes of issuing, renewing and transferring the RL. Furthermore, in response to the 
legitimacy gap produced by the process of formalisation, lawyers, prospective buyers and loan 
officers routinely refer to the mtaa office to further verify and supplement the information 
obtained from official searches of the cadastral database at the Municipality. Similarly, local 
leaders influence the modalities in which the RL map is operationalised, deciding whether it is a 
legitimate instrument of dispute arbitration and which authority should legitimately implement 
it. Often, they choose to use the map at the mtaa level, therefore bypassing the relevant statutory 
authority and formal processes. In this case, they interpret and operationalise the map through 
informal practices of translation, combining this formal instrument with other means of informal 
dispute resolution, like oral history and natural markers. Crucially, our research has 
demonstrated that by legitimising and operationalising the instruments of formal property, local 
leaders effectively mediate the recognition of property relations by other state actors (e.g. 
Municipality, Court). In this way, formal property remains essentially entangled in the same 
local authority, social relations and practices, which were constitutive of informal property. 
Thus, the RL apparatus is far from an idealised model of formal property. 
 
This paper also set out to deploy informality as a lens to deconstruct state and law into their 
contingent and individualised practices, with a focus on processes of land tenure formalisation 
in the Global South. In so doing, we have provided three main contributions. First, we have 
added to prior studies on the informality-state nexus and the informalisation of the state 
illustrating that formal property is itself constituted of informal practices. Second, we have 
contributed to debates on processes of state and public authority formation, exploring the role of 
‘twilight institutions’ (Lund, 2006) – local leaders – as they legitimise and enable the formal 
property apparatus. Third, we have illustrated that formal law is not objective and 
depersonalised. Rather, it is socially practiced through local agents and socially embedded 
dynamics of property recognition. 
 
Taking these contributions together, our study critiques an idealised model of tenure 
formalisation, which suggests that formalisation imposes a transfer of public authority from the 
lowest to higher levels of government, from the informal social contract to formal law. 
Conversely, our empirical material underscores that a model of formal property is actively 
negotiated by multiple actors and practices that translate the law (Kusiak, 2019) and rearrange 
the social relations constitutive of informal property (Blomley, 2014). On the one hand, we have 
argued that the central government cannot construct formal property without the mediation of 
local actors and informal practices. On the other, we have suggested that local leaders require 
the support of the higher-level authority if they are to legitimise one another in the process of 
formalisation. As such, our findings suggest a need for further research studying the 
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sociotechnical processes of formalisation and how they incorporate informal dynamics of 





Figure 1. Examples of Sale Agreement from the mtaa office.  
(a) 
 
Notes: Sale Agreement from the 1990s. Old documents usually provide information on the land (e.g. 
development of built construction, type and number of trees), the price (paid and outstanding), and names 
of the buyer, seller and witnesses, which often include neighbours and local leaders. 
(b) 
 
Notes: Sale Agreement from the 2010s. Recent documents usually describe the plot and its boundaries 
(e.g. size in feet, names of adjacent neighbours). They identify the buyer, seller and witnesses, which 
often include neighbours and local leaders. Most mitaa prepare their own form, borrowing the Municipal 
headings from other official documents.  
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Figure 2. Example of a Residential Licence document. 
(a) 
 
Notes: Front page. It includes information on the plot area (sqm), plot owner’s name and surname, RL 
start and end dates, and terms of validity. For example, it specifies the land rent amount and some 
building standards for new construction.  
(b) 
 
Notes: Back page. This map shows the plot registered with RL (grey) and its surrounding plots. 
Importantly, it identifies plots by numbers but does not display linear measurements or coordinates.  
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Figure 3. Residential Licence programme phase I (2004-2006). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence programme phase I. 
 
 
Figure 4. Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 
 
Notes: Mitaa (sub-wards) in grey included in the Residential Licence programme phase II (started 2019). 















Figure 7. Example of one mtaa map. 
 
Notes: These maps were provided to mtaa offices in the early stages of the Residential Licence 
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Eliciting demand for title deeds: Lab-in-the-
field evidence from urban Tanzania 
 
The project was approved by the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH) [REC ref. 2019-135-NA-2019-37]. It has passed review by the LSE Research 
Ethics Committee in October 2018 under the project name “Leveraging Informal Institutions to 
Raise Land Formalisation” [REC ref.  000770]. More details on the ethical aspects of this 
project are found in Appendix C. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Much of urban land in Africa is allocated low values of built capital, remains unplanned, and is 
settled under informal property rights (UN Habitat, 2016; Lall et al., 2017). A strand of 
literature argues that formalising property rights can boost urban development in developing 
cities (Henderson et al., 2020). Formalisation can create transparency in prices enabling 
functional urban land markets and improved property records facilitating taxation (Collier et al., 
2017). More generally, property rights can reduce expropriation risk, lower the cost of property 
protection, and remove barriers to credit (Besley and Ghatak, 2010).80 Yet, establishing property 
rights is costly for cash-strapped governments in sub-Saharan Africa.81 To recover programme 
costs once neighbourhoods are surveyed and entered into a town plan, plot-specific fees are 
charged for title deeds. This stage of formalisation (the uptake of title deeds) remains a 
bottleneck in many African cities (Bezu and Holden, 2014). 
 
This bottleneck is observed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where formal titles account for only 20-
25% of residential surveyed plots. Despite low uptake, literature suggests that there is a demand 
for land titles in this city. In fact, qualitative research suggests that formalisation policies rally 
considerable social support (Manara and Pani, 2020a).82 However, it is argued that the price of 
 
80 There is empirical evidence that property rights have a positive impact on investment in rural Africa 
(Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008). For urban land, evidence is concentrated in South America 
finding impacts on household investment, education and labour supply (Field, 2007; Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2010). 
81 Formalisation requires surveying and town planning to meet the standards of formal law. There are 
scale economies to surveying, and so governments and development agencies alike make efforts to 
coordinate land demarcation (surveying) en masse. 
82 This paper studies the demand for short-term leases – Residential Licences – in Dar es Salaam, based 
on administrative data from the RL programme and 2018 survey data. The paper notes that demand for 
RL has decreased over time, resulting in a modest rate of formalisation. Nonetheless, survey data 
demonstrate that plot holders have positive beliefs on land registration. In particular, they believe that the 
long-term CRO is a better ownership document, providing the highest benefits. They therefore wish they 
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registration constitutes an important barrier (Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018; Magina et al., 
2020; Omar 2017; Sheuya and Burra, 2016)83 and that project costs exceed demand (Ali et al., 
2016). Precisely, this paper estimates demand for full statutory property rights (Certificate of 
Right of Occupancy, CRO) in two neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam, where a pilot project has 
covered the costs of surveying and planning but the uptake of titles is low (13% in two years). 
Furthermore, we propose a better pricing strategy that elicits demand for titles from local 
leaders, thereby increasing the programme affordability and social inclusivity. 
 
Integrating local leaders in the formalisation process has the potential to raise the uptake of title 
deeds. Institutions in Africa have long relied on local leaders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 
2013). While formalisation can be seen as eclipsing their role in the land tenure system, these 
leaders are complementary to state capacity when they are formally integrated (Henn, 2020). 
For instance, property tax collection by local leaders raises more revenue than collection by 
state agents because of their knowledge of local individuals’ payment propensities (Balan et al., 
2020). If leaders know and will reveal information on the willingness-to-pay for title deeds, it 
can be used by the state to better target fees, i.e. by charging less to plot owners with lower 
willingness-to-pay. This can raise uptake while still covering project costs. However, extracting 
this information accurately can be difficult if leaders have private reasons to favour some 
property owners in their neighbourhood. Two obvious questions arise which are the focus of our 
paper: are leaders informed about the willingness-to-pay for title deeds? And if so, will they 
share this information accurately when they are able to influence the prices faced by their 
neighbours? 
 
This paper is related to a literature that studies the use of agents to target subsidies for the poor, 
to identify individuals with high returns to loans, and to report corruption (Basurto et al., 2018; 
Niehaus et al., 2013; Olken, 2009). Agents may have different preferences from the social 
planner and so strategically give misleading information. In a closely related paper to ours, 
Rigol et al. (2020) test whether cash incentives can encourage entrepreneurs to report which of 
their peers have the highest marginal returns to a loan. Our paper is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first to study whether agents can be used to extract information on willingness-
to-pay. 
 
There is also a long literature on eliciting willingness-to-pay for non-market goods. In a related 
paper, Ali et al. (2016) estimate the demand for title deeds in a neighbourhood of Dar es Salaam 
 
could take part in regularisation schemes and obtain CROs. The paper concludes that the government 
emphasis on CRO partly explains low demand for RL. Crucially, it also demonstrates that there is social 
support for land registration in Dar es Salaam, despite of low uptake of land titles.  
83 Beyond the literature, key policy makers at all levels of government also suggested this to the authors. 
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using a take-it-or-leave-it randomisation of title fees. Their method estimates mean compliance 
conditional on fee size, and so cannot be used to determine individual willingness-to-pay. In 
another related paper, Berry et al. (2020) elicit the willingness-to-pay for water filters using the 
Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) method. This method does allow the researcher to estimate 
individual willingness-to-pay, however the policy maker cannot use it to set fees in practice.84 
Our paper provides a method (by eliciting third party information) that both identifies individual 
willingness-to-pay and can be practically implemented. 
 
In another related study, Balan et al. (2020) show that tax collection by local elites can raise 
more revenue than collection by state agents. Their evidence suggests that the primary 
mechanism through which this works is informational advantages of chiefs that enabled them to 
better target tax visits based on households underlying payment propensities. They test this with 
a treatment arm where state collectors meet with local chiefs who indicate, address-by-address, 
ability and willingness-to-pay. Our paper sheds light on this particular mechanism by directly 
measuring the ability of local leaders to predict willingness-to-pay and by studying the 
conditions under which this information can be accurately extracted. 
 
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we challenge the view that the low uptake of title 
deeds in Dar es Salaam is due to plot owners not recognising, or not needing, the benefits from 
tenure formalisation (Briggs, 2011). In fact, we provide evidence of significant demand for title 
deeds, albeit at lower prices than the government is currently charging. We estimate the demand 
for property titles using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) method which incentivises 
respondents to truthfully reveal their willingness-to-pay.85 Roughly 40% of plot owners in our 
study are willing to pay fees equal to the monthly income of a typical household. This is much 
higher demand than is found in previous work in Dar es Salaam (Ali et al., 2016). Yet, demand 
remains lower than current fees. Therefore, we suggest that the government could set lower 
prices in order to raise the uptake of titles. 
 
Our second contribution is to show that local leaders have accurate information about both the 
aggregate demand curve in their neighbourhood, as well as the ability to distinguish variation in 
willingness-to-pay across owners in their neighbourhood. This is true even when conditioning 
on the fee size, or property value. Therefore, the local knowledge of community leaders can be 
used to set prices of land titles to raise uptake and collect sufficient revenue. This would help to 
make formalisation inclusive for the urban poor and financially viable for the government.  
 
84 The BDM cannot be used in practice by the policy maker because it relies on the credible incentive that 
the customer will be able to buy the good at a random price. 
85 The BDM method was originally developed by Becker et al. (1964) and is still used at the frontier of 
applied work (Berry et al., 2020). 
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Our third contribution is to show that, when predicting willingness-to-pay, leaders are 
influenced by an environment where their predictions are used to allocate subsidies. However, 
almost all these distortions can be mitigated with a simple cash prize for ex-post accuracy. 
Notably, we find that leaders only distort their responses on the aggregate demand. In fact, we 
find no evidence that this environment affects leaders’ predictions when it comes to 
discrimination across different plot owners in their neighbourhood. 
 
As part of a follow-up study, we collected data on each invoice’s progress file to examine the 
stages of the title acquisition process, thereby identifying further bottlenecks on the supply side 
of the formalisation project. Additionally, we interviewed a sub-sample of leaders to further 
investigate some of our experimental results. Finally, forty-two of the plot owners participating 
in our experimental sessions were selected, at random, to also undertake in-depth interviews 
digging into the determinants of their willingness-to-pay, including the expected benefits and 
costs of tenure formalisation, alongside other factors.  
 
Results from this qualitative work on plot owners’ demand are discussed in a companion paper 
(Manara and Regan, 2020). In summary, this paper argues that most plot holders expect both 
private and public returns from the title deed, which explains substantial demand for 
regularisation in the study area. Expected benefits pertain primarily to security of tenure and, to 
a lower degree, access to credit. Low uptake is the result of three factors. First, the price of CRO 
exceeds willingness-to-pay for most respondents (as will be demonstrated in this chapter). 
Second, the survey process provides considerable benefits by enhancing tenure security, which 
reduces the need for title deed acquisition. Third, the title deed does not provide other 
immediate benefits beyond those already gained at the survey stage of regularisation. Thus, 
there is a tendency to delay and postpone uptake to a later date when one of three things arises: 
the household budget, the cash available, or an immediate need for the title deed. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The experimental setting and design are described in sections 
5.2 and 5.3, which cover the study context and data collection methods. The data is described in 
section 5.4 including a description of the demand elicited by BDM. Results in section 5.5 show 
leaders’ ability to predict demand on the aggregate and for price discrimination. Sections 5.6 
and 5.7 discuss the follow-up study and the policy implications of research findings. In section 




5.2 Context and setting 
5.2.1 Conceptual motivation for extracting willingness-to-pay 
In this paper we propose that, by collaborating with leaders who have local knowledge, the 
central government can more effectively target fees to both neighbourhoods and individual plots 
and owners. In doing so, this price discrimination could raise uptake while still meeting the fee 
requirements to cover the project cost. By price discriminating, the government can cross-
subsidise and thereby raise the revenue required to make a titling programme cost effective. The 
potential gains are twofold. First, conditional on the project being complete, price 
discrimination can be used to recover the Harberger triangle deadweight loss. In a simple 
example this would mean waiving fees for particular individuals who are identified as having a 
low ability and willingness-to-pay. The second set of potential gains can be much larger. In a 
context where projects are only built if the expected revenue is above the fixed cost, then price 
discrimination can make the entire project viable which can lead to significant gains (Kremer 
and Snyder, 2018). This reasoning is similar in spirit to Romer (1994) who shows the potential 
for large gains from trade when ‘new’ goods are introduced in the market by raising enough 
revenue to cover a fixed cost of entry. 
 
An alternative response is simply for the government to cover these project costs and give away 
the titles for free. There are two reasons why this may not be possible. First, the government 
may not be able to secure the necessary funds to do so, or the efficiency of raising public funds 
may be so low as to make it unviable. This may be especially true if channels of raising revenue 
are limited or wasteful as is the case in many developing countries (Pomeranz and Vila-Belda, 
2019). Secondly, a growing body of research underscores that building capacity for revenue 
collection is important for state development (Besley and Persson, 2014). From this perspective, 
governments should not universally subsidise formalisation, but rather encourage those with 
higher private benefits to make more of a contribution to the public fund. Finally, while it might 
seem radical to advocate that the government price discriminates when allocating property titles, 
it is important to observe that the current fee structure already employs a price discrimination 
strategy. Invoice fees are calculated based on location, land use, and individual plot size. 
Further, in the private market for survey services, a basic version of leader-elicited price 
discrimination is already employed. The largest surveying and planning company in Tanzania 
offers a ‘free lunch’ to individual plot owners that cannot afford to pay the survey fees. To do 
this, they hold discussions with local leaders who help them identify the plot owners with the 
lowest willingness-to-pay. If these individuals do not own plots above 800 sqm, they are offered 
the service for free.86 
 
 
86 From authors’ discussions with two of Tanzania’s leading survey companies. 
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5.2.2 Experimental setting 
Our study was conducted in Dar es Salaam where the Tanzanian Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD) designed and implemented a pilot project of 
land tenure formalisation, starting in the Kimara Ward of Ubungo Municipality in 2016. Here, 
uptake has been less than 13% after the first two years. Since the government has fronted the 
fixed costs of surveying and planning, they have lessened coordination issues, and now plot 
owners can simply pay their invoice to complete the process of acquiring a title. The title that 
we study is a legal document of ownership, Certificate of Right of Occupancy (CRO), which is 
supplied by the MLHHSD and provides the highest protection by law in the country. A CRO 
formally recognizes a 66-year lease of a plot of land from the government. Legally, a CRO 
provides private benefits in four ways: compensation in the case of government-led 
expropriation, protection from land disputes, use as collateral with mainstream banks, and legal 
transferability of land.87 
 
A plot of land must be surveyed and approved by the municipal town planning office to be 
eligible for a CRO. There are scale economies to surveying: the survey of a standalone plot may 
cost around 6 million TSh while the average cost drops to 17% of this when 10 plots are 
surveyed at once, 5.8% for 100 plots, and for large scale projects with more than 1,000 plots the 
average cost is about 0.2 million TSh.88 For this reason the MLHHSD has run a pilot 
programme in the Ward of Kimara, surveying plots at scale. The fees for CROs cover survey, 
planning and administrative costs. Figure 1 shows an example of an invoice from the Kimara 
programme with charges that include costs for surveying and planning, administrative fees, a 
land value capture ‘Premium’, and ‘Revolving Fund’. The latter is a mark-up used to subsidise 
future surveying projects. Some fees are fixed (Application, CRO, and Deed Plan), while all 
others vary with plot size and land value. Facing these fees, demand for CROs has been low. 
This motivates concerns over the effectiveness of the government’s pricing strategy for raising 
revenues and supplying affordable CROs. 
 
87 More specifically, owners of a CRO who are expropriated by the government are entitled to higher 
compensation, and since surveying is a pre-requisite, documentation of exact plot boundaries mitigates 
potential conflict with neighbours (Wolff et al., 2018). While ownership of a plot without CRO can be 
enough to access small loans, these typically have a maximum ceiling of 20 million TSh, when the 
informal sale agreement is used as collateral. Instead, there is no ceiling for loans pledged against the 
CRO: in this case, the loan amount is only limited by the collateral value and the bank’s single borrower 
limit (Manara and Pani, 2020b). For land sales, the CRO provides the buyer a guarantee of the seller’s 
rightful ownership. While land is often sold informally, these types of sale are susceptible to scamming 
with land being sold to multiple people. Wolff et al. (2018) describe a case in Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam, 
where a single plot was sold to over 30 individuals. 
88 From authors’ discussions with two of Tanzania’s leading survey companies. 
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We conduct two lab-in-the-field experiments with 146 owners and 90 local leaders (wajumbe)89 
from fifteen neighbourhoods (washina)90 in two sub-wards (mitaa),91 where surveying was 
complete and invoices issued to plot owners. These owners had yet to pay their invoice by the 
start of the intervention (April 2019), over three years since the formalisation project 
commencement. The leaders in our study have different hierarchical positions and party 
affiliation,92 but all have been in charge at least for one mandate since the announcement of the 
formalisation project. Importantly, while working closely with the lower level government 
(mtaa chairmen and executive officers), these leaders are non-state actors. The election process 
is regulated by the party,93 and they hold unpaid positions outside of the government apparatus. 
Their role is mostly political on paper, but in practice it encompasses political, social and 
administrative tasks beyond an official mandate. For example, wajumbe organise and encourage 
residents’ attendance of public meetings.94 Furthermore, they are involved in solving family 
disputes, issuing identification letters (e.g. to banks, schools and government), monitoring 
service provision (e.g. waste collection) and facilitating government projects (e.g. distribution of 
IDs). Finally, the mtaa chairman and executive officer often engage wajumbe as witnesses in 
cases of land dispute and, more generally, to validate informal ownership when this is required 
by third parties, e.g. prospective buyers, municipal or bank officers (Manara and Pani, 2020c – 
Chapter 4 of this thesis). In fact, wajumbe are the ultimate source of knowledge on local land 
matters, which is why we propose eliciting demand for titles from them.95 
 
There are roughly six wajumbe in each neighbourhood or shina under study, which enables us 
to have multiple leaders provide information on the local demand. These neighbourhoods 
 
89 In the singular, ‘mjumbe’. 
90 In the singular, ‘shina’. Typically, it includes a couple of hundred plots.  
91In the singular, ‘mtaa’ is the smallest administrative unit and the lowest level of local government in 
Tanzania (sub-ward). Typically referred to as ‘street’, it contains a few thousand plots. 
92 In our study area both the ruling CCM party and the opposition Chadema party were represented by 
wajumbe and, in each neighbourhood, a given party will have one mjumbe and several assistant wajumbe. 
93 The National Election Committee regulates and supervises the election of the mtaa chairmen. In this 
case, the party reviews several candidates and selects one contestant to run for the mtaa election, whereby 
all residents have voting power. Conversely, the election of wajumbe is managed by the political parties. 
In this case, candidates are reviewed by the party office at the shina level. The party committee allows 
some candidates to run for elections. Normally, these are active members of the party. Voters must be 
registered with the party and residents of the shina. After election, each mjumbe appoints four or more 
assistants who must be approved by the party committee. These will automatically join the committee. 
The assistants have the same role as wajumbe, acting on their behalf when the latter are absent. Typically, 
wajumbe collaborate with their assistants on many tasks. 
94 Including, but not limited to, the political party meetings. 
95 In fact, predictions by decentralised leaders are likely more accurate than those by chairmen and 
executive officers who control over a thousand plots and therefore have less fine-grained knowledge. 
Additionally, for ethical concerns, we prefer to have multiple leaders predict the plot owners’ demand for 
land titles. Using an average prediction to determine the discounts available through the study mitigates 




typically contain around 250 plots. They are all located in Kilungule A and B, two mitaa of the 
Kimara Ward. For simplicity we refer to our study area as Kilungule, shown in Figure 2. 
 
5.3 Data collection 
The full timeline of the study is depicted in Figure 3. In brief, first we collected data for the 
sampling process. Then we conducted the leader survey and experiment. Finally, we held 
information sessions with plot owners, and after a few weeks we invited them for their 
experimental sessions. These passages are fully described in this section. Furthermore, forty-
two plot owners were selected at random to undertake in-depth interviews digging into the 
determinants of their willingness-to-pay. Last, we conducted two rounds of follow-up data 
collection in January and October 2020 to gather administrative records on the history of each 
invoice’s file and to interview a sample of leaders who had taken part in our experiment. We 
present and analyse this data in section 5.6 of this paper. 
 
5.3.1 Sampling  
We collected CRO invoice records of all 1,482 invoiced plots in our study area and matched 
1,401 of these to geo-located plot boundaries. Of these, only 13% had purchased their title deed, 
even though 28% had been invoiced over two years earlier, and only 3% had been invoiced 
within the last six months. From this population we randomly sampled fifteen invoiced plots 
from each neighbourhood in our study area, for a total of 225 plots. We stratified our sampling 
so that low, medium, and high value plots were represented in each neighbourhood. We then 
conducted a rapid survey of the selected plot owners in order to gather their contact information, 
occupancy (i.e. owner or tenant), and their social connection to each leader (i.e. whether they 
knew or ever interacted with their leaders). Following the invoice collection, we conducted a 
census of the 96 leaders in our study area which allowed us to match them to neighbourhoods, 
classify their party affiliation (CCM or Chadema) and hierarchical position (main leader or 
leader assistant), and geo-locate their residence. From this population we randomly assigned 
leaders to one of three treatment groups. We stratified the randomisation based on political 
affiliation and physical and social proximity to sampled invoiced plots. 
 
All randomisation (both for the sampling of plot owners and the allocation of leaders to 
treatment groups) was done mechanically during a series of public meetings where the process 
could be observed. Despite the potential for mechanical error, this was an important procedure 
to garner trust with the community. It also provided a practical experience with randomisation 
so that those who also participated in the BDM at the end of the study were already familiar 




5.3.2 Other information sessions 
We invited all 225 sampled plot owners to attend an information session to introduce them to 
our project, two to three weeks before their actual experimental session. The focus of the 
information session was on familiarising the respondents with the BDM procedure. They were 
told that during the experimental session they would be asked, “What is the maximum price that 
you would and could pay in the next 10 days for your invoice towards your title deed?” We then 
explained the concept of willingness-to-pay both in theory and with examples. They were told 
that on the research day they would have an opportunity to commit to pay their invoice if it was 
offered at a price they could afford, and so it was important that they thought carefully over the 
following weeks about their willingness-to-pay for the title deed. We then explained the 
specifics of the BDM method and that their best strategy was to determine for themselves their 
true willingness-to-pay and then reveal exactly that price to the surveyor. We used theory and 
examples to show why this was the best strategy for them. We finished the session by practicing 
with volunteers for either a soda or an aerial photo of their plot (see Figure 4 for an example). 96 
Throughout the session we asked for feedback from respondents until it was clear they 
understood. 
 
Owners were given at least two weeks between the information session and the price elicitation 
session. During this period, they were encouraged to consult others (family, joint plot owners, 
friends, etc.) on their willingness-to-pay and plan out a strategy for gathering the funds they 
may need if they won a discount. This time was also used to sort out individual issues with each 
invoice. Some of these issues were simple for us and the Ubungo Municipal Office to 
accommodate, such as the misspelling of names, partial payments already made, and the 
addition of spouses to invoices. In a few exceptional cases, we allowed ‘decision makers’ to 
participate on behalf of the true owner on the invoice.97 For other issues we had to drop invoices 
from our sample. This was the case where, by the time of starting the study, invoices had 
already been fully paid or the plots sold (19 cases), where at least one owner had deceased (4 
cases), when the owner lived out of country and could not be reached (13 cases) or had conflicts 




96 For the practice rounds, we used scripts similar to the actual experimental script in Appendix A. 
97 This was done in two exceptional cases, one where the plot owner had been living in Canada for over 
thirty years and his brother was the de-facto owner of the plot, and a second where the plot owner was 
disabled and her son took on responsibility for the plot. In both cases the decision maker was responsible 
for paying the invoice, and in neither case did we change the name of the plot owner on the invoice. 
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5.3.3 Owner survey and price elicitation 
We invited 184 eligible plot owners to participate in a survey and price elicitation lottery, and 
146 of these attended. We also invited a leader to each session in order to establish trust with the 
respondents. The survey collected information on demographics, a CRO knowledge test, 
perceptions on tenure security, and perceived costs and benefits of a CRO. Following the 
survey, each respondent participated in the BDM price elicitation. This began with a practice 
round where the respondents were randomly assigned the opportunity to purchase either a soda 
or an aerial photo of their plot (see Figure 4 for an example) through the BDM mechanism. 
Following the practice, they were offered the opportunity to acquire the title deed for their plot 
at a discounted invoice price, again through the BDM mechanism. If the respondent won the 
discount, they were scheduled to make their payment within ten days.98 
 
The BDM procedure that we implement closely follows that of Berry et al. (2020) with slight 
adjustments to our context. Respondents stated their willingness-to-pay (bid) and participated in 
a lottery extracting a new invoice price (draw). According to standard BDM procedure, if the 
draw were lower or equal to their bid, they would be offered the title deed at the new discounted 
price; if the draw were higher, they would not be offered a new price. Scripts can be found in 
Appendix A. Detailed explanation and practice rounds enabled respondents to understand that 
their bid should represent the maximum price they could and would like to pay; their bid could 
not be changed after the lottery; and, upon winning, they must make the according payment 
within ten days. Once the bid for the invoice was finalised, a price was drawn which determined 
whether the respondent would pay for the invoice at the drawn price.99 
 
There were 39 respondents who drew prices lower than their bid and so won a discounted 
invoice value. For each, we confirmed that they could pay and that they had a plan to collect the 
necessary funds. Finally, we had them sign off on their bid value and draw outcome. All 
participants received a 10,000 TSh cash allowance for their participation, and winners of 
 
98 Because the price of the title deed was high for many households, we did not ask for immediate 
payment. First, asking respondents to bring the full amount of cash to cover their bid value would be a 
significant wasted effort in the case that they did not win. The second reason was to allow enough time to 
gather funds from family, friends, or micro-lending groups. In fact, 15% of respondents confided asking 
the financial support from family and friends to make higher bids (Manara and Regan, 2020). 
99 Practically, the respondents drew 1 of 75 plastic balls from an opaque jug. Each ball corresponded to a 
price between 0 and their full invoice value, which was recorded on a reference sheet. The exact 
distribution depended on the size of their plot (thus, indirectly, the invoice value). In order to maintain 
goodwill, the distribution of prices was shown upon request just before the price was drawn and none of 
the respondents asked to change their bid after seeing the distribution. An example of this distribution, for 
plots between 400 and 500 sqm, can be found in Appendix A. 
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discounts were required to use this as a down payment in order to discourage overstating their 
willingness-to-pay. Still, five (12.8 percent) of the winners did not complete the purchase.100 
 
5.3.4 Leader survey and experiment 
We conducted surveys with the leaders one month in advance of the first plot owner price 
elicitation session. All 96 leaders in our study area were invited to participate and 90 (93.8 
percent) attended and completed the survey. The questionnaire consisted of demographics, a 
CRO knowledge test, social network, and predictions of plot owner characteristics. The network 
and prediction questions all related to the owners of the 15 selected plots in each leader’s 
respective neighbourhood. For reference, the leaders were given both official names and 
nicknames of each owner as well as a photo of the particular plot that was selected. 
 
The survey concluded with price elicitation tasks. Leaders were asked to rank each of the 15 
plot owners in their neighbourhood in terms of their willingness-to-pay for the title deed. After 
ranking, leaders had also to predict, for each plot owner, their exact willingness-to-pay. Each 
leader conducted the task under their randomly assigned treatment. The exact scripts used can 
be found in Appendix B. 
 
Leaders assigned to the control group were told that the research was conducted for academic 
purposes only. They were encouraged to be as truthful and accurate as possible to enable high 
quality research. Finally, they were ensured that their answers would not be used to change any 
procedure over the course of the study. 
 
Leaders in the stakes group were informed that their responses to the price elicitation tasks 
would be used to change procedures in the remaining study; particularly, to help decide which 
plot owners would have higher chances to win high discounts through the lottery. If leaders 
suggested a plot owner had a low willingness-to-pay, we would adjust the distribution of 
discounts available in the lottery to this plot owner to make it more likely that they win a high 
discount. Importantly, we adjusted the distribution of available discounts based on an average of 
leaders’ predictions for the same plot owner, thereby mitigating concerns over the ethical 
aspects of this treatment.101 
 
 
100 Three of these cited unforeseen health issues with a family member that became a priority for the 
funds that were allocated to the title deed. One was unable to borrow the money that she had expected. 
The last one went away on business and was unwilling to arrange a representative to make her payment. 
101 Specifically, using an average prediction mitigated the impact of one leader intentionally favouring or 
penalising one plot owner for personal reasons beyond their willingness-to-pay. 
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Finally, leaders in the incentives group received the same instructions as the stakes group, but 
they had the opportunity to earn cash for their accuracy. We adopted an ex-post payment rule 
that would be implementable in a policy setting.102 Leaders were given simple payment 
examples to work through. Each leader was reminded that being as truthful and accurate as 
possible was the best way to earn the cash. At the end, the leader with the most points was paid 
30,000 TSh and the four runners-up were paid 20,000 TSh each. 
 
5.4 Data and sample descriptives 
5.4.1 Summary statistics and balance 
In Table 1 we present mean characteristics for the whole sample of both the plot owners 
(column 1) and leaders (column 2). Compared to leaders, plot owners tend to be younger and 
more highly educated but score worse on a short quiz about CROs and have lower household 
monthly incomes. While the majority of owners are male there is a significant share of female 
ownership (73% of plots have sole ownership, and 35% of these are owned by women). This is 
in line with previous findings that the cultural environment in Dar es Salaam is not particularly 
hostile to co-titling or female ownership (Ali et al., 2016). Leaders are also slightly more likely 
to be men, but 40% of them are women. Considering potential heirs, 92% of plots are owned by 
individuals with at least one child. The average CRO invoice value is 527,000 TSh, or roughly 
two and a half times the median monthly income in our sample. Most plots are occupied by 
their owners, still 28% are owned by absentee landlords. A full 86% of plots were acquired by 
purchase as opposed to inheritance or squatting, though only 25% of all plots have a certificate 
of sale (hati ya mauzo or sale agreement). Exactly half of the plots are owned by individuals 
with at least one other plot in Tanzania. 
 
Leaders themselves tend to own their homes: 94% own the plot they live on while the remainder 
all live on a plot owned by a member of their household. Leaders typically have a long history 
of residence in Kilungule. While only 7% have settled in the past six years, a full 38% have 
been living there for over 19 years. Out of the fifteen owners sampled for each neighbourhood, 
leaders know on average 12 of these, though only 4.3 have ever come to the leader for official 
assistance. Leaders have few social connections among the plot owners in the study: on average 
0.22 owners are family, 1.4 are friends, 1.8 meet regularly for religious purposes, and 1.3 are 
considered highly esteemed by the community. Also presented in Table 1 are differences in 
leaders’ characteristics between the stakes and control groups (column 3), and differences 
 
102 Before the price elicitation tasks, leaders were explained that, at the end of the study, we would pick 
one price level and observe which plot owners stated willingness-to-pay above that price. For each plot 
owner with stated willingness-to-pay above the threshold price, leaders would score a number of points 
corresponding to the assigned ranking position of that plot owner. This is implementable in a real-world 
setting, since the policy maker will observe which of the plot owners do in fact uptake titles. If titles were 
purchased by owners for whom the leader ranked high, then the leader was accurate. 
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between the incentives and control groups (column 4). There are only a few marginally 
significant differences, though standard errors are large. The stakes group has fewer women and 
more leaders with household income below 100,000 TSh compared to the control group. The 
incentives group has more leaders with their home plot surveyed than the control group. 
 
5.4.2 Demand for CROs 
Figure 5 describes the demand for CROs elicited through the BDM. For the BDM demand 
curve in Figure 5a we show, for each price, the share of plot owners whose bid was greater than 
or equal to that price. This is done by running successive logit regressions at each price point 
and correcting for heteroskedasticity in the calculation of the confidence intervals. While the 
full sample of plot owners were not willing to purchase a title deed at their invoiced price, there 
is still a significant amount of demand for CROs. Over 40 percent of plot owners would be 
willing to pay 200,000 TSh, which is more than the monthly household income of half of our 
respondents. However, demand is still much below the invoice fees that are currently being 
charged. The median invoice in our sample is approximately 500,000 TSh. At such a price, less 
than 10 percent of plot owners would be willing to pay. Even if all plots were charged 170,000 
TSh (the minimum invoice value observed in our sample), roughly 50 percent of plot owners 
would not purchase a title deed. In Figure 5b we compare the elasticity of demand calculated 
from the smoothed version of the demand curve above. There is a wide range (200-600,000 
TSh) where demand is relatively elastic, beyond which we have trouble estimating due to the 
sparsity of observations in the tail of the distribution. 
 
5.4.3 Leader predictions and placebos 
Because we are interested in knowing whether leaders have accurate knowledge of the 
willingness-to-pay for CROs in their neighbourhoods, we first check if they have knowledge on 
a related set of plot characteristics. In Table 2 we run regressions based on the model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽 ŷ𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑗 𝛾 + 𝑖𝑗                                                         (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is a characteristic of plot i related to leader j, ŷ𝑖𝑗 is leader j’s prediction of plot i’s 
characteristic and 𝑥′𝑗 is a vector of leader controls for randomisation strata, neighbourhood, and 
surveyor id. 
 
Panel A shows that leaders’ predictions of plot and plot owner characteristics are positively 
associated with their true characteristics. In column 1, leaders are able to distinguish between 
owners with higher or lower income. Our estimates for income rank are very similar to those 
found by Rigol et al. (2020) for Indian entrepreneurs’ predictions of their peers’ income rank. In 
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column 2 we show that leaders’ predictions of the CRO invoice value rank are positively 
associated with the true rank in our sample, and for column 3 this is also true across all the 
fifteen plots selected for the study (including the attriters).103 Therefore, column 3 signals that 
our plot owner survey sample is not selected towards plots that are easier to predict. In columns 
4 and 5 we can see that leaders also have some ability to predict whether plot owners have paid 
their property tax or if they have an informal sale agreement. 
 
Panel B does placebo tests by comparing the relationship of leader predictions and actual 
characteristics across treatment groups. It is a placebo because these predictions were given by 
leaders before they were assigned their treatment. The stakes group has a slightly higher 
differential between predicted and observed for each characteristic, but there are no significant 
differential coefficients of either the stakes or the incentives treatments. This suggests that all 
leader groups have similar predictive capacity. 
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Leader predictions of aggregate willingness-to-pay 
Figure 6 compares demand for CROs elicited through the BDM mechanism with that elicited 
through local leaders. For the BDM demand curve, we show for each price the share of plot 
owners whose bid was above that price. We follow a similar procedure for the leader predicted 
demand curve but use the leader’s prediction of the plot owner’s willingness-to-pay instead of 
the owner’s bid. Since there are multiple leaders for any given owner, and so multiple 
predictions of their willingness-to-pay, we cluster standard errors at the plot owner level. The 
same 146 plots are used to construct both the BDM and leader predicted demand curves. 
 
In Figure 6a, we only use leaders under the control group and compare the demand curve based 
on their responses with the BDM results. Whether demand is elicited from the BDM mechanism 
or predicted by leaders, the curves are strikingly similar. At least on an aggregate level, leaders 
seem to have knowledge of the distribution of willingness-to-pay in their neighbourhoods. 
 
When leaders are told that their responses will be used to determine the likelihood that a plot 
owner receives a discount (stakes), they distort their responses. Figure 6b uses only leaders 
under the stakes treatment and compares the demand curve based on their responses with that 
based on the BDM. For most prices where demand is positive there is a large gap between the 
demand curve elicited from this group of leaders compared to the BDM. This suggests that, 
despite their predictive ability, eliciting aggregate demand from leaders may be difficult in a 
 
103 The full sample of plots includes those plot owners that did not participate in the research, despite 
being selected. Therefore, their actual willingness-to-pay, elicited by BDM, is unknown to us. 
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setting where their responses are used to price CROs in the community. One aspect of this result 
is counter-intuitive: if leaders wanted to increase the chances of high discounts, they should 
have stated that plot owners have low willingness-to-pay. Instead predictions by leaders in the 
stakes group were biased upwards. In Section 5.6.1 we discuss this result in detail based on 
follow-up interviews with local leaders. 
 
However, offering a monetary incentive to leaders for their predictive accuracy can mitigate the 
distortions created in the stakes environment. Figure 6c uses only leaders under the incentives 
treatment and compares the demand curve based on their responses with that based on the 
BDM. Whether demand is elicited from the BDM mechanism or predicted by leaders with 
incentives, the curves are statistically indistinguishable. This is not only due to wide confidence 
intervals. The largest gap between the point estimates of leader and BDM elicited demand 
curves is a 0.08 point difference, and for most prices the gap is less than a 0.03 point difference. 
The cash incentive has shrunk the gap observed in the stakes group, where leaders were told that 
their responses would be used to determine discounts but they did not receive incentives for 
accuracy. 
 
5.5.2 Leader ability to distinguish willingness-to-pay across owners 
While leaders may be able to predict the aggregate distribution of demand fairly well, it remains 
to be seen if they can also distinguish between individuals with high and low willingness-to-
pay. In this section we describe the ability of leaders to distinguish individuals with high and 
low willingness-to-pay by running regressions based on the model: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽 ŵ𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑗 𝛾 + 𝑖𝑗                    (2) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is willingness-to-pay of plot i related to leader j, ŵ𝑖𝑗 is leader j’s prediction of plot i’s 
willingness-to-pay and 𝑥′𝑗 is a vector of leader controls for randomisation strata, 
neighbourhood, and surveyor id. 
 
In Table 3 Panel A we show that the coefficient on leader prediction of different measures of 
owners’ willingness-to-pay is always positively associated with the true measures of owners’ 
willingness-to-pay. Column 1 considers the within neighbourhood rank: an individual predicted 
to be one position higher in the ranking is on average 0.2 positions higher in the rank of plot 
owners’ bids. Column 2 uses the actual level of willingness-to-pay: an individual predicted to 
bid 10,000 TSh above another will, on average, bid 1,000 TSh more. Column 3 takes the log of 
willingness-to-pay: a one percent increase in predicted willingness-to-pay translates to a 0.33 
percent increase in actual willingness-to-pay, on average. Column 4 takes the percentile rank of 
all owners in the sample (rather than within neighbourhood). Here, moving from an individual 
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at the median to one at the 60th percentile of predictions results in a 2.3 percentile increase in 
the true willingness-to-pay, on average.  
 
Finally, columns 5 and 6 use the probability of being the top or bottom rank in the 
neighbourhood: an individual is 15 percentage points more likely to be the highest willingness-
to-pay in the neighbourhood if predicted to be so, and 24 percentage points more likely to be the 
lowest willingness-to-pay if predicted so. On this last point, it is interesting to note that one of 
the largest land surveying companies in Tanzania runs a ‘free lunch’ programme, consulting 
local leaders before charging fees to determine plot owners in the neighbourhood who are in 
need of a discount. In one of their larger projects, they surveyed over 5,000 plots and used 
leader information to waive fees for about 2% of the plot owners.104 
 
Leaders may have knowledge of individual willingness-to-pay, and yet, they may distort their 
responses if it can help certain plot owners win discounts or if they are paid incentives for 
accuracy. In Panel B we analyse the impact of the stakes and incentives environments. To do so 
we adjust model 2 to account for the differential coefficient for leaders in different 
environments: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽 ŵ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽
𝑆 ŵ𝑖𝑗1(j ∈ stakes) + 𝛽
𝐼 ŵ𝑖𝑗1(j ∈ incentives) + 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛼𝐼 + 𝑥′𝑗 𝛾 + 𝑖𝑗   (3) 
where 1(j ∈ stakes) is an indicator if leader j was assigned to the stakes environment, 1(j ∈ 
incentives) is an indicator if leader j was assigned to the incentives environment, and 𝛼𝑆 and 𝛼𝐼 
are dummies for each treatment group. Returning to Table 3 Panel B, none of the differential 
coefficients of either environment is significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
Therefore, we find no evidence that the stakes or incentives environments create distortions 
across the individual level predictions. 
 
5.5.3 Property characteristics to distinguish willingness-to-pay across owners 
The Tanzanian government currently charges for CROs with a formula based on ward level land 
values, plot area and land use. In this section we examine the ability of this formula to target 
high and low willingness-to-pay individuals. In addition, we create a measure of property values 
based on photos of the plot, and local knowledge of the area.105 We consider this measure of 
property values as another potential indicator upon which to price discriminate. Below we show 
how variation in property and invoice values relates to the willingness-to-pay of plot owners. 
 
104 From authors’ discussions with the company. 
105 This follows the procedure that is used for property valuation by local governments and the Ministry 
of Lands. The valuations are based on the subjective determination of three students from Ardhi 
University, a local university, which specialises in surveying, planning, and valuation. 
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In Table 4 we run regressions of the general form: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼 𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽 ŵ𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑗 𝛾 + 𝑖𝑗          (4) 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑗 is either invoiced fee or property valuation of plot i related to leader j. When 
willingness-to-pay is transformed, we also transform the observable characteristic accordingly, 
e.g. in Panel A column 1 where the outcome is the rank of willingness-to-pay, we use the rank 
of invoice value as the explanatory variable. 
 
In Panel A we use invoice value unconditional of the leader prediction of willingness-to-pay. 
Across columns 1-5, invoice values are positively associated with individual willingness-to-pay. 
Column 6 shows that the bottom rank willingness-to-pay is particularly difficult to predict with 
the invoice value. Otherwise the invoice value correlates strongly with willingness-to-pay, with 
coefficients that are typically closer to 1 than the leader prediction in Table 3 Panel A. Finally, 
we note that, while variation in invoice value closely follows that of willingness-to-pay, the 
average invoice value is more than 2.7 times that of the average willingness-to-pay (Table 1 
Column 1). In Panel B we include the leader prediction in addition to the invoice value. In 
columns 1-4 we show that, conditional on the invoice value, the leaders are still able to explain 
variation in the willingness-to-pay. This suggests that the invoice formula and the leaders’ 
predictions could be applied complementary to one another. Finally, conditional on invoice 
value, leaders are not able to capture any variation when it comes to the top rank of willingness-
to-pay. Instead, when considering the bottom rank, leaders are effective while the invoice value 
is not. 
 
Moving to Panel C we use property valuation unconditional of the leader prediction of 
willingness-to-pay. In columns 1-4 the property valuation is positively associated with 
willingness-to-pay and the correlations are of similar magnitude to the leaders’ predictions in 
Table 3 Panel A. However, in columns 5 and 6 the subjective valuation of the property has no 
ability to predict the top or bottom ranked willingness-to-pay. In Panel D columns 1-4 we show 
that subjective property value and leader prediction are both able to describe variation in 
willingness-to-pay conditional on one another. In columns 5 and 6 only the leader prediction is 
able to describe the variation in the top and bottom rank willingness-to-pay. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that leaders’ predictions are still able to predict variation in 
willingness-to-pay, even after controlling for invoice and property values. Thus, their 
predictions could be used complementary to the formula that the government currently applies 
for a better price-discrimination strategy, particularly in order to make CROs more affordable to 
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the plot owners with the lowest willingness-to-pay. As seen, this level of information could not 
be obtained by considering the property value alone. 
 
5.5.4 Can willingness-to-pay cover project costs? 
In this section we do back-of-the-envelope calculations to determine whether the willingness-to-
pay is high enough to cover the costs of the project. Currently, 13% of invoices have been paid 
and their average fee was 616,000 TSh. Therefore, the government raised about 80,000 TSh on 
average. We sampled plots from the remainder of invoices, and here the average willingness-to-
pay was 194,000 TSh. Taking this figure as representative for the entire 87% of unpaid 
invoices, the maximum revenue that could be extracted from the remainder is 
0.87*194,000=168,780 TSh on average. Together the average potential revenue is about 
249,000 TSh per plot.106 Considering that the average cost of surveying and planning for a plot 
is about 200,000 TSh for large projects (quote from two private survey companies), and 
comparing this to the average willingness-to-pay, we realise that the costs of surveying and 
planning are covered. Furthermore, there is an average gain of 50,000 TSh per plot, which could 
cover other administrative fees. Further revenue will also accrue through the annual land rent, 
which is currently relatively low (approximately 15,000 TSh for an average size plot). As 
discussed with key government officials from the MLHHSD, the most onerous invoice items, 
Premium, Revolving Fund and Operational Cost, can easily be reduced or erased altogether. 
The first is a land value capture;107 the second is a mark-up to subsidise further formalisation 
projects;108 the latter is a variable levy by the Municipality.109 These items amount to an average 
of 435,000 TSh per invoice. Reducing these would considerably lower the median invoice in 
our sample (527,000 TSh). 
 
The simple calculation above demonstrates that willingness-to-pay outweighs the project costs. 
Furthermore, we note that the willingness-to-pay for the title deed, which we elicited in our 
study, does not capture the overall private gains to formalisation. In fact, in a separate study we 
document that plot owners already perceive large benefits to the process of surveying and 
allocating beacons, regardless of the title document (Manara and Regan, 2020). In addition, 
there are likely further gains to surveying and titling that are not internalised by the current plot 
owners, which will manifest in the long run (Michaels et al., 2020). Together this suggests that 
the gains to formalisation can far outweigh the costs of surveying and planning. 
 
 
106 Note that this is a conservative estimate since the 13% of property owners who have already paid must 
have had a willingness-to-pay above their invoice fee. Here we assume that their willingness-to-pay was 
equal to the fee. 
107 On average, 190,000 TSh. 
108 On average, 115,000 TSh. 
109 On average, 130,000 TSh. 
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5.6 Follow-up study 
5.6.1 Post-experiment interviews with leaders 
In January 2020, we conducted follow-up interviews with a sub-sample (72 percent) of leaders 
in the stakes group110 to understand why they overpredicted the aggregate willingness-to-pay in 
their areas (Figure 6b). According to the script (Appendix B), if leaders wanted to increase the 
chances of high discounts in their neighbourhood, they should predict that plot owners have low 
willingness-to-pay. Instead, predictions by leaders in the stakes group were biased upwards. 
Thus, stakes leaders have decreased the overall level of discount offered in their neighbourhood. 
To investigate this unexpected result, our follow-up questionnaire included a simple test111 and 
further questions to assess: first, whether the script was understood incorrectly, and second, 
what other reasons (besides a genuine inability to predict) may have caused an upward bias. 
 
We do not have evidence of any systematic inability to interpret the task correctly. However, 
our evidence does suggest that the script was not always immediately comprehensible. Indeed, 
tested on the comprehension of the script, all leaders demonstrated understanding the logic of 
the task correctly (except one). Yet, 35% suggested that the script was difficult to interpret.112 
Furthermore, after being informed of the study results, a full 78% indicated difficult 
comprehension as the most plausible explanation of upward bias, and a few leaders admitted 
they were initially confused by the task. Thus, although we do not have evidence of any 
systematic inability to interpret the script correctly, it is nonetheless possible that some leaders 
misinterpreted the task on the day of their experimental session. This might be the result of both 
script lack of clarity and the experimental environment. On the one hand, tension and fatigue 
may have increased the propensity to misunderstand a complex script.113 On the other, we found 
evidence of experimenter bias. In fact, 39% of respondents suggested that most leaders would 
worry about depicting a certain image of their area and themselves. In this case, leaders would 
overstate the local willingness-to-pay in order to demonstrate to the researchers that their 
neighbourhood is not too poor, and they do not intend to take advantage of the study.114 
 
110 We interrupted interviews when saturation was reached. 
111 For the test, leaders were presented the script of their experimental session and asked questions, such 
as: ‘If a leader wants to increase the chances of high discount for a plot owner which he knows has 
willingness-to-pay 200,000 TSh, what willingness-to-pay should he predict?’ (Options: 100,000 TSh; 
200,000 TSh; 300,000 TSh). ‘If the leader wants to increase the plot owner’s chances of high discount, 
where should he place her plot in the ranking?’ (Options: At the bottom; In the middle; At the top). 
112 We asked respondents if most of their fellow leaders would understand the script correctly eliciting 
third party information in the spirit of the Bayesian truth serum (Prelec, 2004) to encourage truthful 
responses. This method assumes that it is easier to admit that the majority, instead of oneself, found the 
questionnaire hard to comprehend. 
113 On the same day leaders undertook a survey before their experimental session, which may have 
increased fatigue. 
114 Whilst all leaders may have wanted their areas to appear less poor, those in the control and incentives 
groups may have had other motivations to provide accurate responses (respectively, helping the 
researchers to collect high quality data, or winning cash prizes).  
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The follow-up interviews with leaders suggested two further points that are worth noting. First, 
the majority believe that most study participants have tried to increase the chances of high 
discounts for at least some plot owners, typically the elders, the poor, and those with many 
financial responsibilities (e.g. pending loans, dependent children). This suggests that leaders 
care about the tenure of vulnerable plot owners and are ready to actively help them to acquire 
the title deed at a lower price. Combined with the results discussed above, this underscores that 
leaders are both capable and motivated to identify the plot owners with the lowest willingness-
to-pay.  
“Wajumbe are the foundation of the government, hence they are required to accomplish 
all tasks assigned by the government. If they were involved to suggest prices affordable to 
their people, they could help to raise the uptake of title deeds” (Leader 3). 
Second, and related to the quote above, most leaders claimed that they could contribute to 
raising the rate of formalisation in their neighbourhood. In fact, a full 70 percent recounted 
participating in some project activities, for example by identifying boundaries, organising 
meetings, and distributing invoices to plot owners.115 However, only three interviewees (13 
percent) were satisfied about this level of engagement, while the majority (61 percent) deem it 
insufficient.116 In their opinion, the government would get twofold advantages from a closer 
collaboration with leaders. On the one hand, they can provide information on the local demand 
for titles, as demonstrated in this paper. On the other, “leaders are essential to emphasise the 
project and motivate people to pay for the title deed” (Leader 12). Indeed, in this context plot 
owners tend to follow the advice of their leaders (Manara, 2020 – Chapter 3 of this thesis), 
because they “trust the wajumbe” (Leader 8) and “have little information, despite urging the 
title deed” (Leader 20). 
 
5.6.2 Further steps in the title acquisition process 
In January and October 2020, several months following the final price elicitation session (May 
2019), we gathered administrative records on the history of each invoice's file. In a new 
centralised digital system, the land officers at Ubungo Municipality check off steps of the title 
acquisition process, from the invoicing of plots to the payment of invoices, and ultimately the 
collection of the title deed. This allowed us to follow the history of each plot's title acquisition 
process, as summarised in Table 5. We collected data for all untitled plot owners who were 
sampled for our study and won discounted prices (39), did not win discounts (107), or did not 
attend their experimental session (73). By January 2020, there were 14 ‘discounted price’ (36 
 
115 Seven respondents who were not involved are either assistants or belong to the mtaa opposition party. 
116 The rest had no opinions on this matter. Many respondents provided motivations for the low 
engagement of leaders, for example explaining that the ruling party in the mtaa would exclude the 
opposition leaders from the formalisation project. More generally, others mentioned that these projects 
require technical expertise, therefore key actors are surveyors, planners, municipal and ministry officials. 
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percent), two ‘full price’ (2 percent), and four ‘attriters’ (5.5 percent) with allocated titles. Thus, 
it is clear that discounts have raised the uptake of titles. However, out of 20 allocated titles, only 
ten had already been collected. Nine months after, by October 2020, an additional five titles had 
been allocated, among which three to ‘discounted price’, one to ‘full price’, one to ‘attriters’. 
Altogether, 24 titles had been collected by that time. 
 
This suggests the presence of bottlenecks on the supply side, extending the time and possibly 
the costs of title acquisition.117 For example, amongst the 39 plot owners who received 
discounted prices and completed their payments under the research project by June 2019, many 
applications had stalled at the stage of ‘Conversion’ (preceding ‘Allocation’). This means that 
the Municipality needs to amend mistakes in the cadastral drawings and database, including 
simple typos or major issues of overlapping plot boundaries. Unfortunately, sixteen months 
after completing the payment, about half of the 39 plot owners are still at this stage.118 This 
evidence highlights that the survey process can produce significant bottlenecks, if poorly 
organised and rushed, as many of our respondents complained. To conclude, we examined the 
average length of all stages in the acquisition process in order to identify other potential 
bottlenecks. On average, after ‘Conversion’, the ‘Allocation’ phase takes 134 days,119 while 
collection typically occurs another 92 days later. It appears that the lengthier phases concern the 
data entry (five weeks), the approval of final documents (four weeks), and the preparation of the 
invoice (three weeks).120 Thus, the main bottlenecks concern the phases of ‘Conversion’ and 
title deed collection. 
 
5.7 Policy implications of research findings  
Despite of potential theoretical gains, as set out in the paper’s conceptual motivation, the 
government may not engage in first degree price discrimination by charging different prices to 
individuals. First degree price discrimination can be next to impossible for centralised policy 
makers with little to no information on the plot owners themselves. The centralised policy 
maker is likely to observe a very noisy signal of willingness-to-pay and cannot identify, for 
example, plot owners who should be subsidised. This is the key issue that this paper focused on, 
and we argued that it can be mitigated by gathering information on willingness-to-pay from 
local leaders. However, this solution raises non-negligeable practical issues. The most obvious 
one is that extracting information on each individual plot owner entails considerable effort and 
investment of government resources, as each neighbourhood has thousands of plots. 
 
117 Further costs can include the monetary and opportunity costs of travel to the Municipality, plus the 
risk of deteriorated institutional trust. 
118 Precisely, 49% are under ‘Conversion’, while 5% have yet to start this process. 
119 During this phase, documents are validated and signed off by the Registrar of Titles. 
120 Intended as working weeks. 
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Inaccuracies and favouritism cannot be detected as in our controlled environment. On the one 
side, it may be difficult for the government to credibly stick to these prices. For instance, a plot 
owner may hold out for a lower price if they see that they are being charged a higher price than 
a seemingly identical plot. On the other side, the government may be reluctant to such price 
discrimination schemes, anticipating public backlash. We are not aware of any legal framework 
that prohibits first degree price discrimination in the charging of fees for property rights in 
Tanzania.121 However, land matters are highly political. First degree price discrimination may 
trigger perceptions of unfairness, complaints, disputes, and political consequences.  
 
Nonetheless, our evidence is policy relevant in two important respects. First, it suggests that the 
government should lower titling fees across the board. In fact, the government is concerned that 
the price of regularisation is too high, and the MLHHSD has recently established a ceiling to 
surveying fees (the first essential step of regularisation). A maximum price was set at 250,000 
TSh in July 2018,122 and further reduced to 150,000 TSh in April 2019.123 However, we find that 
current titling fees (to pay on top of surveying fees) are also too high for most plot owners. 
Second, eliciting information on willingness-to-pay from local leaders could improve the 
allocation of titles and lead to welfare gains. This could be done either by engaging local leaders 
in targeting subsidies or by simply improving the quality of the information used in the existing 
third degree price discrimination conducted by the government. With regards to the first option, 
we note that in the market for surveying services (before title acquisition), private companies 
already ask local leaders to identify plot owners in need of a free survey. As discussed in section 
5.2.1, the Tanzanian government cannot universally subsidise titles. Regularisation projects are 
costly and the charging of fees for title deeds is enshrined in Tanzanian law. In the absence of 
government data, local leaders could provide relevant information enabling the government to 
target subsidies to plot owners who cannot afford land titles despite of large perceived benefits.  
 
We do accept that this programme may raise some of the issues of first degree price 
discrimination laid out previously. Therefore, we argue that third degree price discrimination 
may be a more viable option, by charging prices to groups of people instead of individuals. 
First, third degree price discrimination can provide benefits from improved information on 
willingness-to-pay. The same intuition applies that this price discrimination can lead to gains by 
recovering some of the Harberger triangle deadweight loss and by making the project viable in 
 
121 The 1999 Land Act provides no definition about the methods by which fees must be determined, and 
simply states that “The Minister ... shall prescribe the rates of fees for all matters in respect of which, by 
this Act, prescribed fees are required to be paid by any person and shall keep such fees under continuous 






the case that it does not get built with a flat fee. Second, the political and credibility issues 
raised above are substantially mitigated for third degree price discrimination. Indeed, there is 
already precedent in Tanzania that fees for title deeds are charged differentially based on land 
use, location, and individual plot size. Further, in our sample of plot owners, 86% of 
respondents believe that it is fair to charge different invoices to different plots. Credibility is 
less of an issue for third degree price discrimination where prices are set on explicit 
characteristics, as long as the rates charged are communicated transparently. We note that the 
government already interviews local leaders to collect information on market land values, and 
these are used to price one of the most expensive invoice items (the ‘premium’) at the Ward 
level. In this context, leaders could provide additional information to improve the existing third 
degree price discrimination conducted by the government. In fact, they can predict plot owners’ 
willingness-to-pay and perceived benefits from regularisation, based on their knowledge of their 
income level, household composition and other explicit characteristics. 
 
Of course, more research is needed to transfer our empirical findings into policy 
recommendations. As many RCTs, our lab-in-the-field experiment is subject to issues of 
internal and external validity. With regards to internal validity, we note that we worked with a 
relatively small sample of 90 local leaders from two communities of Dar es Salaam where a 
pilot program of land tenure regularisation has taken place. We managed to involve most 
leaders in our study areas,124 thereby eliminating concerns with sampling, but our sample size is 
limited. This affects the precision of the estimates (Ravallion, 2020). Additionally, our 
experimental exercise cannot readily be scaled-up as a policy intervention. There are issues of 
generalisability and external validity that we need to consider (for recent discussions, see Davis 
and Mobarak, 2020; Vivalt, 2020; Williams, 2020). First, the same intervention might yield 
heterogeneous effects, depending on sample variability (Meager, 2019) and other factors. For 
instance, environmental features and local leaders’ characteristics might have impacted our 
results, as will be elaborated below. Second, the policymaker should consider further 
complexities, such as general equilibrium effects. That is, if local leaders begin pricing titles, 
plot owners may start to withhold information from them, and this can lower the predictive 
ability of leaders. In sum, our estimated mean treatment effects cannot predict the outcomes of a 
scaled-up intervention. We hope that future research will test the robustness of our findings in 
different settings, at larger scale, and with less researcher control.  
 
Importantly, there are practical issues associated with the implementation of our intervention at 
scale. First, there are coordination issues due to a high number of local leaders in each 
neighbourhood. It might be preferable to involve a high number of leaders to increase their 
 
124 Attrition was limited, and 90 out of 96 local leaders in the two study areas participated in our study. 
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accuracy and accountability, reducing opportunities for error, discretional and rent-seeking 
behavior, but there is a trade-off in terms of coordination effort. Second, literature has found 
evidence of implementer and monitoring effects (Ravallion, 2020). Normally, academic 
researchers and NGOs put a lot more effort into the implementation of small-scale experiments, 
compared to government officers rolling out large-scale programs. For instance, in the field we 
invested a great deal of effort in making sure that leaders showed up at our sessions, and that 
they received and understood the terms of their engagement. Limited resources and effort by 
government officials can substantially alter the result of our intervention. Third, the scaling up 
of our intervention can provide new incentives for local leaders (e.g. political interests) with the 
risk of affecting their predictions (Moffitt, 2006). For example, in the attempt to please the 
government or the electorate, leaders might bias their responses towards higher or lower prices, 
respectively. Relatedly, competition among leaders of different parties might introduce further 
distortions. In sum, scaling-up our intervention entails political processes and consequences (see 
Das, 2020).  
 
Amongst the contextual factors that may have impacted our experimental results – thereby 
limiting the generalisability of our findings – we note that first, the regularisation project under 
study may not fully represent the universe of regularisation schemes in urban Tanzania, or even 
Dar es Salaam.125 In fact, the Kimara project is a government-led pilot, where the government 
coordinated and subsidised the phases of planning and surveying. First, there is a selection 
concern. Our communities may have been selected for the pilot because their local leaders are 
particularly cooperative or supportive of regularisation. Second, the very fact of being selected 
for the pilot may have generated closer cooperation or alignment with the government’s goals, 
impacting the leaders’ experimental behaviour towards higher accuracy and lack of favouritism. 
Additionally, Kimara has a relatively recent history of urbanisation, controlled levels of density, 
and a middle-class profile. In inner-city neighbourhoods, leaders might be less familiar with the 
plot owners due to higher rental and churning of residents. Thus, research findings could be 
poorly transferable to other neighbourhoods, if leaders have different attitudes towards the 
government, the regularisation project, or the plot owners in general. 
 
Moreover, local leaders in urban Tanzania differ from similar agents governing unplanned 
settlements, either formally or informally, in other Sub-Saharan cities. As explained, our leaders 
are political representatives working in close collaboration with the local government to 
 
125 The Kimara project triggered numerous regularisation schemes in the private sector, starting with the 
Goba project. Most of these later projects are still incomplete therefore it was not possible to study the 
uptake of CRO in these neighbourhoods. We note that regularisation schemes by private companies 
involve similar, though not identical processes, which may also impact demand for CRO. For instance, 




administer everyday matters, including but not limited to land management (e.g. informal 
arbitration of land disputes, informal land transfers). This has three important implications for 
the generalisability of our findings to other contexts. First, our local leaders are knowledgeable 
in local land matters. Second, the government typically involves them in the delivery of public 
projects and services. Third, there is a widespread popular perception that local leaders act 
overall fairly and in the public interest. Thus, to a large extent, local leaders are the legitimate 
local authority. In consideration of these important contextual factors, it might be difficult to 
generalise our research findings to other contexts where local leaders represent the interests of 
particular elites, where they have scarce legitimacy, or are known to exercise power and rent-
seeking behaviour (see for example the role of chiefs in the Kibera slum in Nairobi; Marx et al., 
2019). Indeed, our experiment should be repeated at a larger scale and in different contexts, 
including in urban Tanzania, before recommending any policy intervention. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
African governments adopt land tenure reforms to contrast the socio-economic issues connected 
with unplanned and rapid urbanisation, essentially pushing for a transition from informal land 
tenure to formal law, from the local authority to the central government. Despite there being low 
uptake of property titles in much of urban Africa, we find that demand for formal property 
rights is substantial in two neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam where a pilot project of 
formalisation only registered 13% uptake in two years. Indeed, roughly 40% of plot owners are 
willing to pay fees equal to the monthly income of a typical household (200,000 TSh). This is 
much higher demand than is found in previous work in Dar es Salaam (Ali et al., 2016).126  
 
Drawing on this result, we challenge the view that plot owners do not recognise, or need, the 
benefits of formalisation, as we further explore in a qualitative companion paper (Manara and 
Regan, 2020). However, demand remains considerably lower than current fees, with the average 
invoice value being more than 2.7 times the average willingness-to-pay. We demonstrated that, 
if the government implemented a strategy of price discrimination, it would be possible to both 
cover the costs of surveying and planning and extract an average gain of 50,000 TSh per plot. 
Our evidence suggests that the government should lower the price of formalisation across the 
board and implement some cross-subsidisation in favour of plot owners with the lowest 
willingness-to-pay.  
 
This study has proposed that a better pricing strategy elicits local demand for titles from 
community leaders, who are typically involved in the land matters of unplanned settlements. To 
 
126 However, results are not easily comparable, because Ali et al. (2016) study two neighbourhoods closer 
to the city-centre, where the land value is higher and plots are smaller. 
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summarise, this argument is supported by three sets of experimental evidence. First, local 
leaders have accurate information about the aggregate demand curve in their neighbourhoods 
and they can distinguish variation in willingness-to-pay across plot owners. Second, whilst 
leaders’ predictions of aggregate demand deteriorate under an environment where their 
responses are used to allocate subsidies, an incentive scheme of cash prizes for ex-post accuracy 
can correct for almost all misreporting. Third, there is predictive capacity of leaders even after 
conditioning on the fee and property values.  
 
Altogether, this evidence suggests that the local knowledge of leaders can be used to set prices 
of land titles in combination with the current price discriminating formula based on land value, 
use and plot area. As argued, this pricing strategy would help to make formalisation projects 
financially viable and – crucially – more inclusive of the urban poor. In fact, interviews with 
leaders suggest that they are keen to support the government’s formalisation endeavours and 
facilitate vulnerable plot owners in achieving higher tenure security. Thus, we recommend that 
these key actors of informal institutions are not left behind in the transition to formal property. 
Finally, we underscore the need for more empirical research on the supply side of land titling, 







































Figure 5. BDM elicited CRO demand and elasticity. 
(a) Demand curve 
 
    
(b) Price elasticity of demand 
 
Notes: Figure 5a plots the BDM demand curve with 90% confidence bands. The demand curve 
indicates the share of respondents with a BDM bid greater than or equal to the indicated price. 
Confidence intervals are calculated using logit regressions (at prices TSh 50,000; 100,000; ...; 
1,000,000) clustering standard errors at the plot level. The sample is 146 plots. Figure 5b shows 
demand elasticities using BDM predicted demand. The BDM elasticity is calculated by a local 
polynomial regression where, first demand is interpolated using a local polynomial regression 
with an Epanechnikov kernel, then the point elasticity is calculated and smoothed using a local 
polynomial regression. In Figure 5b to highlight the sparsity of data in the right tail of our data 





Figure 6. Leader elicited CRO demand. 
(a) Control Group Leader Elicitation 
 
(b) Stakes Group Leader Elicitation 
 
(c) Incentives Group Leader Elicitation 
 
Notes: Figure 6 plots the BDM and Leader Predicted demand curves, with 90% confidence bands. The 
demand curves indicate the share of respondents with a BDM bid, or leader predicted WTP, greater than 
or equal to the indicated price. Confidence intervals are calculated using logit regressions (at prices TSh 
50,000; 100,000; …; 1,000,000) clustering standard errors at the plot level. The same sample of 146 plots 
is used for both, and predictions are frequency weighted by the number of leaders making predictions on 
that plot (i.e. each plot is equally weighted when calculating each leader predicted demand curve). Sub-
figure 6a uses only leaders from the control group and compares the demand curve from their predictions 






Table 1. Owners and leaders summary and balance. 
 











 (1)   (2) (3) (4) 
 Mean   Mean Diff 
Stakes-Contr 
Diff 
Incent-Contr    
 
  
Sole ownership 0.73     
 (0.037)     
Sole ownership and  0.26 Female 0.40 -0.24* -0.15 
female (0.036)  (0.052) (0.124) (0.130) 
Under 40 years old 0.23 Under 40 years old 0.07 0.06 0.04 
 (0.035)  (0.026) (0.064) (0.058) 
Over 60 years old 0.20 Over 60 years old 0.33 0.09 0.11 
 (0.033)  (0.050) (0.120) (0.123) 
Educ.  primary or  0.48 Educ.  primary or  0.57 0.05 0.05 
less (0.041) less (0.053) (0.129) (0.131) 
Educ.  above  0.27 Educ.  above  0.12 -0.07 -0.06 
secondary (0.037) secondary (0.035) (0.087) (0.090) 
Monthly income <  0.34 Monthly income <  0.19 0.25** 0.00 
100,000TSh (0.039) 100,000TSh (0.041) (0.104) (0.080) 
Monthly income > 0.35 Monthly income > 0.42 -0.08 0.05 
300,000TSh (0.040) 300,000TSh (0.052) (0.127) (0.132) 
Avg.  CRO quiz  4.9 Avg.  CRO quiz  7.4 0.15 0.08 
score (0.114) score (0.124) (0.309) (0.318) 
No children  0.08 Opposition party 0.14 0.03 0.00 
 (0.022)  (0.037) (0.092) (0.091) 
Over 4 children  0.32 Assistant leader 0.39 -0.05 0.01 
 (0.039)  (0.052) (0.126) (0.130) 
Absentee Owner  0.28 Owns their home  0.94 0.00 0.03 
 (0.037) plot (0.024) (0.064) (0.058) 
Acquired in last 6  0.11 Settled in last 6 0.07 -0.03 0.04 
years (0.026) years (0.026) (0.056) (0.074) 
Acquired over 19   0.34 Settled over 19  0.38 -0.01 -0.06 
years (0.039) years (0.051) (0.127) (0.128) 
Acquired by   0.86 Home plot 0.91 0.07 0.17** 
purchase (0.029) surveyed (0.030) (0.087) (0.070) 
Has sale certificate 0.25 Count of 15 owners   12 0.54 1.1 
 (0.036) known at all (0.321) (0.807) (0.773) 
Owns another plot   0.50 Count of 15 owners   4.3 1.7 0.33 
 (0.042) use services at all (0.465) (1.19) (1.01) 
Owns another   0.25 Count of 15 owners   0.22 0.09 -0.03 
surveyed plot (0.036) family members (0.052) (0.130) (0.114) 
Owns another  0.10 Count of 15 owners   1.4 -0.41 -0.08 
titled plot (0.024) close friends  (0.142) (0.358) (0.363) 
Avg.  invoice value   526 Count of 15 owners   1.8 -0.48 0.07 
(1000TSh) (17.9) religious affiliation (0.267) (0.646) (0.757) 
Avg. plot area   464 Count of 15 owners   1.3 0.02 0.08 
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(sqm) (32.8) highly esteemed  (0.124) (0.297) (0.330) 
Avg. BDM bid 195     
(1000Tsh) (14.5)     
 N 146  90   
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01 for difference =0 t-test  




Table 2. Leader predictions and placebos. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income Invoice Invoice Property 
Tax Paid 
Certificate 
of Sale Rank Rank Rank 
   Full   
Panel A: Predictions      
Leader Prediction 0.20*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.07** 0.09* 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.045) 
N 871 871 1349 871 871 
R2 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.18 
Panel B: Placebos 
Leader Prediction 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.02 0.09* 
 (0.035) (0.058) (0.046) (0.050) (0.047) 
Stakes × Leader 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.03 
Prediction (0.048) (0.086) (0.068) (0.065) (0.057) 
Incentives × -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 
Leader Prediction (0.046) (0.077) (0.071) (0.072) (0.042) 
N 871 871 1349 871 871 
R2 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.18 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at leader level in parentheses. Each observation is a leader-plot 
owner pair. Column 1, the dependent variable is the within neighbourhood rank of plot owners’ income. 
The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is the within neighbourhood rank of invoice value. Column 2 
restricts the sample to plot owners who participated in the study, while column 3 includes all the fifteen 
selected invoices in the leader’s neighbourhood. Column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator if the 
plot owner paid property tax in 2018. Column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator if the plot owner 
has a certificate of sale (sale agreement). The regressor is always the leader’s prediction of the dependent 




Table 3. Leaders’ ability to distinguish variation in willingness-to-pay. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WTP WTP In(WTP+1) WTP Top Bottom 
Rank   Percentile Rank Rank 
 
Panel A: Predictions       
Leader Prediction 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.048) (0.037) (0.052) (0.055) 
N 871 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.12 
Panel B: Distortions from real stakes 
Leader Prediction 0.175*** 0.105 0.253*** 0.159** 0.124 0.249*** 
 (0.041) (0.081) (0.095) (0.069) (0.085) (0.093) 
Leader Prediction 0.049 0.011 0.208 0.150* 0.043 -0.120 
× Stakes (0.058) (0.091) (0.133) (0.089) (0.125) (0.130) 
Leader Prediction 0.030 -0.025 0.089 0.098 0.019 0.103 
× Incentives (0.055) (0.088) (0.112) (0.085) (0.125) (0.135) 
N 871 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.12 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at leader level in parentheses. Each observation is a leader-plot 
owner pair. Column 1, the dependent variable is the within neighbourhood rank of plot owner’s BDM bid. 
The dependent variable in column 2 is the value of the plot owner’s BDM bid in Tanzanian shillings, and 
in column 3 is the log value. Column 4, the dependent variable is the percentile rank across the entire 
distribution, rather than neighbourhood only. Column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator if the 
BDM bid is the highest in the neighbourhood, and column 6 indicates if the bid is the lowest in the 
neighbourhood. The regressor is always the leader’s prediction of the dependent variable. Fixed effects 




Table 4. Using observable characteristics to distinguish variation in willingness-to-pay. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WTP WTP In(WTP+1) WTP Top Bottom 
Rank   Percentile Rank Rank 
 
Panel A: Invoice Formula       
Invoice 0.26*** 0.49*** 1.33*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.04 
 (0.017) (0.053) (0.088) (0.031) (0.059) (0.051) 
N 871 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.25 0.37 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.09 
Panel B: Invoice Formula and Leader Prediction 
Invoice 0.228*** 0.480*** 1.247*** 0.409*** 0.431*** 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.092) (0.032) (0.060) (0.052) 
Leader Prediction 0.151*** 0.053*** 0.253*** 0.179*** 0.062 0.239*** 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.055) 
N 871 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.30 0.37 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.12 
Panel C: Valuation 
Property Value 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.03 
(1,000TSh) (0.007) (0.072) (0.061) (0.022) (0.047) (0.066) 
N 870 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.08 
Panel D: Valuation and Leader Prediction 
Property Value 0.075*** 0.171** 0.229*** 0.195*** -0.015 -0.011 
(1,000TSh) (0.012) (0.073) (0.059) (0.023) (0.054) (0.064) 
Leader Prediction 0.170*** 0.092*** 0.301*** 0.202*** 0.147*** 0.242*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) (0.038) (0.054) (0.056) 
N 870 871 871 871 871 871 
R2 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.12 
*p≤0.1, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at leader level in parentheses. Each observation is a leader-plot 
owner pair. Column 1, the dependent variable is the within neighbourhood rank of plot owner’s BDM bid. 
The dependent variable in column 2 is the value of the plot owner’s BDM bid in Tanzanian shillings, and 
in column 3 is the log value. Column 4, the dependent variable is the percentile rank across the entire 
distribution, rather than neighbourhood only. Column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator if the 
BDM bid is the highest in the neighbourhood, and column 6 indicates if the bid is the lowest in the 
neighbourhood. The regressors in Panels A and C are the invoice fee and property valuation equivalents 
of the dependent variable, respectively. While the regressors in Panels B and D are the leader’s prediction 
of the dependent variable as well as the invoice fee and property valuation equivalents of the dependent 





Table 5. Title acquisition process. 













        
N plots 39 107 73  39 107 73 
        
Titles 
Allocated 
14 2 4  3 1 1 
        
Titles 
Collected 
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5.12 Appendix A: BDM Scripts (English) 
BDM Introduction SHEET 1 
READ: 
• We would like to share the cost of your invoice, but the price that you will pay is not yet 
fixed. It will be determined by chance in a lottery that we will play at the end of this 
survey. 
• You will not have to spend any more towards the invoice than you really want to. 
• You may even be able to buy it for less. 
• If you do not want to pay anything, state this, and you will not have to. 
 
Here is how the Lottery works: 
• I will ask you to tell me the maximum price that you would and could pay in the next 10 
days towards the invoice for your title deed. Let us call this your bid. 
• If you state your bid at ‘zero’ it means that you are not willing to pay anything. By 
placing a bid larger than ‘zero’, you declare yourself willing and able to pay that 
amount in the next 10 days. 
• Therefore, you must state a bid that you are ABLE to pay in the next 10 days. 
• We will write your bid down on a piece of paper and return to the lottery after finishing 
the survey. 
• At the Lottery table there is a cup with many different balls with different numbers on 
them. They represent discounted prices for your invoice. 
• After the survey, we will sit at the Lottery table and pick a ball from the cup. 
• If the number you pick (your draw) corresponds to a price that is greater than your bid, 
you will not be offered any discount. You will receive your allowance immediately. 
• If the number you pick (your draw) corresponds to a price that is less than or equal to 
your bid: 
o You will pay that price for your invoice in the next 10 days.  
o You will not receive your allowance until that payment has been made. 
• If you win a discount and you fail to pay within the 10 days, as agreed, you will:  
o loose the discount 
o loose the allowance 




• You can withdraw from the study at any time with no consequences for yourself. 
• You will only have one chance to play the lottery for your invoice.  
• You cannot change your bid once the lottery has occurred. 
 
Answer any questions respondent has. 
To read ONLY upon request: 
What happens if you win a discount at the Lottery: 
• You will have 7 days to collect the money. From day 8 to 10 you will go to Ubungo 
Municipality with the researchers.  
• You will pay the discounted price that was drawn at the Lottery. The discount will be 
paid, at the same time, from the research budget. 
• Thus, your invoice will be paid fully and you will receive a receipt of the full 
payment. 
• The receipt and the title deed will display only the name(s) of the plot owners. Thus, 
your title deed will be as valid as if it was purchased outside of the research project. 
2.1 Which item has the respondent been assigned to practice on? Soda Picture  
Proceed with practice round. 
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BDM SHEET 3 (Invoice for Title Deed) 
REMEMBER: Get respondent to state HIGHEST price they are WILLING AND ABLE 
to pay within 10 days. 
READ: 
- Now you will play to pay for your Invoice.  
    - Your invoice value is [state value from questionnaire], you will not be offered a price 
above this value or below zero. 
- Recall the informational meeting held by us in the last weeks. 
- Have you thought about how much you would and could pay for your invoice? 
- Will you have the funds available within no more than 10 days? 
Let’s begin: 
1) What is the maximum price that you would and could pay for your invoice? We will 
call that amount your “bid”. 
[Respondent states a price X] 
2) After finishing the questionnaire, we will proceed with the lottery. 
• If we draw a number that is equal to X or less than X, you will pay for your 
invoice at the discounted price drawn.  
• If we draw a number greater than X, you will not be offered any discount.  
• You cannot change your stated maximum price after the lottery has occurred.  
• Do you understand? 
3) Please, tell me – if we extract [X + 5,000 TSh] through the lottery, what will happen? 
[Correct Response: they will not be offered any discount to their invoice.] 
If respondent does not give the correct answer, explain the rules again and then ask 
question again > go back to 2). 
4) And if we will extract [X - 5,000 TSh] now through the lottery, what will happen? 
[Correct Response: they will pay for the invoice at [X - 5,000 TSh] in the next 10 days.] 
If respondent does not give the correct answer (both that they will purchase and at the 
correct price), explain the rules again and then ask question again > go back to 2). 
5) If we draw [X + 5,000 TSh], will you regret NOT being offered that discounted price?  
• If YES > proceed to 6. 
• If NO  > skip to 7. 
6) If yes, do you want to change your bid to [X + 5,000 TSh]? 
• If YES > Ok, your new bid is [X + 5,000 TSh].  
> Go back to 2) with [X + 5,000 TSh] as new bid. 
If NO  > proceed to 7. 
7) So, is X truly the most you would want to pay?  
• If YES > proceed to 8. 
• If NO  > go back to 1. 
8) If you draw X, you must be able to pay X within 10 days. Are you able to pay X within 
10 days?  
• If YES > proceed to 10. 
• If NO  > What is the maximum price that you would and are ABLE to pay 
within 10 days from now?  
> Go back to 1. 
9) Do you confirm that you have a plan to collect the money in 7 days in order to make the 
payment within 10 days?  
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• If YES > proceed to 10. 
• If NO  > Go back to 8. 
 
10) If the lottery draws a price X or below X we will keep your allowance on hold until 
your payment has been made at Ubungo Municipality. Do you accept to have your 
allowance on hold if you win?  
• If YES > OK, this is your final bid. We are now going to write it down and seal 
the envelope.  
• If NO > start again from 1)  
 
Record respondent’s Final Bid (Section 2, question 2.3) 
2.3 Record Respondent’s Final Bid (WTP0) TSh 
 
11) Your bid is now sealed and cannot be changed. We will proceed with the lottery after 
finishing the remainder of the questionnaire. 
 
[Surveyor, write WTPo in the envelope, make the respondent sign and seal the envelope.] 
Surveyor, do you confirm that the envelope has been sealed and the 











5.13 Appendix B: Leader Experimental Scripts (English) 
Task 1 
For this task, you are asked to think about all plot owners of Kilungule A and B and the 
maximum price that they would pay for a title deed in the next couple of months. For instance, I 
would not buy a soda if the shopkeeper charged 10,000. If the price was lowered to 1,000 or 800 
I still would not buy, but if the shopkeeper lowered the price further to 500 I would buy the 
soda. So the maximum price that I would pay for a soda is 500. 
39.1 Out of 100, how many plot owners of Kilungule A and B would take up the title 
deed in the next couple of months if the price was zero, that is, if the Government was 
giving it for free?  
Input a number X from 0 to 100  
 
39.2 So, does it mean that (100 – X) plot owners would 
NOT take up the title deed even if the Government was 
giving it for free? 
YES NO 
Note: Proceed only if the respondent responds YES to 39.2. Otherwise call Assistance. 
40.1 Out of 100, how many plot owners of Kilungule A and B would pay for the title 
deed in the next couple of months if their invoice price was:  
 Input a number X from 0 to 100 
40.1 100,000  
40.2 200,000  
40.3 300,000  
40.4 400,000  
40.5 500,000  
40.6 600,000  
40.7 700,000  
40.8 800,000  
40.9 900,000  
40.10 1 mio  
40.11 1 mio & 100,000  
40.12 1 mio & 200,000  
40.13 1 mio & 300,000  
40.14 1 mio & 400,000  
40.15 1 mio & 500,000  
40.16 1 mio & 600,000  
40.17 1 mio & 700,000  
40.18 1 mio & 800,000  
40.19 1 mio & 900,000  
40.20 2 mio  
40.21 2 mio & 100,000  
40.22 2 mio & 200,000  
40.23 2 mio & 300,000  
40.24 2 mio & 400,000  
40.25 2 mio & 500,000  
40.26 2 mio & 600,000  
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40.27 2 mio & 700,000  
40.28 2 mio & 800,000  
40.29 2 mio & 900,000  
40.30 3 mio  
Notes: Normally, as the price increases, the number of people who would purchase at that price 
decreases or stays the same. So the ODK will NOT let you proceed if the number X inserted for 
a response (e.g. 41.20) is bigger than the previous response (e.g. 41.19). If your respondent 
consistently gives higher numbers for increasing prices, call Assistance. 
!!! Stop the question when the respondent gives response: 0 “zero”!!! 
!!! The ODK will allow you to go above 3 mio, if necessary!!! 
Task 2 
For this task, you are asked to think about the selected plot owners from your shina and the 
maximum price that each plot owner would pay for a title deed in the next couple of months. 
41.1 Please rank the selected plot owners from your shina from the highest to the lowest 
willingness to pay.  At the top place, rank the plot owner who would pay the highest 
price. At the bottom place, rank the plot owner who would pay the lowest price. 
 
41.2 Please, indicate the maximum price that each plot owner would pay for a title deed 
in the next couple of months. 
  41.1 Plot ID 41.2 Max price that plot owner would pay 
for a title deed in the next couple of months 
HIGHEST PRICE   
SECOND PLACE   
THIRD PLACE   
FOURTH PLACE   
FIFTH PLACE   
SIXTH PLACE   
SEVENTH PLACE   
EIGHTH PLACE   
NINTH PLACE   
TENTH PLACE   
ELEVENTH PLACE   
TWELFTH PLACE   
THIRTEENTH PLACE   
FOURTEENTH PLACE   
LOWEST PRICE   
Note: You can write any number in intervals of 50,000 OR ‘zero’ for plot owners who would 
only take up if the title deed was for free OR ‘less than 0’ for plot owners who would NOT take 
up even if it was for free. 






SCRIPT 1: Control Group  
Congratulations, you made it to the final section of the questionnaire! Now we are going to 
assign you two final tasks. As before, your responses will be used for research purposes only.  
 
With this research, we want to understand how much leaders know about the plot owners of 
Kilungule A and B, especially those living in their washina, and how accurate is their 
knowledge. We encourage you to be as truthful and accurate as possible. In this way, you will 
allow us to produce high quality research and you will demonstrate your knowledge as a leader! 
Your answers will NOT be used to change anything we do in the course of the study.  
 
SCRIPT 2: Treatment 1 (Stakes) 
Congratulations, you made it to the final section of the questionnaire! Now we are going to 
assign you two final tasks. Differently from previous questions, your responses to this section 
will NOT be used for research purposes only. Before presenting each task, we will explain very 
clearly how we will use your responses. Please listen carefully and do not hesitate to ask any 
questions.   
 
Before Task 1 
As you know, all plot owners participating in the research will have the chance to win a 
discount on the price of the title deed through a lottery process. Our objective is to get as many 
plot owners titled as possible within our budget. 
 
With Task 1, we ask to leaders on the capacity of plot owners of Kilungule A and B to pay 
for a title deed. This information will allow us to decide how much discount we should make 
available through the lottery. 
 
So, do you understand that with your responses to Task 1 you can influence the discounts that 
plot owners can get? For example, if we find out from you and other leaders that the capacity to 
pay is very low, we will make more discount available to be won through the lottery. Proceed 
with task 1 
 
Before Task 2 
As you know, all plot owners participating in the research will have the chance to win a 
discount on the price of the title deed through a lottery process. Our objective is to get as many 
plot owners titled as possible within our budget. 
 
With Task 2, we ask to leaders what is the capacity of each of the selected plot owners from 
their shina to pay for a title deed. We will take this information into account when deciding to 
whom we should make available higher discounts through the lottery. 
 
So, do you understand that with your responses to Task 2 you can influence the discounts that 
plot owners in your shina can get? For example, if leaders of a shina suggest that a plot owner 
has a very low capacity to pay we will make it more likely that this plot owner wins a higher 




SCRIPT 3: Treatment 2 (Incentives) 
Note that you will earn points for performing well on the two tasks. At the end of the study, we 
will reward the 5 leaders with the best scores with some monetary prizes: 30,000 to the 1st place, 
20,000 to each of the next four! So, this is your opportunity to show your knowledge and win a 
prize! 
Incentive for Task 1 
As part of the research, we will interview plot owners on their capacity to pay for the title deed. 
At the end of the study, we will pick one price level and count the number of plot owners of 
Kilungule A and B who would pay at least that price. Task 1 allows us to measure how good 
you are at predicting that number. You will earn points depending on the correctness of your 
responses to Task 1. Be as truthful and accurate as you can if you want to win the prize! 
 
For simplicity, I am going to explain the rule that we will use to assign points through an 
example. 
• Suppose that I ask you: how many letters come before C in the alphabet? 
• The correct response is 2, that is, letters A and B. 
• You will earn:  
• 2 points for responding 2 (correct response) 
• 1 point for responding 1 or 3 (wrong response) 
• 0 points for responding 0 or 4 (wrong response) 
This simple example shows that the more accurate responses will earn more points.  
 
Incentive for Task 2 
As part of the research, we will interview plot owners on their capacity to pay for the title deed. 
At the end of the study, we will pick one price level and observe which plot owners from your 
shina would pay at least that price. Task 2 allows us to verify if those who have higher capacity 
to pay are the same that you rank higher in Task 2. Ranking at the highest places those plot 
owners that have the highest capacity to pay will earn you points!  Be as truthful and accurate as 
you can if you want to win the prize! 
 
For simplicity, I am going to explain the rule that we will use to assign points through an 
example. 
• Suppose that I ask you to rank four letters of the alphabet from the first to the fourth. 
• There are several possible rankings of which only one is correct. 
Option 1: CORRECT Option 2: NOT correct 
1 A 1 D 
2 B 2 B 
3 C 3 C 
4 D 4 A 
 
• To allocate points, we will pick one letter, say for example B. 
• We will cross out letter B and all letters coming before B, as in the table below. 
Option 1: CORRECT Option 2: NOT correct 
1 A   1 D   
2 B   2 B   
3 C   3 C   
4 D   4 A   
 
• We will then sum up the remaining numbers. 
Option 1: CORRECT Option 2: NOT correct 
3 + 4 = 7 1 + 3 = 4 




• As you can see, respondents who give the correct ranking (Option 1) will score 7 points, 
while respondents who give an incorrect ranking (for example, Option 2) will score 4 
points only. 
This simple example shows that the more accurate rankings will earn more points.  
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5.14 Appendix C: Research Ethics 
The project has passed review by the LSE Research Ethics Committee in October 2018 under 
the project name “Leveraging Informal Institutions to Raise Land Formalisation” [REC ref.  
000770]. The project was approved by the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH) [REC ref. 2019-135-NA-2019-37]. What follows is a note on research ethics, that 
Tanner Regan and I have circulated to the Department of Geography and Environment on the 
14th March 2019. Next, there is the Ethical Approval by the LSE Research Ethics Committee. 
 
NOTE ON RESEARCH ETHICS 
The communities of Kilungule are an ideal context for our study because the formalisation 
programme is at an advanced stage and many plot owners have already received invoices for the 
payment of their title deed. Therefore, individual plot owners are already confronting the choice 
of whether to take up or not take up the title deed.  
 
Importantly, the research does not interfere with the process of invoicing the plot owners. It is 
the Municipality that decides on the invoicing process (e.g. which residential blocks to invoice 
first). For our study, we only sample from a pool of plot owners who were already invoiced by 
our study’s start date. 
 
Furthermore, the research does not interfere with the plot owners’ chances to get their CROs. 
Whether they are selected for the study or not, all invoiced plot owners can pay for the title deed 
at their invoice price and following the normal procedure at any time - before, during and after 
the study. 
 
Instead, crucially, the research does increase the affordability of the CRO for a subsample of 
invoiced plot owners who will be offered a discount on their invoice price (which they may 
decide not to redeem).  
 
Plot owners and discount levels will be selected randomly through a lottery occurring in the 
presence of local authorities and other community representatives, which guarantees 
transparency in the process. 
 
Importantly, plot owners in the study sample will be able to: 
• Refuse to take part into the study; 
• Drop from the study during the experimental sessions. (As usual, participants will be 
able to leave the room and the study at any time and with no consequences to them. In 
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fact, on several occasions, they will be explicitly asked if they wish to continue or 
withdraw from the study); 
• Decide not to redeem the discount. 
 
In other words, the research does not force plot owners to purchase titles. Those who are 
selected for the study have a chance to participate and win a discount on their invoice price. 
This does not mean that they will have to redeem the discount and purchase the title at the 
discounted price if they do not wish to do so.  
 
Furthermore, the research does not manipulate or influence plot owners’ evaluations of the title 
deed. Survey and in-depth interview questions are designed specifically to capture both positive 
and negative views, perceptions and beliefs on tenure formalisation. Indeed, we aim to 
understand the complexity of formalisation choices, not to impose our views on the participants. 
 
Further Ethical Concerns 
Deception:  
The project makes no use of deception: plot owners participating to the experiment will have 
full information on and understanding of the processes involved (e.g. the BDM method, the 
lottery). At a public meeting, they will be informed that by participating in the study they will 
have a chance to win a discount on their invoice price. They will be explicitly informed that: a) 
a lottery will allocate discounts: thus, it is not guaranteed that they will get a discount; b) even if 
they win one, they will not have to redeem it and purchase the title deed, if they do not wish to 
do so.  
 
Because some of the survey techniques involved are complicated (e.g. the BDM method), 
participants will receive appropriate training before their actual sessions. Instructions will be 
delivered in Swahili through group and one-to-one sessions with the enumerators. With the 
group training, we ensure that all participants receive exactly the same instructions. Through 
one-to-one training, the enumerator will understand and address the specific doubts of each 
respondent. The enumerator will repeat the training until the respondent feels confident to 
proceed with the actual session. 
 
Vulnerability: 
All project participants are adults with full capacity of making individual choices concerning 
whether they wish to: a) take part in the study or withdraw; b) respond to specific questions; c) 




Importantly, each participant will receive all the relevant information to make properly 
informed choices. In order to achieve this, there will be a first introductory event several weeks 
before the experimental sessions. Subsequently, participants will be given the phone number of 
one enumerator that they may contact for further questions at any time before and after their 
experimental session (each enumerator will take care of 30 participants). 
 
Reminders of salient information will be provided through phone calls and text messages three 
weeks before and three weeks after the experimental session. 
 
Participants will be read an informed consent sheet before their experimental session and their 
in-depth interview (the latter will be conducted with a subsample only). They will be informed 
that it is their right to drop from the study at any time and, on several occasions, they will be 
explicitly asked if they intend to continue: after reading the informed consent, after explaining 
the BDM game, before starting an in-depth interview, and before the actual lottery of price 
discounts. It is our foremost priority to create a research environment where the participants are 
capable of informed individual choices. 
 
Participants are likely to be household heads (women and men); therefore, we do not foresee 
them having to confront unbearable pressure within their own household concerning their 
participation in the study. Additionally, because participants are selected with a publicly 
transparent lottery mechanism, it is unlikely that the selection process will create severe conflict 
within the community. 
 
In fact, since early November we have been working with representatives at the Municipality, 
the ward and the neighbourhood levels to ensure that the entire research process will occur in a 
fair and transparent way. To address concerns over the sampling of the study participants, it was 
agreed to operate a mechanical randomisation process during a public event in the presence of 
about 70 local leaders, including ward, neighbourhood and other community representatives. 
 
We formed a Committee of nine members to oversee the entire project, particularly the lotteries. 
Two members are part of the research team. Their role is to overview the scientific aspects of 
the project. The remaining are ward representatives and neighbourhood leaders. Their role is to 
ensure that the research does not compromise the community wellbeing. 
 
Each major event will be video taped in its key moments. Detailed minutes will be written and 
signed by the Committee members. This precaution will allow us to easily mitigate – and 




The Committee proposed that we explain the value of the research and its potential policy 
implications to the entire community, including plot owners who are not selected for the study. 
Unfortunately, organising one large public event is logistically challenging, whilst it is beyond 
our budget to conduct multiple small events. Hence, we will distribute informative leaflets to 
the non-selected plot owners.  
 
Finally, our research design minimises all sources of vulnerability and distress due to the 
participants’ relationships with their local leaders. In fact, the research design precludes local 
leaders from making decisions that could influence or limit the choices of plot owners, 
including their chances to be selected as study participants or win discounts. 
 
Financial Incentives: 
Overall the study’s participants will receive two types of monetary incentives: a small 
allowance to compensate the time commitment to the research (for all participants) and 
monetary discounts on the price of the CRO (only for the winners of the lottery who wish to 
purchase a title deed at the discounted price). 
 
Concerning the first, the LSE’s regulation on ethical research recognises that participants may 
incur substantial time – and monetary – losses as they take part in research activities. In the 
settlements where we conduct our research, plot owners may engage in occasional, formal or 
informal, remunerating activities during the weekend: thus, they will bear time and monetary 
costs for taking part in the study (each participant is expected to spend between two and three 
hours in a research session, including transport time). Accordingly, all our participants will 
receive an appropriate allowance, independently of the lottery outcome. Importantly, also 
participants who drop out during the experimental session will receive an equal allowance. 
 
Crucially, this allowance does not interfere with or compromise the research findings. On the 
contrary, by providing an allowance we incentivise also plot owners who are not interested in 
tenure formalisation – and have no interest in winning the discount – to take part in the research, 
despite of the potential time and monetary costs. 
 
Concerning the second, we are conscious that the lottery process may expose participants to 
some level of emotional distress, manifesting through anxiety, frustration and anger, of which 
we are fully respectful. However, the respondent will be able to control whether they wish to 
continue up to the lottery stage. In fact, just before the lottery takes place, participants will be 
reminded that the lottery exposes them to the chance of not gaining a monetary discount on the 
price of the CRO and they will be asked if they wish to drop out. This will occur in a private 
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and confidential conversation between the enumerator and the respondent. In this way, we hope 
to minimise the risk that those who intend to drop out feel any sense of shame or guilt towards 
the Committee and the researchers. They will not be asked to provide any justifications for their 
choice. 
 
To conclude, according to the LSE Ethics Committee standards, research that causes 
respondents some degree of psychological distress is justified when: a) researchers are 
conscious of the source of distress and put in place adequate mechanisms to minimise it; b) 
respondents have the capacity to foresee and manage the expected distress; c) respondents 
control the research environment and are capable of an informed individual choice concerning 
whether they wish to expose themselves to any potential distress caused by the research; and d) 
the potential benefits from the research (to the participants and the community) exceed the 
potential distress that the research may cause. 
 
Specifically, we are fully aware that the proposed research project exposes respondents to some 
degree of vulnerability and distress, linked to their participation in a lottery process that 
randomly allocates monetary discounts. However, to the best of our capacity, we are working to 
minimise these issues, through careful research design and implementation. 
 
In faith,  
Martina Manara and Tanner Regan 
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